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1 Introduction
Eﬃciency in Higher Education Systems is an issue of crucial importance these
days considering the strong dependence of this sector on public funds (especially
in the case of Italy where the share of public funds in 2010 was 91% of the overall
expenditure). Indeed in the context of the current economic crisis the evaluation
of eﬃciency of education provision is a primary target for governments from a
social viewpoint. Several studies in the scientific literature started in the early
1990s to explore the issue of eﬃciency in the Higher Education Sector by focusing
on diﬀerent particular aspects.
In this context, this thesis seeks to fill a significant gap in the literature on the
Italian higher education system, by looking at issues of eﬃciency and quality as
described below. The thesis consists of three essays, one of which (chapter 3) is
a joint paper with my supervisor Daniele Checchi (University of Milan).
Hence the first paper is strictly related to the estimation of the overall eﬃ-
ciency of Italian Universities during the last decade using appropriate recently
introduced (Tsionas, 2002; Greene, 2005) econometric techniques. Eﬃciency is
measured by taking into account the multidimensional nature of academic insti-
tutions which -by their nature- involved teaching, research and administrative
activities as their primary dimensions. Going deeply into the issue of academics’
eﬃciency, we should note that the main human capital stock of inputs for both
the teaching and research dimensions consists of the academic body.
Quality, competences and professionalism of professors are leading “determi-
nants” of teaching and research of our universities. Therefore the selection
mechanisms of academics and their recruitment rules gather a great importance
in this context. To this purpose we notice that a decentralization of academic se-
lection procedures was introduced in Italy in 1998 with the “Berlinguer reform”
act.
The second and the third paper of this thesis focus especially on the evaluation
of the quality of those individuals who succeeded in competitive examinations
to become associate, and full professors, and on the incentives to produce in-
ternational research associated with diﬀerent recruitment mechanisms (national
versus local).
In order to build the empirical basis for our research, we have expressly assem-
bled an ad hoc database by creating an algorithm to match journal-publications
of the web version of ISI-Web of Knowledge with the institutional database of
6
Italian scientists (provided by the Italian Ministry of University and Research
- Miur) and with the Journal Citation Index (JCI 2010). This way we set up a
database of academic careers of the entire population of Italian university pro-
fessors over the last two decades in terms of their international research products
(with measures on impact, quantity and notoriety). ISI records with associated
bibliometric indicators provide us with comparable international measures of
the research performance of the academics involved.
Starting from the 1990s, we found in the scientific literature several studies on
the research productivity of academics. Examples are Levin and Stephan (1991)
who studied the relationship between publishing productivity and age of Ph.D.
scientists using individual US data, and Noser, Manakyan and Tanner (1996)
who focused the attention on the relationship between research productivity
and the perceived teaching eﬀectiveness of economics scientists. Furthermore,
a growing literature arose with the advent of available bibliometric sources of
information that addressed the possibility of evaluating institutions, depart-
ments and individuals with objective quantitative measures. Indeed empirical
evidences showed an increase of the publishing trend in the last two decades (the
so-called “secular progress of knowledge” of J.Mincer, 1974) and a large degree
of heterogeneity in bibliometric measures across diﬀerent academic disciplines
(Angelucci, M. et al., 2010).
Over the last decade a large literature has documented pros. and cons. of
applying bibliometric indicators to evaluation exercises (Falagas et al., 2008;
Bakkalbasi et al., 2006). The role of the impact factor (Seglen, P.O., 1997),
ownerships of the bibliometric sources (private companies and open source ser-
vices), diﬀerences in disciplinary coverages (Klavan and Boyak, 2007), correla-
tions between bibliometric measures of diﬀerent sources (Archambault et al.,
2009) and the use of citations statistics (Adler et al., 2009) are some of the
most debated topics in this field. In what follows, considering that bibliometric
indicators are -at this moment- the only available, objective, standard accepted
measures of international research outcomes of Italian academics over the last
twenty years, we focussed on the eﬀects on these international research out-
comes of decentralizing the recruitment of professors from the national to the
university level.
To date -at my knowledge- no studies in the scientific literature deal with the
eﬀects of the 1998 reform (which decentralized by law academic recruitment
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selections) on the scientists’ research productivity in Italy, except for Labartino
et al. (2009) where the main goals were both to test the presence of misbe-
haviors such as familism and nepotism in the Italian academia (evidenced by
the diﬀerences in the distributions of surnames with respect to the provincial
population) and the possible relations of these phenomena with diﬀerent levels
of civic capital.
All the three chapters are written as single working papers to be read indi-
vidually by the readers. Therefore it is possible to note a certain degree of
overlapping that was clearly unavoidable. In the remaining part of this intro-
duction I briefly introduce the topic of each paper, the econometric techniques
used, and I summarize the main findings of each essay.
The Italian University System: A Technical Eﬃciency Analysis
In the first paper we estimates the eﬃciency scores of Italian universities over
a panel of four years from 2005 to 2008. The proposed approach considers a
multiple-input and multiple-output production function (Baumol et al., 1982)
where teaching, management and research are considered as diﬀerent dimensions
of the same productive technical process.
The production function we used has a trans-logarithmic functional form to
take into account the multidimensionality of the higher education system (mul-
tiple are the ‘missions’ of an Italian University: knowledge transfer, research
eﬀort, social mission. . . ). From an econometric viewpoint, a recent version of
the stochastic frontiers model with random coeﬃcients (Tsionas, 2002; Greene,
2005) allows to simultaneously consider the heterogeneity of academic institu-
tions and the institutional inter-temporal dynamic. The proposed model incor-
porates at the same level the trans-logarithmic input-output distance function
and some background control variables. An institution-specific variable to dis-
entangle the eﬀect of subject-mix composition of universities on their research
outputs, a regional-specific covariate and other institutional variables are in-
troduced in order to control for background and territorial diﬀerences between
institutions.
Usually eﬃciency studies in higher education are estimated through indirect
measures of research outputs (research amount of funds/grants) due to the lack
of more appropriate data. A novelty with respect to the current literature is
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indeed the dataset we used: particularly interesting is the availability of direct
measures of research outputs (taking into account both quality and quantity
dimensions of the research eﬀort) at the institutional level.
Our dataset is assembled with oﬃcial data published by the Italian Ministry
of Education and Research (MIUR) and direct measures of research outputs
thanks to the web version of ISI Web Of Knowledge and its Journal Citations
Report. This study is one of the first panel studies on eﬃciency scores in the
Italian case. Some methodological implications such as the bias of estimates due
to grade inflation in quality measures of both teaching inputs and outputs are
widely discussed in the paper. Grade inflation is persistent in Italy and both
empirical evidences (Modica, 2008; Bagues, et al., 2008; Bratti et al. 2010)
and its theoretical framework (Tampieri, A, 2012) are provided by the recent
literature. We show that eﬃciency scores are strongly biased by the inclusion
of teaching input measures weighted by grades (as inclusive of quality) instead
of quantity only.
The empirical results of this study suggest that the levels of inputs do not vary so
much across institutions with diﬀerent eﬃciency but what varies is their outputs
composition. The most eﬃcient institutions tend to be the largest producers of
both graduates and postgraduates but not absolutely the largest producers by
quantity and quality of research products.
Selecting University Professors in Italy: much ‘ado’ about nothing1
The second and third papers are both focussed on the relationship between the
recruitment mechanisms of academic professors and their research productivity
(Allesina, S., 2011; Checchi, D., 1999). Particularly in the second chapter we
considered whether the introduction of local selection procedures after the 1998
reform influences the research quality of selected academics (measured by ISI
Web of Knowledge records). We tested the presence (or not) of a negative eﬀect
of local selections on the productivity of Italian professors at the time of their
selection (both for associates and full professorships).
As a first result focussing our analysis on the quality level (measured by bib-
liometric indicators of quantity and impact of publications) of the promoted
individuals relative to the corresponding losers, we found no clear picture of
a general worsening, as previously noticed by the literature (Labartino at al.
1Joint with Daniele Checchi
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2011).
The major finding of this study is that no average eﬀect is associated with the
decentralizing reform over all the disciplinary areas. Nevertheless, when the
world is restricted to ‘bibliometrics disciplines’ only a negative -even if poor-
significant eﬀect arises. This is due to the large heterogeneity of data across
disciplines: strong negative eﬀects of local selections in the case of few sciences
(Chemistry, Biology, Physics and Industrial Engineering) are combined with
null eﬀects over the remaining disciplines. This is verified with some diﬀerences
in discplines both for associate and full professorships. However, what is clearly
evident is the increase invariability in the quality of selected professors due to
the reform impact.
Hence we asked whether this increase in the quality variability of promoted
professors might be the result of increased polarisation in the criteria adopted
by the selecting committees. Results are again contrasting: candidates with a
higher scientific productivity are less likely to be selected by a department with
a higher (on average) productivity, but this eﬀect is attenuated after the reform.
This implies that one of the reform’s eﬀects is an increase in the polarization
of department/candidates behaviours. An opposite eﬀect is associated with the
reform when considering measures of research impact and notoriety of selected
candidates.
Decentralized Academic Selection Mechanisms: Opportunity or Parochial-
ism?
The third chapter deals with the econometric measure of individual research in-
centives associated with diﬀerent recruitment mechanisms in Italy. We focused
primarily on the diﬀerences between individual research patterns (both in terms
of quantity and impact) before and after the 1998 decentralizing reform for sci-
entists recruited as both associates and full professors in a "quasi-experimental"
research framework. The underlying idea is to identify two groups of compa-
rable scientists (with balanced levels of productivity, same discipline and same
position at time of selection) who were selected one before and the other after
the introduction of the 1998 reform.
Methodologically we applied two diﬀerent strategies: a standard propensity
score matching approach and a recently proposed non-parametric matching al-
gorithm called Coarsened Exact Matching-CEM (Iacus, S., 2009).
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The first methodology is used as benchmark and it is based on observational
studies literature where propensity score can be used in diﬀerent manners: in-
cluded as an adjustment covariate or used in a quintile regression framework or
finally it can also be the matching factor in indentifying treated and controls
groups on which apply treatment models (Kleinman and Horton, 2009; Hedeker
and Gibbons 1997). On the other hand, as our alternative empirical strategy
we use CEM as matching algorithm. It allows to obtain balanced groups of
treated (selected after the reform) and controls (before the reform) with respect
to the available research productivity outcomes at the time of selection. The
main advantage of this strategy relies on its non-parametric nature. The multi-
dimensionality of the original data is preserved (while propensity score reduces
it to an one-dimension score) and the balance of the two groups when tested
performs really well. Balancing is set at the first stage and then the number of
matching units is a consequence.
Results suggest that the story is diﬀerent for each discipline, and that they can-
not be generalized for the entire Italian academia. However, negative eﬀects on
impact research outcomes and slopes are identified with both strategies for peo-
ple selected after decentralization, proving that lower incentives for publishing
in international top-level journals are associated with the local selections in the
case of both associate and full professors.
By diﬀerentiating the model by research areas, it is shown that negative incen-
tives are associated with disciplines such as Math, Earth sciences, Medicine,
Veterinary and Agricultural Sciences. The identified eﬀects are robust on dif-
ferent checks.
Results are consistent with previous findings also in this case. Stated diﬀerently,
there is evidence that, on average, scientists become less productive after the
local reform in terms of the impact of their research and in some cases in terms
of the quantity of their research production.
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2 The Italian University System: A Technical Ef-
ficiency Analysis
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to estimate eﬃciency scores of Italian universities
using a recent evolution of the stochastic frontiers approach. We intro-
duce a recently random coeﬃcients version of the model (Tsionas, 2002;
Greene, 2005), which takes into account the heterogeneity of the academic
institutions and the inter-temporal dynamic. The production function is a
multiple-input and multiple-output function (Baumol et al., 1982) where
teaching and research are both considered as diﬀerent dimensions of the
same productive technical process.
A trans-log stochastic frontier production function model is estimated over
a four-years period (2005- 2008) using an integrated data-set composed by
oﬃcial data published by the Italian Ministry of Education and Research
(MIUR) and direct measures of research outputs. This study is one of the
first panel studies on eﬃciency scores in the Italian case and it allows to
measure the eﬃciency using direct measures of research outputs (taking
into account both quality and quantity dimensions): the ISI – Thomson
dataset of Philadelphia. One of the most common drawbacks in literature
is that the estimation of the eﬃciency scores is fitted through indirect
measures of research outputs because of the lack of available informations
(amount of money collected from the public/private sector, number of
research projects accepted/financed by the National Ministry of Education
and Research etc. . . ). Unfortunately the examination of the eﬀects of
quantity-quality measures of teaching inputs and outputs on eﬃciencies
suggests the presence of a persistent grade-inflation in the Italian system.
Grade inflation mainly aﬀects south and middle regions Universities.
JEL Classification: I23 C01 C33 D24 Keywords: stochastic frontiers, technical
eﬃciency, ISI Web of Knowledge
2.1 Introduction
The higher education sector in countries is commonly sustained by public fund-
ing. For instance, the amount of private sector expenditure for educational
institutions in 2007 was 8,9% in Italy, 10,8% in the EU area and 17,4% in the
OECD countries (Education at a Glance 2010). This shows the dependence of
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the Higher Education Institutions (HEIs) on public sector, especially in the case
of Italy.
In this context, accountability has a specific and crucial importance, and mea-
surements of the eﬃciency of education provision are a primary concern for each
government from a social point of view. The aim of this paper is to measure the
eﬃciency of Higher Education Decision Making Units (DMUs) by estimating ef-
ficiency scores, which can be used as a support in the political decision-making
process. The recent financial crisis has determined a situation of austerity in
terms of public spending, so that publicly funded sectors are facing with tight
budgets. The University Reform Law recently approved (14th January, 2011)
as an attempt to address some of the structural problems of the Italian system
and one of its declared aims is the introduction of a “meritocratic system” were
all the academic institutions are evaluated and financed with respect to their
management capability and eﬃciency levels (D.L. 240/2010, Tit. I, art.1, co.
4). It has also been suggested that there is scope for absorbing part of the
public fundings cuts by increased in the eﬃciency of the institutions (Mandel-
son, 2009). The research eﬀort of this work would be finalized to find out some
robust results that could be used by policy-makers.
Eﬃciency evaluation has been a topic of particular interest in economic liter-
ature over the last fifty years, which has been applied to diﬀerent economic
fields; for example, health (Thanassoulis, Boussfofiane and Dyson, 1995) and
banking sectors (Golany and Storbeck, 1999). Despite this, the higher educa-
tion sector (HES) is understudied, probably because of its non-profit nature and
makes it diﬃcult to study the eﬃciency. The view of universities as producers
of graduates has been overhauled with the pioneering paper of Baumol, Pan-
zar and Willing (1982). After that the HES was characterized by the presence
of a multi-input and multi-output structure recognizing the multi-dimensional
nature; it produces multiple outputs (e.g. research, graduates, patents, papers)
from multiple inputs (e.g. students, research eﬀort, fees, funds and grants. . . )
with a process that can be modelled by a specific production function.
The international literature reports various studies about technical eﬃciency of
educational systems (at all levels: high-schools or universities) in some diﬀerent
countries (USA and UK above all), but -according to my knowledge- only few
studies in the Italian case (in both the two sub-sectors). The cornerstones of
the eﬃciency studies in HES are papers of Athanassopoulos and Shale (1997)
and J. Johnes application of the data envelopment analysis (DEA) at higher ed-
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ucation performances (Izadi, Johnes, Oskrochi, Crouchley, 2002; Johnes, 2006).
Other pioneering researches are related to the measure of departmental eﬃciency
(Gimenez, J.L. Martinez, 2006), the student’s study eﬃciency -considering their
optimal time-allocation- (Dolton, Marcenaro, Navarro, 2003) and the aggregate
eﬃciency of HEIs from an individual student’s perspective, where each student
is supposed to be a DMUs himself (Thanassoulis, 2001; Waldo, 2009).
Only a couple of papers are related to the measurement of technical eﬃciency
(only using a cost function approach) through Stochastic Frontier Analysis
(SFA) related to Italian universities (Agasisti, Johnes, 2010); a few others used
Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) instead of SFA approach (Agasisti, Johnes,
2009) again with a cost related perspective. The aim of the present paper is to
measure the technical eﬃciency of the Italian HES by applying a recent method-
ological extension of the SFA (with random parameters) to a multi-input/multi
output distance production function. The panel data-set is relative to all the
Italian Universities between academic years 2005/2006 and 2008/2009 and it
is used to estimate a stochastic frontier trans-log model where parameters are
allowed to vary across institutions and over time. This random version of SFA
approach is introduced in the work of Tsionas (2002) and Greene (2005) and
is useful for separating technical eﬃciency from technological diﬀerences across
universities. Usually in stochastic frontier framework this restrictive assump-
tion is supposed: all universities must share exactly the same technological pro-
duction function; it’s a sort of “homogeneity assumption” in their accounting
behaviour.
Nevertheless it is well known that each academic institution’s production func-
tion may have a diﬀerent functional form due to the diﬀerent features of the
institution itself. Therefore, we have to consider universities as a complex sys-
tem in which diﬀerentiation is the key concept to understanding the global
phenomena. The higher education sector in Italy is considered too often as a
monolithic and homogeneous framework where universities are considered equal,
with same management system, same level of teaching quality and sometimes
same quality of research outputs. On the contrary each university has diﬀerent
excellences in teaching and research areas, diﬀerent type of students and are
settled in a diﬀerent regional labour-market context. For these reasons, in our
paper, we relax this hypothesis and we try to consider as well as possible the
heterogeneity that it’s own of the HES’ nature.
Only recently few empirical studies of the HEIs sector have used frontier meth-
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ods, instead of DEA (the most commonly used tools), to estimate models that
provide measures of institutional eﬃciency (Johnes, 1997 and 2010; Agasisti,
Johnes, 2010; Stevens, 2005). These studies are mostly focused on the UK
Higher Education System.
An unusual aspect of the work is represented by the direct measure of research
output we used. In literature a lot of diﬀerent measures of research outputs
have been used, but they are often not properly “direct”. The amount of grants
or funds received by a department (Agasisti and Johnes, 2008) or the number
of research project financed by the government (Athanassopoulos and Shale,
1997) are examples of these “indirect” measures of the quality of a university’s
research. Properly grants could represent an input of the research process, and
should not be used as a measure of the research output (Johnes and Johnes,
1993). In order to solve this problem, our paper uses the ISI – Thomson data-set
for measuring the number of high-level research publications and papers that
are produced by each Italian University in each of the selected years, while we
use research grants (numbers of research projects funded) for measuring the
research input associated.
Then our basic research question is: which methodology can best be employed to
measure eﬃciency in HEIs taking into account both the multidimesnionality and
heterogeneity of the input-output HE structure? Does it allow for institutional
variability? In order to answer this research questiosn an analysis combining a
translog distance function with multiple inputs and outputs with a RPM SFA
is proposed. This is new to the literature and is particularly relevant because
of the quality of data available for the study. Direct measures of quality and
quantity of research output are available for the Italian system and this work
tends to be the first attempt in the estimation of a complex -but more realistic-
model of technical eﬃciency. As a result of the theoretically suggested inclusion
of quality weights into teaching inputs and outputs we register strong bias due
to grade-inflation. Italian institutional marks can not be considered as realistic
metrics of students’ quality.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents some brief infor-
mation about the structure and the growing attention on evaluation processes
in the Italian university system. The third section provides a wide explanation
of the integrated data set used for the analysis and of the diﬀerent sources that
composed it. The fourth section presents in details, the random parameters
stochastic frontier model with its advantages and drawbacks. Results are pre-
sented in section five with a plausible explanation of their meaning. Section
six discuss grade-inflation issue and it’s eﬀect on eﬃciency rankings we found.
Conclusions regarding eﬃciency of the Italian Universities are drawn in the last
section.
2.2 The Italian University System
The Italian HE system is characterized by a strong central government given by
the State since the beginning of its modern life (Casati Act, 1859). During the
XX century the central education authority administrates the system in both
financial issues and teaching aspects.
The autonomy of the universities, introduced by the Constituent law (1948 ),
and the Legal Value of the degree title (introduced in 1973 ) were substantially
undervalued since the end of 80’s. The Italian system does not provide a binary
division between vocational and academic institutions, typical of most of the
European and USA countries, but it is composed by universities with same
aims and structure that only diﬀer in their sizes and locations (more details on
the administrative evolution of Italian Higher Education System in Marra, A.,
2009).
The most common feature of HES in developed countries is an heterogeneous
systems composed by a double quality levels of education (academic and voca-
tional), as in the case of the United Kingdom, Germany (Universitaeten and
Fachhochschule) or France (Universities and Grandes Ecoles). Starting from
the beginning of the 90’s the financial issue of academic institutions increases
in freedom of managing the financial funding (Financial law, 1993 ), which it
started to be totally under their own responsibility. Actually the central author-
ity has fixed only a few restrictions (e.g. 90% maximum proportion of staﬀ’s
income expenditure and 20% maximum amount of tuition fees with respect to
Ordinary Financial Fund - FFO) that have to be observed. On the other hand,
the economic dependence -in terms of funds- of the system from the central
regulatory authority (Ministry of Education, University and Research - MIUR)
remains valid.
Afterwards the European uniformity eﬀort started with Bologna Process (1998)
has driven the Italian system to a period of reform of the educational system.
Bologna Process consisted of 46 volunteering countries that met with the aim
to create a European Higher Education Area (EHEA). “As the main objective
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of the Bologna Process since its inception in 1999, the EHEA was meant to
ensure more comparable, compatible and coherent systems of higher education
in Europe”. One of the major Italian eﬀects due to this European Process was
the reduction in time to completion.
According to the OECD report the Italian survival rate in 1998 was 35% with
a drop-out rate equal to 65%, and a graduation rate of 9% with respect to the
enrolled students. Finally also more than 80% of the system’s economy was
provided by the public sector. In response to these problems, a reform process
started (University reform act, 1999 ) and the structure of the system was trans-
formed from a unique course of four years to a two level educational system with
the standard bachelor/master organization. Finally, PhD degrees represent the
last educational step and would be more devoted to people that have an incli-
nation towards joining academia, while their labour market value remains quite
close to the master’s (in some sense it should be also considerd lower thinking
about the three years age diﬀerence of PhD students with respect to standard
graduates). Hence in the last years the eﬀort was both to coordinate the na-
tional system with the EHEA and to shorten the time to qualification. Then
additional reform acts were not introduced till the last three years when a sub-
stantial reform process started with the advent of Berlusconi’s last government
(2008- November 2011).
The institution of an independent National Agency for the Evaluation of the
University System and Research, (ANVUR) in 2006 (instead of the National
Committee for the Evaluation of the University System – CNVSU), the intro-
duction of an increasing share (starting from 7% in 2009) of the FFO divided
between the university institutions according to a central evaluation exercise
(Law n° 1, 2009 ) and the last Reform Act (14th January, 2011 ), which es-
tablishes, as a basic principle, a meritocratic criteria related to the eﬃcacy and
eﬃciency of the institutions in future evaluation gains. The guiding principles of
this reform fix in quality, openness, eﬃcacy, and eﬃciency the seeds/keywords
of the future reorganization of the system.
All of these are signs of the probable new policy direction of Italian universities.
We suppose that this changing process will be in the interest of the academic
system in the upcoming years and the role of eﬃciency evaluation methods will
be preeminent in the future setting. Actually the debate between experts and
decision-makers about the choice of the specific evaluation criteria is a great issue
in Italy, but indeed it lies outside our contingent purposes. The final aspect of
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Italian system that we need to consider at this stage is that it is composed of 103
academic institutions grouped into 26 private universities, 61 public universities,
ten distance universities and six high-quality education institutes.
The aims, purposes and juridical regime for all institutions are the same, what
diﬀers are nature and methods of their financing systems. Indeed the shares of
funds collected from the private sector and the public sector are diﬀerent be-
tween public and private academic institutions. Private funding mostly finances
the budget of private universities. A minor share of their total budget is due to
the public education system in a sort of private bargaining mechanism between
each institution and MIUR. On the other hand the higher education institutes
are autonomous institutions that provide especially higher quality and research
related academic degrees (usually postgraduate and post-doctoral).
Finally, we note that the recent reforming process will depend on the concrete
eﬀort of the academic actors deputed to the reorganisation strategy. However,
considering the international trend the evaluation exercise will have, starting in
the short term and maybe realizing in the long run, an increasing importance
in the national academic debate and in future government policies.
2.3 Data
The data is collected for inputs and outputs of universities in Italy for four
academic years between 2005/2006 and 2008/2009 form the basis of our anal-
ysis. The integrated data-set is created combining information’s from diﬀerent
sources.
Primary source is represented by MIUR that shares a wide variety of data on its
public website. The university’s information consists of the number of students
enrolled, number of graduated students (both undergraduate and postgraduate
togheter), total number of teaching staﬀ and total number of academic staﬀ per
year in both private and public universities. Also, data on student facilities and
accommodation services are provided (DSU).
Second we collect data on research outputs on ISI – Thomson web version
dataset. This dataset is a collection of all the research products (papers, working
papers, letters, books, conference proceedings) published in the last 40 years by
more than 8.700 scientific journals. All these journals are published in English
and have an anonymous referee evaluation system for each paper. Anonymity
of the refereeing process usually implies stringent selection criteria of scientific
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quality, reserving the pages available (that are always very limited in the most
important and prestigious journals) to the best of the scientific works submitted
for publication. We know that this dataset is aﬀected by some shortcomings.
The most common critics of ISI citation database notes that it covers mainly
North American, Western European (Italy), and English-language papers, it is
limited to citations from 10.000 journals and provides diﬀerent coverage between
research fields. We are conscious of these potential problems and of the fact that
this database probably is not the most representative for Italian Universityies
because it could be biased mainly by diﬀerences in research fields that are own
of each academic institution in the country. By the way it is the best available,
international, quality-certified (using a worldwide standard quality measure:
the 2010 Journal Citation Reports® -JCR-) source of published products and
it consists of more than 250.000 papers, books, and conference proceedings
referring to our 59 referring Universities in 2005/06-2008/09 academic years
(more than 60.000 research products by year). Distance Universities, most of the
small and recent private universities and three of the standard ones (L’Aquila,
Arcavacata di Rende and Vercelli and) are excluded by the study due to data
avilability. Measures of ISI products and teaching and research inputs and
outputs were not available for them.
Figure 1 shows quantity (P) and quality (C and C/P) of ISI products by coun-
try in the eightees, what is important to note here is that Italy was the forth
country for quantity of published works and the nineth for quality of scientific
production (C/P). So ISI database could be considered an appropriate, stan-
dard and accepted source for scientific production information since 30 years and
Italian Scientific Output is well-represented by this source (except for subject
mix bias).
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Figure 1: Overall scientific production in EU countries, 1981-1990
2.
The integrated data set obtained yields information about all (business adminis-
tration, teaching and research) inputs and outputs we consider in our production
function.
Input includes both the absolute value of enrolled students and the number of
enrolled students weighted by a measure of their skill-level at the end of the high-
school (to capture both the quantity and quality of graduate teaching input).
These two input measures will be used alternatively in the production function
and joined with the graduate quantity-quality measure will show us the rising
of a grade-inflation eﬀect. Also measures of total number of post-graduates stu-
dents enrolled (PhD_ENR) is included as a measure of post-graduate teaching
and research input. The values reported for students and staﬀ are not based
on the standard convention of Full Time Equivalents (FTE) but they are the
absolute values of these data. Unlikely Italian data do not allow a distinction be-
tween full-time and part-time students, so the FTE information is unavailable.
Same information’s are unavailable for teaching, research and administrative
staﬀ. The number of teaching and research staﬀ are considered according to
their academic position (Lecturers, Associate professors, Full professors) as a
measure of research and teaching inputs. These measures reflects the structure
of the academic staﬀ without taking into account the permanent or temporary
2Breno, E., et al., (2002) “Scientific Research in Italian Univesities: an initial analysis of the citations in the
ISI data bank”, CRUI
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status of their positions. We decided to consider all the individuals that take
part into education and research process in the academy in the considered year.
All of them contribute to realize the final process.
Other measures of research eﬀort are taken by the ISI dataset, as the total
number of citations by university and the total number of papers published on
ISI journals and are considered as proper outputs. A measure of the quality of
these papers is also included. It represents the number of paper published by
each university weighted by the quality of the journal on which it is published .
Journal quality is given by the value of its 2005-2010 impact factor (2010 Jour-
nal Citation Reports®). In a nutshell we can summarize the Impact Factor
meaning as a measure of the average number of citations expected by an arti-
cle published in a certain journal (according to the definition of impact factor
value). Outputs also include number of graduates weighted by their degree
classification to capture both quantity and quality dimensions of teaching out-
put. Finally Ph.D number of graduates (PhD) are included as output of the
post-graduate teaching eﬀort.
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the selected inputs and outputs. To-
tal teaching staﬀ (TEACH) is considered as an aggregate measure of all the
academic positions. On average the academic population is composed by 960
professors, relatively higher is the number of lecturer (376) while Associate and
Full positions are -on average- composed by 287 and 294 units. Standard devi-
ation is very high because of great volatility between diﬀerent universities. A
similar number of staﬀ (841) represents the average of non-academic workers.
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Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Cases Missing
Inputs
TEACH 960,4 883,4 32 4736,0 236 0
FULL. PROF. 294,29 273,8 8 1.473 236 0
ASS. PROF. 287,9 253,4 6 1.370 236 0
LECTURER 375,9 356,5 7 2.025 236 0
STAFF 841,8 822,8 0 4.841 236 0
PhD. ENR. 199,56 197,7 0 1.293 236 0
PROJ.FIN. 14,0 16,3 0 104 236 0
DSU 3.006,04 2.745,9 0 16.823 236 0
TOTQ 123.723 106.416 2540 541.690 236 0
ENROLLED 4812.31 4342.29 35 24.310 236 0
Outputs
GRADQUAL.TOT 95.358 81.421 1435 438.200 236 0
GRADUATES 4414.39 3953.97 60 20648 236 0
RESEARCH 2.883,67 3495,2 0.603 16.509,5 236 0
TOT. PAPERS 711,5 788,55 0 4.108,0 236 0
PhD 163,7 188,8 0 1.851 236 0
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
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Figure 2: yearly level of Outputs and Inputs; *1% level of the original variable
Total number of enrolled students weighted by the initial skill level, absolute
value of enrolled students (4.812), number of research project financed by the
national research programme (14) and number of student’s services provided by
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the universities (3.006) complete the whole set of inputs considered. Finally we
consider the weighted number of enrolled students of five-academic years earlier
as the input related to the current year graduates weighted output. Five years
in Italy is the legal time for graduation and we suppose that it is the best proxy.
In the outputs box we can find the quantity-quality measure of teaching eﬀort
(Gradqual) and the only quantity measure (4.414), number of PhD students
that obtained their degree and the direct measures of research weighted by the
impact factor value (2.833).
Total n° of Paper by University
Year Min Max Mean Std.Dev
2005 1 3.692 639.7 799,8
2006 1 3.931 689.5 849,9
2007 1 4.294 783.8 946,9
2008 4 4.414 817.2 965,5
Paper’s citations (avg) by University
Year Min Max Mean Std.Dev
2005 1 18,18 10.53 4,46
2006 1 32,56 9.01 4,80
2007 1 26,00 6.90 3,33
2008 1 9,22 4.75 1,89
Total sum of citations by University
Year Min Max Mean Std.Dev
2005 1 45.772 7.562,1 10.186.6
2006 1 38.352 6.684,8 8903.1
2007 1 34.178 5.705,1 7587.1
2008 5 25.060 4.350,4 5807.9
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of ISI informations
The measure of ISI research eﬀort is available from 2001 to 2010 and it is com-
posed by 450.845 papers written by at least one of the authors who is belonging
to an Italian University. Then the ISI output is aggregated by university taking
into account the average number of papers, the average number of citations and
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the total sum of citations by university and by year (Table 2), while the qual-
ity dimension of the research output is given by the impact factor value of the
journals where papers were published. The impact factor measure is available
online, thanks to ISI - Journal Citation Reports database, as the average impact
factor of the journals over a five years period: 2005-2010. This quality measure
is by definition fixed during the time span for the 10.477 journals considered
in our analysis (2.731 journals in social sciences and 7.746 in science fields).
Table 3 shows the average value of the impact factor and the average number of
citations of the overall papers over period 2005-2008 [Table 3 and Figures 3(a)
and (b)].
Year N° Universities avg if 2005/2010 avg tot_quot
2005 59 3.40 10,53
2006 59 3.41 9,01
2007 59 3.24 6,90
2008 59 3.30 4,75
Table 3: average impact factor 2005/2010 by year
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Figure 3: average impact factor and average number of citations by year (a); absolute value of the impact factor
by year (b), 2005-2008.
The year by year measure is determined over 257.079 papers published in the
period 2005-2008, a share of 77,4% of the ISI papers have been reconducted
to their impact factor value (Figure 4). The average number of citations is
influenced by time, therefore there is an expected positive relationship between
time since publication (spread of knowledge amongst researchers) and number
of citations for each paper. Hence the negative slope of the average number of
citations is not a surprise and considering it as a measure of research quality
could be misleading (Figure 3, a).
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Figure 4: shares of ISI papers with impact factor (2005-2008)
Therefore we decide to use as our research quality measure the year-by-year
quantity/quality score given by the weighted average of the number of paper
and the 2005/2010 impact factor value of their publishing journals. Figure 5
shows the dynamics over time of research output versus the total number of
papers by year. It seems that the quantity-quality measure of research eﬀort is
increasing in the time span.
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Figure 5: research output and total number of papers by year.
2.4 Methodology
Stochastic frontier models have become popular tools in productivity analysis.
One of the interesting advantages of these specific models is the ability to ac-
count simultaneously the production relationship between inputs and outputs
and the determinants of the ineﬃciency of institutions. Production function
models can be estimated using both parametric and non-parametric methods.
Both of these strategies are well-known in eﬃciency literature. It is reassuring
that comparative studies of eﬃciency scores with both parametric and non-
parametric tools show that these measures are highly correlated (correlation
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close to 0.70) (Ferrier and Lovell, 1990; Coelli and Perelman, 1999; Whiteman,
1999, Fecher et al., 1993). The most common non-parametric method is Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA). DEA is a linear programming method which ex-
amines the relationship between inputs to a production process (resources used
in an institution) and the outputs of that process. It assumes that there is a fron-
tier technology that can be described by a piece-wise linear hull that envelopes
the observed outcomes. It is useful because it does not required a definition of
the production function functional form for the technology, by the way serious
drawbacks consist on the exclusion of stochastic error terms (that implies no
measurement error or random fluctuations), strong sensitivity to outliers and
obviously (by definition) no estimates of the production function parameters.
All these shortcomings make the diﬀerence in our choice towards parametric
methods.
Stochastic Frontier Analysis is an econometric technique which uses regression
analysis to estimate a production function, with the diﬀerence being that the
eﬃciency of an institution is measured using the residuals of the estimated equa-
tion where the error term is divided into a stochastic error term and a systematic
ineﬃciency term. Stochastic frontier models date back to the cornerstone papers
of Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977) and Meesen and van den Broek (1977).
They proposed a production function with a two-part composite error term in
a cross-sectional setting as follows
yi = α+ β
￿xi + ei (1)
Where ei = vi−ui and vi is a symmetric random error to account for statistical
noise that arises from the inadvertent omission of relevant variables from the
vector xi, as well as from measurement errors and approximation errors associ-
ated with the choice of the functional form. Withal ui is a one-sided random
variable representing ‘technical ineﬃciency’ (Farrell, 1957), that is defined as
the distance of the specific observation from the production estimated frontier
(Figure 6). This could -by theory- follow any non-normal distribution, so that
it can be separated out from the other residual term. A common assumption in
literature is that it follows a truncated half-normal distribution. And we agree
with this assumption in our article. The random error term (vi) can be positive
or negative and so the stochastic frontier outputs vary about the deterministic
part of the model.
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Figure 6: deviation from the production frontier obtained with SFA in a cross-section analysis
3
In a standard set-up maximum likelihood methods are used to estimate regressor
coeﬃcients. Hence the most-common measure of technical eﬃciency is the ratio
of the observed output to the corresponding stochastic frontier output
TEi =
qi
e(x
￿
iβ+vi)
=
e(x
￿
iβ+vi−ui)
e(x
￿
iβ+vi)
= e(−ui) (2)
This measure of technical eﬃciency takes a value between zero and one. It
represents the output of the i− th institution relative to the output that could
be produced by a fully-eﬃcient firm using the same input vector. This notion of
technical eﬃciency shows the ability of a firm, institution, country or university
to obtain maximal level of output from a given set of inputs. It’s measured
by the output of the firm relative to that which it could attain if it was 100%
eﬃcient, or in other words if it lays on the frontier itself. Clearly the first step
in predicting the technical eﬃciency, TEi, is to estimate the parameters of the
stochastic production function model. The production functions express a single
dependent variable (single or aggregate ouptut measure) as a function of one or
more explanatory variables (usually inputs).
There are various ways in which the relationship between inputs and outputs of
higher education institutions can be explored. There could be two types of ap-
proach, an output oriented strategy where we assume that the instution aim is
to maximize output from a given level of inputs and an input-oriented perspec-
tive where universities assume to minimize inputs from a fixed level of outputs.
In studies where comporative analysis are estimated between these two choices
results shown that the eﬃciency scores are strongly correlated (Coelli and Perel-
man, 1999). In the case of higher education we consider an output-oriented per-
spective as the more realistic strategy where universities try to maximize their
3Source: Japanese Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs and Communications, Vol. 20, 2009
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outputs (quantity or quantity-quality of graduates, number and quality of pa-
pers produced) from their own given level of inputs (academic staﬀ, amount of
public funds and/or grants, quantity or quantity-quality of enrolled students,...).
In this framework the eﬃcinecy of an institution can be assesessed by study-
ing outputs produced in relation to either the cost incurred or the inputs used.
The former (cost) approach is the most common tool of analysis applied by re-
searchers according to the literature (Cohn et al., 1989; Johnes, 1996; Hashimoto
and Cohn, 1997; Glass et al., 1998; Izadi et al., 2002; Cohn and Cooper, 2004;
Stevens, 2005; Worthington and Higgs, 2008; Johnes and Johnes, 2006). The
question below this former approach is: by how much can cost be reduced with-
out changing the output quantities produced by the institution? Therefore the
cost functions can not be used to estimate the characteristics of multiple-output
production technologies in cases where we have no price information (Perelman,
Santìn, 2005) and/or it is inappropriate to assume firms minimise costs or max-
imise revenues (e.g. when industry is outside regulated). The HEIs sector lays
exactly in this case, where institutions are settled in a non-profit sector where
the problem is not to maximize revenues or minimize costs but to obtain some
diﬀerent and selected outputs starting from their level of inputs. So the study of
the production of outputs referring to the inputs is the best strategy in the HE
case. This approach is more complicated and there is only one paper, according
to my knowledge, about the production relationship in the UK university sector
(Johnes, 2010), and no studies, to date, on the Italian HE sector.
In a multiple-output/multiple-input context the simple alternative is to estimate
the relationship of an aggregate output measure and the multiple inputs. But
of course the aggregate composite output measure has to be defined by the
researcher itself, estimating (that means arbitrarily deciding) some weights to
assign over each output dimension. Consequently an estimation bias could aﬀect
this approach beacause of the incorrect (even if unintentionally) definition of the
weights.
The distance function strategy oﬀers an alternative which is not beset by any of
these problems. Distance functions allow for both multiple inputs and multiple
outputs (Coelli and Perelman, 2000; Rodriguez-Alvarez et al, 2004; Tonini,
2004), does not assume any particular optimizing behaviour on the part of the
institutions, does not require a knowledge of prices of either inputs or outputs
(Coelli and Perelman, 1999; Coelli, 2000; O’Donnel and Coelli, 2003; Uri, 2003)
and does not require prices to be exogenous (Banos-Pino et al, 2002). All of
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these points make the distance function approach particularly attractive in the
context of higher education (Johnes, 2010).
2.4.1 Estimating a university production function
In this paper we propose a parametric stochastic distance function at instituion
level in order to go beyond in the eﬃciency analysis of higher education sectors.
For this purpose our function could be represented by the following
Dit = f (Rit, Tit,Mit) (3)
Where f represents the best technology used in transforming institutional in-
puts in outputs, Dit is the distance that separates each university (i) from the
technological boundary at time t, Rit, Tit, and Mit represent Research, Teach-
ing and Managerial dimensions (measured through their inputs and outputs) of
each educational institution (i) at time t. This function is settled naturally in
a parametric stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) framework.
The SFA distance function
First of all we have to define a vector of inputs x = (x1, ..., xk) ∈ Rk+ and a
vector of outputs y = (y1, ..., yz) ∈ Rz+ , so that the multi-input/multi-output
production technology can be defined as the output distance function (Shep-
hard, 1970): Dit (x, y) = inf (θ : θ > 0, (x, y/θ) ∈ P (x)) where P (x) is defined
as the output possibility set that can be produced using the input vector x. If
D (x, y) ≤ 1 then the institution possibility set (xit, yit) belongs to the produc-
tion possibility set P (x), otherwise if Dit (x, y) = 1 it means that y is located
on the outer boundary of the output possibility set.
In order to estimate in our context the defined distance function in a parametric
framework a trans-log functional form is proposed. Coelli and Perelman (1999)
demonstrate that this trans-log specification fulfills a set of desirable charac-
teristics: it’s flexible, easy to derive and allows the imposition of homogeneity
of degreee one with little trouble. The trans-log has also been use to estimate
distance functions in many diﬀerent context: telecommunications (Whiteman,
1999; Uri, 2003); railways (Coelli and Perelman, 1999; Banos et Pino, 2002;
Atkinson et al. 2003; O’Donnel and Coelli, 2005); electric utilities (Whiteman,
1999; Atkinson and Primont, 2002; Atkinson et al., 2003); water industry (Saal
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and Parker, 2006); and agriculture (Paul et al, 2000; 2002; Karagiannis et al.,
2004; Tonini, 2004; Paul and Nehring, 2005; Balcombe et al., 2007). Translog
distance function is defined for the HEIs using inputs xk (k = 1, ...,K) to pro-
duce outputs yz (z = 1, ..., Z):
lnDit (x, y) = α0 +
￿Z
z=1 αklnyzit +
1
2
￿Z
z=1
￿Z
h=1 αzhlnyzitlnyhit +
￿K
k=1 βklnxkit +
1
2
￿K
k=1
￿K
j=1 βkjlnxkitlnxjit +
￿K
k=1
￿Z
z=1 γkjlnxkitlnyzit
where i denotes the i− th university at time t. In order to obtain the
production frontier surface we set Dit (x, y) = 1 which means that
lnDit (x, y) = 0. According to most of the literature a trans-log distance
function allows the possibility of applying linear regression techniques -thanks
to its logarithmic form- and the satisfaction of most of the subsequent criteria
(Coelli, Rao, Battese, 1999): they have to be linear in inputs and outputs,
non-decreasing, linearly homogeneous and concave in outputs. Trans-log
distance functions have the characteristic of being a satisfactory functional
form for the first two assumptions and to the third one applying simple
constraints to obtain the homogeneity of degree + 1 in outputs. According
with Lovell et al. (1994), to normalize the output distance function by one of
the outputs is equivalent to imposing homogeneity of degree + 1.
Homogeneity of degree +1 in outputs conditions:
Z￿
z=1
αz = 1
Z￿
h=1
αkh = 0, z = 1, 2, ..., Z
Z￿
k=1
γkh = 0,k = 1, 2, ...,K
Symmetry conditions:
αkh = αhk, k, h = 1, 2, ..., Z
βkj = βjk, k, j = 1, 2, ...,K
By the homogeneity conditionD(x, ρy) = ρD(x, y) which means that the output
can be chosen arbitrarily, for axample the Z-th output, such that ρ = 1/yZ and
rearranging the function this way we could obtain the following equation:
−ln(yZit) = TL(xit,yit/yZit,α, β, γ) − lnDit(x, y) (4)
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where −lnDit(x,y) corresponds to the radial distance function from the bound-
ary. According to Battese and Coelli (1988) specification we obtain the distance
function version of SFA setting uit = −lnDit(x, y) and adding up a term vit cap-
turing the noise
−ln(yZit) = TL(xit, yit/yZit,α,β, γ) + ￿it, ￿it = vit + uit (5)
where uit = −lnDit(x, y) represents the distance to the boundary set, and is
a negative random term assumed to be independently distributed as trunca-
tions at zero of the N(0,σ2u) distribution, and the vit term is assumed to be
a two-sided random (stochastic) disturbance designated to account for statis-
tical noise and distributed iidN(0,σ2u). The truncated-normal distribution of
the u-term allows us to relax the hypothesis that the mean of the underlying
ineﬃciency variable is zero (as in the normal-half normal case), and this seems
to be the most realistic assumption. Hence vit and uit are independent of each
other, independently and identically distributed such that vit ∼ N(0,σ2v) and
uit ∼ N+(0,σ2u) and N+represents a truncated-normal distribution truncated
at 0. Thus −uit = −lnDit(x, y). The decision about the method of estimation
depends on which is the assumption we make on the technical ineﬃciency com-
ponent uit which contains components related both to institutions and time.
The simplest assumption is the one that allows ineﬃciency to vary by institu-
ions and not by time (time-invariant; uit = ui). In this simple case ui can be
treated as a fixed parameter (Coelli et al., 2005). A second alternative is to
assume a time-varying decay model for the ineﬃciency term (as proposed by
Battese and Coelli, 1995). This way uit = {exp[−η(t− Ti)]}ui where Tiis the
last period in the i-th panel, η is a decay parameter to be estimated by the
model and ui is the base-level of ineﬃciency which is the ineﬃciency in the last
period observed for unit i. Ineﬃciency decreases towards the final period level
(over time) if η > 0 and vice-versa an estimated value of η < 0 means that
ineﬃciency increases towards the final period. To our knowledge a more appro-
priate estimation strategy of the ineﬃciency term with respect to the previous
ones is the random parameters approach (Greene, 2005; Tsionas, 2002). This
approach allows the production function to vary more generally across institu-
tions to account unmeasured heterogeneity as well as firm ineﬃciency within
our statistical framework. The potential surplus regarding this approach is il-
lustrated by Johnes (Johnes et al. 2008 and Johnes and Johnes, 2009) with
a comparison study of two cost-functions over HEIs in England. A standard
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stochastic frontier production function and a random parameters version of the
same cost-eﬃciency model are estimated using the same data-set over UK Uni-
versities and they found that mean eﬃiciency is increased of 7% (from 69% to
75%) allowing one of the outputs parameter to vary by Institutions.
Random parameters technology
In the present paper we estimate the model on a panel data set of four years,
so (1) needs to be modified as follows
yit = α+ β
￿xit + vit − uit (6)
so that yit is the performance of institution i in period t (output), xit is the
vector of inputs and outputs, the βi are modelled as random parameters and
we assume that these follow a normal distribution. According to our trans-log
distance function approach eq. (6) becomes the following (defining β∗ = (α,β, γ)
in the previous notation)
−ln(yZit) = TL(xit, yit/yZit,β∗) + vit − uit (7)
Greene (2005), extending the works of Tsionas (2001), Kumbhakar (1990) and
Battese and Coelli (1995) proposed this (6) random parameter version of (3)
allowing the variance of the ineﬃciency term over time. For long time series
data, time invariance is a too strong assumption in stochastic frontier models
(Pitt and Lee, 1981). A general form of the random parameters stochastic
frontier model may be written as
(1) Stochastic frontier:
yit = αi + β￿ixit + vit − uit,
that in our study is −ln(yZit) = TL(xit, yit/yZit,β∗) + vit − uit
vit ∼ N [0,σ2v ], vit ⊥ uit
(2) Ineﬃciency distribution:
uit = |Uit|, Uit ∼ N [µi,σ2ui],
µi = µ￿izi,
σui = σuexp(θ￿ihi).
(3) Parameter Heterogeneity:
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(αi,βi) = (α¯, β¯) +￿α,βqi + Γα,βwα,βi ,
µi = µ¯+￿µqi + Γµwµi
θi = θ¯ +￿θqi + Γθwθi
Each subvector of the full parameter vector (αi,βi), µi or θi is allowed to vary
randomly with means vector (α¯, β¯) +￿α,βqi and likewise for the others, where
￿j is a standard matrix of parameters to be estimated and qi is a set of related
variables which enters the distribution of the random parameters.
The wji (where j = (α,β), µ, θ) vector contains the parametrization of the
random variation and it is assumed to have mean vector zero and known diagonal
covariance matrix Σj . The random vectors wji is usually assumed to be normally
distributed (and so Σj = I).
Therefore the log-density for the random parameters version for stochastic fron-
tier model is logLit = logf(Θi|xit, zi, hi, qi, wi) where Θi contains all the pa-
rameters of the model, e.g., for (αi,βi), this is (α¯, β¯,￿α,β ,Γα,β) and likewise
for µi and θi. Then assuming that conditioned on the firm specific random
parameters vector wi the observations are independent, the conditional log-
likelihood for the sample is logL|w1, ..., wN =
N￿
i=1
T￿
t=1
logf(Θi|xit, zi, hi, qi, wi).
And in order to estimate the model parameters it is necessary to integrate
the heterogeneity out of the log-likelihood. The unconditional log-likelihood
is logL =
N￿
i=1
´
wi
T￿
t=1
logf(Θi|xit, zi, hi, qi, wi)g(wi)dwi where g(wi) is the multi-
variate density of the random vector wi.
However there is no closed form for density of the compound disturbance in this
model, so integration can be done only by quadrature (for small models with
less than two random parameters) or by simulation (MSL-Maximum Simulated
Likelihood).
Estimation of the random parameters model is extremely time-consuming and
the simulation algorithms can achieve a reasonable approximation to the true
likelihood function for a large number of random draws. So the process of
maximization can be done using ’intelligent’ draws, such as Halton sequences
(Bhat, 1999; Train, 2002), that can reduce the number of required draws by a
factor of five or ten. To our porpouses we fitted the model using 1000 Halton
draws, which is roughly equivalent to random simulations of several thousands
of draws.
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Accounting for Background variables
Question of how to model environmental (or background) variables in stochastic
frontier analysis is seldom discussed in economic literature. Previous studies ap-
plied a two-step approach using these regressors as determinants of eﬃciency in
a second stage regression of the predicted eﬃciency scores on university-specific
factors. Others include them into the frontier itself. But the question in this
case is: do these factors aﬀect production directly or indirectly? (Stevens,P.A.,
M., Vecchi, 2005). In the first case the environmental factors enter the produc-
tion frontier function, while in the latter case they aﬀected indirectly through
the eﬀects on the eﬃciency. The big problem of the direct approach is due
to the theoretical hypothesis that are implied: in the first frontier step the
eﬃciency scores are assumed to be independently and identically distributed
while in the second regression step we assume that they are a function of some
university-specific factors, implying that they cannot be identically distributed
(Kumbhakar, Gosh and McGulkin, 1991). A popular method that overcomes
this problem is the one proposed by Battese and Coelli (1995), which consists
in estimating both frontier and eﬃciency terms in a unique stage. Battese and
Coelli extended the works of Reifschneider and Stevenson (1991) and Huang and
Liu (1994) to the panel framework. For these reasons exogenous variables could
be considered as background or environmental variables in that each university
has little control over them, in the eﬃciency literature they are named as ‘non-
discretionary’ variables (Worthington, 1999; Stevens and Vecchi, 2002). These
factors aﬀect the attractiveness of the academies on high school students, they
give a diﬀerent market power to each institution because of their subject-mix
and others similar factors.
According to these reasons we introduce out from the trans-log distance function
some additional variables to represent trend over time and diﬀerences between
groups of universities. We fit our model incuding two dummy variables (state vs
private and polytechnic vs others), a variable measuring the rate of non-regular
students per institution (’perc’) and a variable capturing subject-mix.
This subject-mix variable consists on the proportion of students enrolled in
science and technical courses as a proxy of departmental composition of the
university.
In order to attain a rigorous assessment of HEIs, we are conscious of the need
to take into account diﬀerences in the subject-mix composition of institutions
regarding the possible impact that these diﬀerences may have in explaining dif-
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ferent performances. Since disciplines vary in terms of research productivity and
research outputs, these diﬀerences need to be considered when we are measur-
ing quantitative performances of universities, otherwise we may draw spurious
conclusions regarding the relative performances of Italian academic institutions
(Sarrico and Dyson, 2004). Probably the better solution to this problem in our
particular context would be represented by a less aggregate eﬃciency analysis
which measures eﬃciency at departmental or faculties level (Sarrico, Teixeira et
al., 2009). But serious drawbacks on this solution consist in data availability,
inputs and outputs measures at this lower level are unavailable for the Italian
system. The purpose of the author is to insert a variable that has the role of mea-
sure the ISI exposure of each University. The higher it is this variable greater
is the exposure in terms of subject-mix composition of the specific academic
insititution towards disciplines devoted to ISI in terms of research outputs.
2.5 Model estimation
In order to investigate ineﬃciency of Italian HEIs, we employ a multidimensional
production functions specifically without any direct influence of costs but only
related to teaching, managerial and research eﬀorts (a DEA approach of the
same type is given by J. Johnes, 2006), whose basic set-up, according to our
pourposes, is a trans-log function as specified earlier (7).
We considered diﬀerent measures of output according to the three diﬀerent
dimensions of the HEIs: teaching eﬀort, research eﬀort, organizational issues.
Usually research inputs are considered in literature as proxies of research out-
puts, justified with the idea that “research grants are in general awarded to
meritorious groups of researchers on the basis of the quality and quantity of
their previous work” (Johnes, 1997, pag. 728). However some studies identified
the correlation between research funding and quality research outputs (as the
average score across all the departments in UK using the 1996 RAE data) in
0.65, and in 0.7 the correlation between faculty publications and grant support
(based on data from National Academy of Sciences).
The estimation accuracy using these inputs instead of outputs is roughly low
with respect to a direct measure of the quantity and quality of publications
that has to be unavoidably better. For these reasons in this paper we use
informations from the ISI-Thomson database. Research output measures of
this source consist in the total number of papers published by each academic
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instititution in Italy weighted by the average impact factor (2005-2010) of the
journal where they were published.
From the teaching point of view previous studies have rarely taken into account
both the quality of the students enrolling and the quality of the final graduates.
Few examples are Koshal and Koshal (1999), who used the average Student
Aptitude Test Scores of input students, or Johnes and Johnes (2009). A failure
to account for input and output quality would provide an imprecise measure of
university teaching input and output. So it is clear that a correctly-specified
model is important when making policy recommendations. We believe that the
proportion of first and upper second class degrees represents a relatively con-
sistent measure of Italian degree quality, and certainly the best that is readily
available to our knowledge. Therefore as a first attempt the teaching outputs
considered in this paper are the numbers of graduates (accounted for their qual-
ity through degree classification measures) and the number of postgraduate
students. Stevens (2005) and Koshal and Koshal (1999) have found that the
eﬀect of the omission of output quality measures on the eﬃciency scores has
ambiguous eﬀects (in some case positive and in other negative). But for sure
the omission of a measure of output quality implicitly assumes that all the HEIs
are producing graduates of the same level of quality. And this is a really strong
and roughly unbelievable assumption. We will see that the inclusion of quality
dimension of teaching inputs and outputs in the Italian case has a misleading
negative eﬀect on eﬃciency score because of the grade-inflation eﬀect. So both
models with quantity-quality and only quantity measures will be fitted.
Disaggregation by subject areas (arts, sciences, humanities, engineering, ...)
of the quantity (and quality) measures of graduates output (and input) were
available in our information sources, but this choice has a multiplicative eﬀect on
the trans-log regressors number that consists on an unacceptable loss of degrees
of freedom for our case. For this reason our production models in HE, as in the
most common eﬃiciency literature, tend to be estimated (few exceptions to this
rule are Johnes, 1997; Izadi et al., 2002; Stevens, 2005) using aggregate outputs
(Athanassopulos and Shale, 1997; Johnes, 2008; Avkiran, 2001).
While the output measures for the research eﬀort are the total number of pa-
per published by each university weighted by their impact factor values (RE-
SEARCH), the number of graduates (GRADUATED) and alternatively it’s
quantity-quality measure (GRADQUAL) and the number of students that ob-
tained a PhD (PhD).
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According to our first specification of the model the inputs variables are given
by measures of research inputs, teaching inputs, management and services in-
puts. The total number of enrolled students (ENROLLED), also accounted
for their quality using information of high school degree-levels (TOTQ), total
number of post-graduate enrolled students (PhD_ENR), number of research
project financed by the Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research
as a research input measure (PROJ.FIN), total number of student’s services
and facilities (DSU), number of management workers (STAFF) and number of
teaching staﬀ (TEACH) are included.
2.6 Empirical Results
As usual in trans-log function estimations all the original inputs and outputs
are size corrected and mean-corrected prior to estimation (Cuesta and Orea,
2002; Cuesta and Zofìo, 2005). That means, each output and input variable is
corrected by the size (given by the total number of enrolled students) and has
also been divided by its geometric mean. In this way, the first-order coeﬃcient
can be interpreted as distance elasticities evaluated at the sample means.
In addition homogeneity of degree +1 is imposed by selecting one of the outputs,
research in our study, as the dependent variable and the ratio of the other
outputs with respect to it as explanatories in the trans-log function. First
of all a simple random eﬀects model of the first trans-log multi-input/multi-
output production function was performed in order to underline that the output
dependent composite measure has an eﬀective strong relationship with our input
regressors. The random eﬀects results are reported in the table below, what we
want to stress the skewness of the residuals, that is negative (-0.0809). A positive
skewness is usually considered problematic in stochastic frontier studies because
it cannot be reconciled with a one-sided distribution of ineﬃciencies that is
positively skewed. Waldman (1982) proved that when Random Eﬀects residuals
are skewed to the left, then the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) for the
frontier model is unique and we have no trouble in the estimation procedure of
the frontier itself. Otherwise a “positive skew implies that target institutions are
‘super eﬃcient’ rather than ineﬃcient” (Green and Mayes, 1991, p. 528).
In table 4 we propose in addition to the non-frontier model the results of three
stochastic frontier models, a pooled time invariant model, a time varying decay
model (Battese and Coelli) and finally a fuller random parameters specification
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of the trans-log stochastic frontier production function with coeﬃcients of in-
puts and outputs that are allowed to vary across institutions. In all cases the
random parameters are assumed to follow a normal distribution. The model
is solved by a simulated maximum likelihood technique using a specific econo-
metric software (Limdep). We implement an Halton sequence of quasi-random
draws to generate enough simulations that allow us to aproximate the real un-
conditional log-likelihood function and maximize the unclosed integral of this
function (Tsionas, 2002; Greene, 2005). In fact it is not possible to solve the log-
likelihood function with simpler techniques due to the existence of the unclosed
integral.
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RE TI SFA TVD SFA (BC) RPM SFA*
Variable Param Coeﬀ P-value Coeﬀ P-value Coeﬀ P-value Coeﬀ P-value
Constant 0,0868 0,4470 0,2101 0,0849 0,2187 0,0313 -0,4061 0,0000
Grad α1 0,2970 0,0000 0,3208 0,0000 0,2975 0,0000 0,2137 0,0000
PhD α2 -0,2145 0,0000 -0,2305 0,0000 -0,2114 0,0000 -0,1403 0,0000
Research α3 0,9175 0,9097 0,9131 0,9266
Grad*Grad α11 -0,1813 0,0003 -0,1648 0,0000 -0,1725 0,0001 -0,0254 0,0002
PhD*PhD α22 -0,1851 0,0000 -0,1822 0,0000 -0,1825 0,0000 -0,0184 0,0018
Research*Research α33 0,325 0,2998 0,3106 0,025
Grad*PhD α12 0,3457 0,0001 0,3234 0,0000 0,3328 0,0000 0,0344 0,0054
Grad*Research α13 -0,1644 -0,1586 -0,1603 -0,009
PhD*Research α23 -0,1606 -0,1412 -0,1503 -0,016
Teach β1 0,1721 0,0947 0,2027 0,0387 0,2097 0,0222 0,6678 0,0000
Staﬀ β2 0,0666 0,1706 0,0808 0,1143 0,0752 0,0832 -0,0498 0,0000
Enrolled β3 0,3455 0,0001 0,2743 0,0004 0,2943 0,0000 0,14521 0,0000
Prog.fin β4 0,0546 0,0583 0,0597 0,0605 0,0574 0,0271 -0,04178 0,0000
PhD Enr β5 0,1708 0,0001 0,1658 0,0006 0,1597 0,0000 0,0774 0,0000
Dsu β6 0,0110 0,6156 0,0245 0,2421 0,0132 0,5039 -0,0195 0,0000
Teach*Teach β11 -0,1445 0,6549 -0,1147 0,7233 -0,1460 0,6177 0,0277 0,5706
Staﬀ*Staﬀ β22 0,0190 0,5466 0,0157 0,6861 0,0141 0,6170 -0,0206 0,0000
Enrolled*Enrolled β33 -0,2646 0,3541 -0,1487 0,6463 -0,1968 0,4394 0,2332 0,0000
Prog.fin*Prog.fin β44 -0,0823 0,0595 -0,0974 0,0615 -0,0874 0,0260 0,0087 0,2331
PhD Enr*PhD Enr β55 0,0356 0,0009 0,0351 0,0041 0,0336 0,0004 0,0156 0,0000
Dsu*Dsu β66 0,0007 0,8573 0,0047 0,2581 0,0008 0,8101 -0,0053 0,0000
Teach*Staﬀ β12 -0,3391 0,1752 -0,2758 0,2793 -0,2671 0,2247 -0,0328 0,4730
Teach*Enrolled β13 0,1165 0,7732 0,0546 0,9032 0,2220 0,5374 0,1078 0,2644
Teach*Prog.fin β14 -0,0242 0,8976 -0,0357 0,8423 -0,0382 0,8200 0,1010 0,0018
Teach*PhD Enr β15 0,1695 0,2244 0,1712 0,3305 0,1839 0,1468 -0,0772 0,0000
Teach*Dsu β16 0,0282 0,6351 -0,0030 0,9676 0,0349 0,5161 0,0240 0,0203
Staﬀ*Enrolled β23 0,6238 0,0047 0,6226 0,0051 0,5958 0,0023 0,1263 0,0006
Staﬀ*Prog.fin β24 0,3008 0,0004 0,3066 0,0001 0,3015 0,0001 -0,0391 0,0054
Staﬀ*PhD Enr β25 0,0592 0,4315 0,0604 0,5642 0,0524 0,4357 0,1281 0,0000
Staﬀ*Dsu β26 -0,0943 0,1310 -0,1230 0,0334 -0,1175 0,0332 0,0325 0,0001
Enrolled*Prog.fin β34 -0,2156 0,2102 -0,2716 0,1082 -0,2545 0,0955 -0,1744 0,0000
Enrolled*PhD Enr β35 0,3690 0,0631 0,3842 0,0907 0,3603 0,0427 0,2343 0,0000
Enrolled*Dsu β36 -0,0408 0,4201 0,0107 0,8881 -0,0441 0,3402 0,0232 0,0033
Prog.fin*PhD Enr β45 -0,0063 0,8943 -0,0027 0,9609 -0,0065 0,8788 0,0032 0,7501
Prog.fin*Dsu β46 -0,0036 0,8584 -0,0054 0,8812 -0,0039 0,8337 -0,0126 0,0034
PhD Enr*Dsu β56 -0,0135 0,4098 -0,0055 0,8957 -0,0110 0,4501 -0,0171 0,0000
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RE TI SFA TVD SFA (BC) RPM SFA*
Variable Param Coeﬀ P-value Coeﬀ P-value Coeﬀ P-value Coeﬀ P-value
Teach*Grad δ11 -0,4926 0,0221 -0,4342 0,0084 -0,4758 0,0140 -0,0627 0,0279
Teach*PhD δ12 0,4382 0,0297 0,3939 0,0099 0,4246 0,0191 0,0403 0,1443
Teach*Research δ13 0,054 0,0403 0,0512 0,0224
Staﬀ*Grad δ21 0,0078 0,9324 0,0311 0,6930 0,0316 0,7000 0,0053 0,7266
Staﬀ*PhD δ22 -0,0007 0,9936 -0,0214 0,7870 -0,0135 0,8640 -0,0379 0,0059
Staﬀ*Research δ23 -0,0071 -0,0097 -0,0181 0,0326
Enrolled*Grad δ31 0,2064 0,3040 0,2319 0,2741 0,2480 0,1700 0,2945 0,0000
Enrolled*PhD δ32 -0,1094 0,5985 -0,1419 0,5342 -0,1469 0,4345 -0,3015 0,0000
Enrolled*Research δ33 -0,097 -0,09 -0,1011 0,007
Prog.fin*Grad δ41 0,0239 0,7378 0,0229 0,7409 0,0233 0,7153 0,0909 0,0000
Prog.fin*PhD δ42 -0,0237 0,7238 -0,0271 0,7220 -0,0267 0,6584 -0,0696 0,0000
Prog.fin*Research δ43 -0,0002 0,0042 0,0034 -0,0213
PhD Enr*Grad δ51 0,0680 0,2088 0,0633 0,2416 0,0657 0,1785 0,0149 0,1165
PhD Enr*PhD δ52 -0,0130 0,7656 -0,0101 0,8116 -0,0123 0,7544 0,0160 0,1171
PhD Enr*Research δ53 -0,055 -0,0532 -0,0534 -0,0309
Dsu*Grad δ61 -0,0421 0,0623 -0,0550 0,0377 -0,0427 0,0323 0,0027 0,6309
Dsu*PhD δ62 0,0353 0,1210 0,0461 0,0915 0,0371 0,0659 0,0097 0,0781
Dsu*Research δ63 0,0068 0,0089 0,0056 -0,0124
Time τ 0,0021 0,3549 0,0020 0,0285 0,0021 0,0179 0,0058 0,0000
Health 0,0318 0,0591 0,0284 0,3185 0,0157 0,5980 -0,0517 0,0000
SciTech 0,0557 0,0031 ,151301D-06 0,9996 ,149153D-06 0,9980 0,0277 0,0011
Perc -0,6107 0,2205 -0,6469 0,002 -0,6975 0,0001 -0,2868 0,0000
Type of University 0,1049 0,0267 0,0625 0,4243 0,0700 0,3572 0,4963 0,0000
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Random Parameters SD of (**) RPM SFA*
Constant 0,1811 0,0000
Grad 0,0176 0,0000
PhD 0,0406 0,0000
Teach 0,1140 0,0000
Staﬀ 0,0029 0,1749
Enrolled 0,0943 0,0000
Prog.fin 0,0580 0,0000
PhD Enr 0,4426*E-04 0,9479
Dsu 0,0019 0,0000
RE TI SFA TVD SFA (BC) RPM SFA*
Param Coeﬀ P-value Coeﬀ P-value Coeﬀ P-value Coeﬀ P-value
Sigma σ2 0.779 0.000 0.2171 0.001 0.1600 0.000
σ2u 0.5956 0.000 0.0443 0,000 0.00411 0,000
σ2v 0.0113 0,000 0.0028 0,000 0.00001 0,003
η 0,0508 0,0809
Log-Likelihood 152.86 248.15 291.308
N 236 236 236 236
N° of groups 59 59 59
Technical Eﬃciency 0.9189 0.893 0.9378
R-square 0.99
Skewness (residuals) -0.0809
Kurtosis (residuals) 3.1183
Table 4 - Parameter estimates of OLS and translog output distance functions (Time Invariant Random Eﬀects,
Time Varying Decay model and Random Parameters); Estimated parameters without p-values are calculated using
the homogeneity conditions (see paragraph 0.01); * Coeﬃcients reported for inputs and outputs is the mean; **
estimates of SD of random parameters normal distributions.
The estimated parameters of the models are presented in table 4. The time
invariant Battese and Coelli specification of the model shows contraddictory
results. Most of the coeﬃcients are non significant, the Eta parameter of time
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varying ineﬃciency is positive, which should mean that the level of ineﬃciency
is decreasing towards the final period level (considered the base level) and so
over time. But the significance of technical progress in time variant model is
neglected using the test of H0 : η = 0 which means no certain evidence of
progress in techinical eﬃciency over time.
Kernel density estimators are used in this case to compare the eﬃciency esti-
mates from the pooled time invariant model to the Battese and Coelli model.
Results are surprising, and not encouraging. The estimates of ui from time vary-
ing Battese and Coelli model are far larger than those from the pooled model,
which ignores the panel element of the data set (Figure 7, graph on the right).
Usually an important benefit of Battese and Coelli time varying model is that
when data are very consistent with the model, it produces quite satisfactory
results. But, a serious drawback is that, when this is the wrong model, extreme
results can emerge (Greene, 2004). In our case there is a poor fit to this model,
and results demonstrate this. Probably this is due to the assumption of time
invariance in ui that severely distorce the estimated model and it’s ineﬃciency
estimates.
However the presence of technical ineﬃciency in the time invariant model is
assessed using the test H0 : σ2u = 0 against the one-sided alternative, reject-
ing H0. So ineﬃciency is significant. Mean eﬃciency over the whole period is
around 93% and varies from around 61,9% in the worst-performing university
to 99% at the top university (on the basis of the random parameters sfa results;
TI model suggests a minimum of 60% and a maximum score of 100%). We
will explore later on the characteristics of the best-and worst-performing insti-
tutions. In the context of previuos results about mean eﬃciency in the Italian
university system the only study, to my own knowledge, is Agasisti and Johnes
(2010) paper on cost eﬃciency analysis over the period 2001-2003. Mean eﬃ-
ciency estimated by them was 81%. It is diﬃcult to make comparisons between
this study and the Agasisti-Johnes cost-eﬃciency analysis because of diﬀerences
in the methodological approach (cost with respect to production perspective)
and sample data (our data refers to 2005-2008 years and does not include any
expenditure-related variable). Also eﬃciency rankings obtained are really dif-
ferent in the two studies. Referring to previous studies in other countries we can
note that the range for production eﬃciency in English Universities is from 85%
to 95% (Johnes, 2008; Flegg et al. 2004; Flegg and Allen, 2007) but it should,
however, be borne in mind that eﬃciencies in each country study are defined
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in relation to the country-specific frontier, so it is hard to make comparisons
between our estimation and other non-italian studies.
Patterns of eﬃciency over time are indicated by the coeﬃcient of the time vari-
able (T). Evaluated at the mean of inputs and outputs, technology has increased,
in fact the frontier has shifting outwards by 0.2% to 0.58% (by year). Figure
7 plots also the distributions of the estimates of ineﬃciencies from the random
parameters model (graph on the left) and the simple stochastic random eﬀects
frontier time invariant model (middle figure). The figures suggest that Ran-
dom Parameters formulation is moving some of the variation of the production
distance function out of the ineﬃciency term and into the production model,
in the form of parameter estimates variation. It also appears that the random
specification is moving the ineﬃciency to the left and reducing the variation.
Which means that both mean and standard deviation are generally smaller than
for the simpler, homogeneous parameters model. These results are statistically
significant (p-values are lower than 0.05) and imply the existence of a positive
technology change in Italian higher education system over the considered pe-
riod. In general our random parameters results are plausible and suggest that
this approach to frontier estimation can be extremely instructive in identifying
inter-institutional diﬀerences in eﬃciency.
will explore later on the characteristics of the best-and worst-performing insti-
tutions. In the context of previuos results about mean eﬃciency in the Italian
university system the only study, to my own knowledge, is Agasisti and Johnes
(2010) paper on cost eﬃciency analysis over the period 2001-2003. Mean eﬃ-
ciency estimated by them was 81%. It is diﬃcult to make comparisons between
this study and the Agasisti-Johnes cost-eﬃciency analysis because of diﬀerences
in the methodological approach (cost with respect to production perspective)
and sample data (our data refers to 2005-2008 years and does not include any
expenditure-related variable). Also eﬃciency rankings obtained are really dif-
ferent in the two studies. Referring to previous studies in other countries we can
note that the range f r pro uction eﬃc ency in English Universities is from 85%
to 95% (Johnes, 2008; Flegg et al. 2004; Flegg and Allen, 2007) but it should,
however, be borne in mind that eﬃciencies in each country study are defined
in relation to the country-specific frontier, so it is hard to make comparisons
between our estimation and other non-italian studies.
Patterns of eﬃciency over time are ind cated by th coeﬃ nt of the time vari-
able (T). Evaluated at the mean of inputs and outputs, technology has increased,
in fact the frontier has shifting outwards by 0.2% to 0.58% (by year). Figure
7 plots also the distributions of the estimates of ineﬃciencies from the random
parameters model (graph on the left) and the simple stochastic random eﬀects
frontier time nvariant model (middle figu e). The figures sugges that Ran-
dom Para eters formulation is moving some of the variation of the production
distance function out of the ineﬃciency term and into the production model,
in the form of parameter estimates variation. It also appears that the random
specification is moving the ineﬃciency to the left and reducing the variation.
Which means that b th mean and standard deviation are generally smaller than
for the simpler, homogeneous parameters model. These results are statistically
significant (p-values are lower than 0.05) and imply the existence of a positive
technology change in Italian higher education system over the considered pe-
riod. In general our random parameters results are plausible and suggest that
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inter-institutional diﬀerences in e ciency.
Figure 7 - Kernel density estimator for Random Parameters, Time Invariant and Battese andCoelli models
Ineﬃciencies.
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Figure 7 - Kernel density estimator for Random Parameters, Time Invariant and Battese andCoelli models
Ine ciencies.
2.6.1 Eﬃciency scores
It’s useful to see the characteristics of high and low-performing HEIs (Figure
8 a) and b)). Those HEIs in the highest eﬃciency quartile have the largest
number, on average, of graduates-by size and PhD obtained by size (teaching
and teaching/research outputs) while the level of research is on higher than the
average, but slighty lower than the institutions of the third quartile. Inputs are
distributed between the four quartiles without any specific rule, the enrolled
45
student input his higher in the 2nd and 4th quartile, but quite close to the
1st and 3rd; teaching and staﬀ inputs are substantially costant across quartiles,
while PhD are increasing with the eﬃciency level (from the first to the fourth
quartile). Finally student services measure has a u-shaped distribution across
quartiles, with higher levels in first and fourth ones woth respect to second and
third.
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Figure 8 a) and b) - average Inputs and Outputs (size corrected) measures by eﬃciency quartile
As discussed in previous paragraphs we expect that the heterogeneity of italian
universities means diﬀerences in eﬃciency levels by size and tipe of institution.
A comparison of the values in Table 5 for size (small and medium/large univer-
sities), state versus private institutions and polytechnic versus the others shows
that size and technical propension matter, while the type of institutional form
does not. A test of the null hypothesis that means are the same for all groups
are rejected in two of the three cases. Diﬀerence in eﬃciency means for in-
dependent groups of institutions indicate that there is a statistically significant
diﬀerence between mean eﬃciency of medium/large universities (0.947) vs small
universities (0.924) and for state against private academies (0.9355 vs 0.9350).
polytechnic diﬀerence is not statistically significant.
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Freq avg_Eﬀ st.dev Test of Variances Pr>F Test of Means Pr>|t|
Medium/Large Universities 28 0.947 0.0439 Folded-F <.0001 Satterthwaite 0.0013
Small-Universities 31 0.924 0.0640
State Universities 53 0.9355 0.0516 Folded-F <.0001 Satterthwaite 0.9805
Private Universities 6 0.9350 0.0905
Polytechnic Universities 4 0.9335 0.0567 Folded-F 0.1356 Pooled 0.0267
Other Universities 55 0.9705 0.0038
Table 5 - Average Eﬃciency by size, nature and type of Institution
Table six presents eﬃciency scores of the random paramenter stochastic frontier
distance function model for each insitution. It’s evident the flexible nature of
the scores that can vary across institutions and over time allowing for both time
and institutional heterogeneity.
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University 2005 2006 2007 2008
Ancona - Università Politecnica delle Marche 0,958787 0,972596 0,925032 0,959907
Bari - Politecnico 0,956432 0,958692 0,894511 0,895688
Bari - Università degli studi 0,961725 0,970529 0,974043 0,955125
Benevento - Università degli studi del Sannio 0,794272 0,793083 0,814051 0,832286
Bergamo - Università degli Studi 0,883157 0,845281 0,894049 0,871059
Bologna - Università degli studi 0,99332 0,987701 0,985782 0,982551
Bolzano - Libera Università 0,803565 0,681247 0,72371 0,906872
Brescia - Università degli studi 0,929411 0,926037 0,919884 0,940435
Cagliari - Università degli studi 0,854377 0,855234 0,855623 0,869301
Camerino - Università degli studi 0,916948 0,884243 0,910973 0,870508
Campobasso - Università degli studi del Molise 0,905934 0,89107 0,852878 0,857979
Cassino - Università degli studi 0,812182 0,930916 0,906008 0,940529
Castellanza - Università "Carlo Cattaneo" 0,995804 0,995217 0,995493 0,994452
Catania - Università degli studi 0,839546 0,873813 0,86728 0,925197
Catanzaro - Università degli studi "Magna Grecia" 0,96295 0,957236 0,960109 0,959852
Chieti - Università degli studi Gabriele D’Annunzio 0,994728 0,994719 0,989278 0,955504
Ferrara - Università degli studi 0,969759 0,982999 0,98037 0,942549
Firenze - Università degli studi 0,968125 0,979207 0,981666 0,985458
Foggia - Università degli studi 0,800402 0,952894 0,832248 0,925142
Genova - Università degli studi 0,869258 0,862985 0,862449 0,869053
Lecce - Università degli studi 0,904694 0,926271 0,909806 0,929978
Macerata - Università degli studi 0,919323 0,905543 0,937621 0,947467
Messina - Università degli studi 0,855651 0,847025 0,871818 0,871321
Milano - Politecnico 0,9979 0,998104 0,998742 0,998173
Milano - Università Cattolica del "Sacro Cuore" 0,970736 0,937685 0,986333 0,988117
Milano - Università commerciale "Luigi Bocconi" 0,99919 0,998343 0,999497 0,999543
Milano - Università degli studi 0,918063 0,921244 0,944854 0,962087
Milano-Bicocca - Università degli studi 0,962861 0,969096 0,976442 0,969202
Modena e Reggio Emilia - Università degli studi 0,956954 0,923925 0,942449 0,949537
Napoli - Istituto Universitario "Suor Orsola Benincasa" 0,882034 0,829213 0,900973 0,93043
Napoli - Seconda Università degli studi 0,938571 0,942506 0,941352 0„940916
Napoli - Università degli studi "Federico II" 0,905185 0,911076 0,930739 0,944308
Padova - Università degli studi 0,996342 0,994814 0,995911 0,994651
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University 2005 2006 2007 2008
Palermo - Università degli studi 0,959997 0,962333 0,958518 0,917041
Parma - Università degli studi 0,977236 0,975379 0,961559 0,957069
Pavia - Università degli studi 0,97892 0,975837 0,973624 0,977038
Perugia - Università degli studi 0,974724 0,972714 0,97224 0,971258
Pisa - Università degli studi 0,965328 0,948446 0,959324 0,961
Potenza - Università degli studi della Basilicata 0,845965 0,773551 0,854377 0,865419
Reggio Calabria - Università degli studi Mediterranea 0,861457 0,864545 0,852882 0,858591
Roma - III Università degli studi 0,946806 0,932316 0,975075 0,942697
Roma - Libera Università Maria SS.Assunta (LUMSA) 0,978217 0,976802 0,982848 0,983897
Roma - Università degli studi "La Sapienza" 0,97089 0,989376 0,967383 0,989983
Roma - Università degli studi di "Tor Vergata" 0,971375 0,957592 0,906597 0,947324
Salerno - Università degli studi 0,88307 0,887915 0,875922 0,87727
Sassari - Università degli studi 0,848636 0,855521 0,825656 0,840012
Siena - Università degli studi 0,986702 0,990723 0,991375 0,994792
Teramo - Università degli studi 0,940804 0,910112 0,968135 0,93359
Torino - Politecnico 0,988137 0,987872 0,985199 0,987084
Torino - Università degli studi 0,996572 0,974365 0,986945 0,989311
Trento - Università degli studi 0,971634 0,95874 0,959123 0,964327
Trieste - Università degli studi 0,992608 0,979146 0,98479 0,985929
Udine - Università degli studi 0,932289 0,958161 0,961042 0,947283
Urbino - Università degli studi "Carlo Bo" 0,992071 0,997232 0,997495 0,981005
Varese - Università dell’ Insubria 0,905665 0,947791 0,942252 0,897249
Venezia - Università IUAV 0,990867 0,992477 0,994628 0,990348
Venezia - Università degli studi "Cà Foscari" 0,938342 0,922843 0,9382 0,92993
Verona - Università degli studi 0,959989 0,959158 0,9449 0,926741
Viterbo - Università della Tuscia 0,964058 0,980087 0,980925 0,98422
Table 6 - Random Parameters SFA Eﬃciency scores and university rankings by year
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University 2005 2006 2007 2008
Ateneo ranking ’05 ranking ’06 ranking ’07 ranking ’08
Milano - Università commerciale "Luigi Bocconi" 1 1 1 1
Milano - Politecnico 2 2 2 2
Torino - Università degli studi 3 19 9 8
Padova - Università degli studi 4 5 4 4
Castellanza - Università "Carlo Cattaneo" 5 4 5 5
Chieti - Università degli studi Gabriele D’Annunzio 6 6 8 26
Bologna - Università degli studi 7 11 11 15
Trieste - Università degli studi 8 15 13 11
Urbino - Università degli studi "Carlo Bo" 9 3 3 16
Venezia - Università IUAV 10 7 6 6
Torino - Politecnico 11 10 12 10
Siena - Università degli studi 12 8 7 3
Pavia - Università degli studi 13 17 21 17
Roma - Libera Università Maria SS.Assunta (LUMSA) 14 16 14 14
Parma - Università degli studi 15 18 25 25
Perugia - Università degli studi 16 20 22 18
Trento - Università degli studi 17 26 29 20
Roma - Università degli studi di "Tor Vergata" 18 29 43 30
Roma - Università degli studi "La Sapienza" 19 9 24 7
Milano - Università Cattolica del "Sacro Cuore" 20 35 10 9
Ferrara - Università degli studi 21 12 17 34
Firenze - Università degli studi 22 14 15 12
Pisa - Università degli studi 23 32 28 22
Viterbo - Università della Tuscia 24 13 16 13
Catanzaro - Università degli studi "Magna Grecia" 25 30 27 24
Milano-Bicocca - Università degli studi 26 23 18 19
Bari - Università degli studi 27 22 20 27
Palermo - Università degli studi 28 24 30 45
Verona - Università degli studi 29 25 31 42
Ancona - Università Politecnica delle Marche 30 21 39 23
Modena e Reggio Emilia - Università degli studi 31 40 33 28
Bari - Politecnico 32 27 46 48
Roma - III Università degli studi 33 36 19 33
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Table 7 - University rankings by year
University 2005 2006 2007 2008
Teramo - Università degli studi 34 44 23 38
Napoli - Seconda Università degli studi 35 34 35 35
Venezia - Università degli studi "Cà Foscari" 36 41 36 41
Udine - Università degli studi 37 28 26 31
Brescia - Università degli studi 38 39 40 37
Macerata - Università degli studi 39 45 37 29
Milano - Università degli studi 40 42 32 21
Camerino - Università degli studi 41 48 41 52
Campobasso - Università degli studi del Molise 42 46 55 57
Varese - Università dell’ Insubria 43 33 34 47
Napoli - Università degli studi "Federico II" 44 43 38 32
Lecce - Università degli studi 45 38 42 40
Bergamo - Università degli Studi 46 55 47 51
Salerno - Università degli studi 47 47 48 49
Napoli - Istituto Universitario "Suor Orsola Benincasa" 48 56 45 39
Genova - Università degli studi 49 51 51 54
Reggio Calabria - Università degli studi Mediterranea 50 50 54 56
Messina - Università degli studi 51 54 49 50
Cagliari - Università degli studi 52 53 52 53
Sassari - Università degli studi 53 52 57 58
Potenza - Università degli studi della Basilicata 54 58 53 55
Catania - Università degli studi 55 49 50 43
Cassino - Università degli studi 56 37 44 36
Bolzano - Libera Università 57 59 59 46
Foggia - Università degli studi 58 31 56 44
Benevento - Università degli studi del Sannio 59 57 58 59
Table 8 shows the results of Spearman ranking correlations in the selected years. It’s statistically significant and
positive for each pair of years and around 90%. So the results are persistent over time.
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Spearman Correlation ranking 05 ranking 06 ranking 07 ranking 08
ranking 05 1.0000 0.90169 (<.0001) 0.91677 (<.0001) 0.86774 (<.0001)
ranking 06 0.90169 (<.0001) 1.0000 0.87756 (<.0001) 0.83881 (<.0001)
ranking 07 0.91677 (<.0001) 0.87756 (<.0001) 1.0000 0.89369 (<.0001)
ranking 08 0.86774 (<.0001) 0.83881 (<.0001) 0.89369 (<.0001) 1.0000
Table 8 - Spearman Correlation between rankings over time
2.6.2 Grade Inflation
In Table 9 eﬃciency rankings by year of the quantity-quality teaching input/output
model are shown. What is clear is that the rankings are consistent from year
to year as in the previous case with considerably high correlation coeﬃcients
between the considered years (Table 10). What is surprising is that the eﬀect
on rankings is huge and most of the universities in the last positions in the pre-
vious specification shift now from the bottom to the top of the ranking. This
eﬀect is measured by the correlation between these new rankings and the same
rankings in the previous model confirming that there is a negative, statistically
significant, correlation between them.
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Ateneo ranking2005 ranking2006 ranking2007 ranking2008
Napoli - Seconda Università degli studi 1 2 1 1
Roma - Università degli studi "La Sapienza" 2 1 3 31
Reggio Calabria - Università degli studi Mediterranea 3 6 7 8
Potenza - Università degli studi della Basilicata 4 4 52 55
Cagliari - Università degli studi 5 5 8 6
Messina - Università degli studi 6 3 4 4
Bergamo - Università degli studi 7 7 25 19
Cassino - Università degli studi 8 20 11 7
Udine - Università degli studi 9 19 16 13
Bari - Politecnico 10 12 6 5
Milano - Università degli studi 11 11 28 29
Campobasso - Università degli studi del Molise 12 10 5 3
Firenze - Università degli studi 13 18 26 25
Foggia - Università degli studi 14 13 9 22
Catania - Università degli studi 15 27 27 24
Pisa - Università degli studi 16 15 24 26
Salerno - Università degli studi 17 29 20 18
Trento - Università degli studi 18 8 17 16
Parma - Università degli studi 19 16 12 9
Pavia - Università degli studi 20 25 29 21
Modena e Reggio Emilia - Università degli studi 21 17 18 12
Torino - Politecnico 22 23 21 20
Benevento - Università degli studi del Sannio 23 45 34 42
Perugia - Università degli studi 24 21 23 17
Bari - Università degli studi 25 26 32 28
Teramo - Università degli studi 26 9 13 10
Lecce - Università degli studi 27 31 22 44
Brescia - Università degli studi 28 22 30 23
Bologna - Università degli studi 29 28 31 27
Ancona - Università Politecnica delle Marche 30 30 14 33
Torino - Università degli studi 31 24 36 30
Catanzaro - Università degli studi "Magna Grecia" 32 36 43 38
Camerino - Università degli studi 33 40 15 15
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University 2005 2006 2007 2008
Varese - Università dell’ Insubria 34 39 40 37
Milano - Università Cattolica del "Sacro Cuore" 35 14 37 32
Roma - Università degli studi di "Tor Vergata" 36 37 19 35
Viterbo - Università della Tuscia 37 34 46 51
Milano-Bicocca - Università degli studi 38 43 42 39
Ferrara - Università degli studi 39 41 41 40
Milano - Politecnico 40 42 44 43
Siena - Università degli studi 41 35 45 48
Padova - Università degli studi 42 38 38 36
Napoli - Università degli studi "Federico II" 43 33 10 11
Roma - III Università degli studi 44 46 50 46
Venezia - Università degli studi "Cà Foscari" 45 44 47 47
Trieste - Università degli studi 46 32 35 41
Castellanza - Università "Carlo Cattaneo" 47 48 48 50
Napoli - Istituto Universitario "Suor Orsola Benincasa" 48 49 49 49
Urbino - Università degli studi "Carlo Bo" 49 47 57 45
Sassari - Università degli studi 50 50 2 2
Bolzano - Libera Università 51 51 53 53
Venezia - Università IUAV 52 53 51 54
Roma - Libera Università Maria SS.Assunta (LUMSA) 53 54 58 57
Palermo - Università degli studi 54 57 39 14
Milano - Università commerciale "Luigi Bocconi" 55 52 55 56
Chieti - Università degli studi Gabriele D’Annunzio 56 55 56 58
Macerata - Università degli studi 57 56 54 52
Genova - Università degli studi 58 58 59 59
Università degli studi di Verona 59 59 33 34
Table 9 - University rankings using quantity-quality measures of teaching inputs and outputs
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Spearman Correlation ranking 05 ranking 06 ranking 07 ranking 08
ranking 05 1.0000 0.92466 (<.0001) 0.71479 (<.0001) 0.64980 (<.0001)
ranking 06 0.92466 (<.0001) 1.0000 0.70900(<.0001) 0.65149 (<.0001)
ranking 07 0.71479 (<.0001) 0.70900(<.0001) 1.0000 0.89936 (<.0001)
ranking 08 0.64980 (<.0001) 0.65149 (<.0001) 0.89936 (<.0001) 1.0000
Table 10 - Spearman Correlation between q-q* rankings over time
The table below (Table 11) reportes the Spearman correlation values, null hy-
potesis of zero correlation is rejected (p-value in brackets) and so there is a
slighty negative correlation of 0.35 between the two rankings referring to the
same academic year. Figures 9 plot the two alternative rankings showing that
for each of the considered years the relationship is slighty, and negative.
Spearman Correlation ranking q-q* ranking q*
ranking q-q* 1.00 -0.35517 (0.0058)
ranking q* -0.35517 (0.0058) 1.00
Table 11 - Spearman Correlation coeﬃcients between q-q* and q* rankings
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Figure 9 a) b) c) d) - quantity-quality i/o teaching ranking vs quantity i/o teaching ranking
It’s self-evident for everyone, both pratictioners and starters, that new rankings
are unrealistic in the Italian case; Universities of Potenza, Messina, Reggio Cal-
abria, Campobasso, Foggia and the others in the top of table 9 are always in
bottom positions in institutional evaluation exercises (Civr and Cnvsu sources).
In order to identify if there is a real misleading eﬀect in this table we have
fitted the same stochastic frontier random parameters model excluding alterna-
tively each input and output out from the production function. Results shown
that the ranking does not suﬀer of relevant changes except for the exlusion of
quantity-quality teaching input (totqual) and output (gradqual). Substituting
these with their absolute values (corrected by size and mean) the new ranking
table obtained is Table 7.
Is there something wrong in quality data or not? Usually if grades are inflated
the grade distribution is shifted towards better grades and becomes compressed
at the upper tail. Looking at the histograms in figure 10 (a-...-d) it is clear
that the distribution of graduates by marks (divided in 4 classes) is diﬀerent by
macro-region. Universities in the north-est and north-west parts of the country
show quasi-normal distributions while in middle and south regions the distrbi-
tion is shifted to the right with more than 45% of graduates obtaining a mark
greater than 106/110. Tha last graph (figure 11) shows that distribution of
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marks is lower for the first-third classes and higher in last two intervals for
middle and south universities with respect to the northen ones (both in east
and west northen parts). Our graphs cannot give more detailed informations
beacause of the few number of mark intervals available. What is clear is that
in these regions students get better grades. Two possible explanations are given
to this phenomenon: concentration of better students is particoularly nested in
central and south regions or achievement requirements for passing exams and
obtain a degree are decreasing in these universities. The general opinion is that
the former hypothesis is unrealistic and so the latter is more realistic. Indeed
it’s well known in Italian Education literature at all educational levels (starting
from Invalsi test in primary school up to Ocse-Pisa results in the high schools)
that our system suﬀer from a severe regional-bias on grades. Average grades are
higher in south and middle regions with respect to the northen ones. Support
to this is given by other sources of institutional information about achievement
evaluation in Italy for lower educational levels. It is a well-known problem for
example in Invalsi standardized tests of shool achievement where the own eval-
uating institution is studying a strategy to overcome this problem and correct
the scores distribution by this problems (Figures 17 in Appendix). In addition
to this while the Ocse-Pisa results of standardized test on Italian high-school
students (in 2006) shows that students from southern regions in Italy are in
the bottom part of the Ocse leauge table (and students from Italian central and
northen regions get higher positions) Italian institutional data about high-school
marks (source Miur) in the same year assess the high percentage of top marks
in these regions.
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There are some possible explanantions to grade inflation in Italian Universities.
My belief is that we have to consider two possible sources of grade-bias in the
University system and one probable future negative eﬀect. The first source is
due to institution (teaching and professor staﬀ) unintentional cheating, which
means that universities in the south or middle regions are not able to determine
in an approriate way achievement and abilities of their students. Grades does
not provide a realistic metric as proxy of student’s ability. The second source
could be a realistic explanation of the first. Due to labor-market system features
in the diﬀerent regions of the country and higher young unemployment rate,
longer university-to-work transitions and lower average incomes are recorded in
south and middle regions; this issue probably makes grade inflation a possible,
in most of the cases also unintentional, answer to students’ working, income and
life expectations.
Finally the probable negative future eﬀect is structure-related at system level.
As a matter of fact with the introduction of indicator-based funding system
(Law n° 1, 2009) it’s probable that grade-inflation could be a severe problem for
Italian Universities. These financing system aimed at increasing the competition
between universities by making a share (7% in 2009, 10% in 2010, up to 30% in
2013) of their pubic funds dependent on their relative performances concerning
diﬀerent output measures, such as the share of students obtaining a degree, their
time to degree and the amount of third party funds. In contrast to traditional
funding systems in which the budget of a given year was basically related on
past budget values, the new funding system takes the actual performance of a
university into account for an increasing share of the total amount of fundings.
It is possible, and in some sense probable, that this system pushes universities
to inflate grades in order to get more funds. Existing evidence shows that
a funding system that concentrates on a few output indicators may lead to
wrong incentives. Using for example the number of graduates as an indicator
to determine the yearly amount of public funds may reduce quality standards
to increase the amount of graduates rather than increasing teaching quality. In
such a case twice is the negative eﬀect, the reform may increase grade-inflation
and on the other side the goal of increasing teaching quality due to the reform
is not reached (Bauer, T.K. and Graves, B.S., 2011).
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2.7 Conclusions
This paper has provided a random parameters approach which might be used
to assess eﬃciency in Italian Higher Education Institutions. Our SFA model is
applied in a multiple-input multiple-output production context. The application
of this model is illustrated using a data set of Italian universities in period 2005-
2008.
Our study should be considered as a novelty in Italian economic literature thanks
to the methodological approach and the data avilability. We propose a translog
distance function approach to measure techincal eﬃciency of Italian universities
under a recent evolution of the stochastic frontier analysis. The recent version
of Random Parameters stochastic frontier models is fitted in order to allow
institutional heterogeneity in eﬃciency estimations over time. Direct measures
of research output both referring to their quality and quantity are provided by
ISI-Thompson datasets and Journal Citations Report.
An examination of the input and output composition of the highest and lowest
sets of HEIs with respect to their eﬃciency suggests that the level of inputs
does not vary so much across institutions quartiles but the most eﬃcienct uni-
versities tend to be diﬀerent in outputs composition. The most eﬃcients tend
to be largest producers (on average) of graduates and of PhD students, but
not absolutely the largest producers by quantity and quality of their reserach
products (3rd quartiles institutions are better).
A strong caveat must accompany our results, even if the model incorporate a
subject-mix control variable in order to disentangle the eﬀect of subject-mix
composition of universities on the reserach ISI output, we are consciouss of the
fact that in our future work, waiting for direct trustworthy indexes of italian
research output (quantity of research products) and related measures of their
quality, we need to consider a more disaggregated level of inputs and outputs
to study ceteris paribus the technical eﬃciency in a departmental or faculty
perspective.
A rising and not yet resolved problem is the accountability of grade-inflation
eﬀect in Italian Universities. Both quality measures of inputs and outputs of
teaching production are grade-inflated towards central and southern universities,
with strong diﬀerences in grade distributions across macro regions. It’s self
evident that institutional scores for high schools and university courses cannot
be considered as ralistic measures of the student performances. Incorporating
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measures of quality particularly in the context of teaching inputs and outputs
has a misleading eﬀect on eﬃciency estimations and eﬃciency rankings. It’s
Therefore a study of substituability between inputs and outputs (using for ex-
ample Morishima elasticities; Jhones, 2010) was outside our goals in this paper,
but could be an interesting perspective of future studyies in order to analyze
the degree of substitution between teaching, research and managerial inputs in
order to obtain greater eﬃciency levels.
Another future extension of this work is the inclusion in the production func-
tion for HEIs in addition to reserach, teaching and managerial dimensions, of
the ’third mission’ of the University System, the so called ’social mission’. This
includes such services provided by Universities as the storage of knowledge, the
provision of advice to business and firms and its own public interests dimen-
sion. This measure of output is really rare in literature due to the availability of
quantitative realistic information over them; results of our work may be biased
as a consequence of the omission of this social dimension (Johnes, 2010). Fur-
ther work in this area should also include comparative studies across countries
(matching our work with the Spanish and UK eﬃciency literature for example)
in order to abtain feasible comparative results across countries.
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Figure 13 - Research Indexes (both input and outputs) by eﬃciency quartiles
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Figure 14 - Inputs and Outputs (size corrected) average measures by Type of University
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Figure 16 - Plot of RPM Rankings by pair of years
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Figure 17- Math test scores distributions in Italian primary school by macro area, s.y. 2005-06, source Invalsi
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3 Selecting University Professors in Italy: much
‘ado’ about nothing?
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to test the eﬀect of decentralizing recruitment
mechanisms on the average quality of researchers in the Italian academia.
Quality is measured via some bibliometric indicators collected from the
web version of ISI Web Of Knowledge over the last two decades (1991-
2010). We test the presence of negative eﬀects on international research
quality of selected researchers in terms of quantity, impact and notori-
ousness of their published research products. A by product of this work
is the analysis of changes in promotion criteria adopted by national and
local selection committees. We found contrasting results: an overall gen-
eral worsening eﬀect of decentralization on the quality of recruited is not
clearly identified. However diﬀerentiating our analysis by disciplinary area
we found negative eﬀects onto “bibliometric disciplines” with stronger ef-
fects in few disciplines (e.g. Physics, Chemistry, Biology) with respect to
the left-overs. A general increase in research outcomes variability of hired
researchers and a polarization eﬀect of the selecting criteria adopted by
the selection committees (where better candidates are more likely to be
selected into higher quality departments with respect to national competi-
tons) are associated with the local reform.
JEL Classification: Keywords: treatment eﬀect, research quality, ISI Web of
Knowledge
3.1 Introduction
The third and fourth chapters of this thesis are strictly related and we suggest to
read them consequently. The underlying idea of both these works is to analyze
if recruitment mechanisms of academic professors matters on scientists research
productivity (Allesina, S., 2011; Checchi, D., 1999). Particularly in what follows
we aim to verify whether the introduction of local selection procedures after
the decentralization reform (Berlinguer’s reform in 1998) in Italy influences the
research quality of selected associates and full professors (Levin, S. 1991 and
Noser et al. 1996). As in the fourth chapter we build up a new dataset of
international research outputs for the Italian professors since 1991 thanks to
the web version of ISI Web of Knowledge and the individual administrative
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dataset of Italian professors of the Italian Ministry of University and Research
(MIUR). The final, consistent, database contains 963.181 international research
publications of Italian academics over the last twenty years. Some bibliometric
measures of research productivity (mainly on quantity, notoriousness and impact
of the published research) are calculated for each professor on the selected time
period.
Even if the issue of familiar networks and it’s relations with labour market out-
comes, wages and school enrolment has been recently studied (e.g. Angelucci
et al, 2010), lower attention has been given to educational recruitment reforms
(Fox, M. F., 1983). According to our knowledge only the paper of Labartino et
al. (2011) explores the eﬀects of this decentralizing reform on recruitment pro-
cedures in terms of increasing nepotism and familism phenomena. The authors
found evidences of higher probability of these misbehaviours in those territorial
areas where a lower level of civic capital is present. According to our knowledge
no other papers - up to now- with similar research questions are present in the
Italian context.
We tested the presence (or not) of a negative eﬀect of local selections on the
quality of Italian professors (both for associates and full professors) at the time
of their selection.
The paper is structured as follows: the next section introduces the issue of mea-
suring the quality of Italian professors using bibliometric indicators and shows
some descriptive statistics of the dataset we used. Then we introduce the two
diﬀerent recruitment procedures (local and national). The subsequent section
reports both the empirical strategy and results we obtain in testing diﬀerences
between pre and after reform selected scientist showing evidences of an increase
of variability in international research productivity of locally recruited. We then
move deeper in the analysis of the selection processes focussing on changes in
the determinants of being selected with the two regimes in the last section.
Conclusions and policy issues complete the paper.
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3.2 Measuring the quality of professors by means of bib-
liometric indexes
University professors perform diﬀerent tasks, among which the main one are
teaching (at both undergraduate and postgraduate), research and administra-
tion. The quality of the performance in each task is diﬃcult to measure because
of unobservability of individual eﬀort and talent, and university administrators
(deans, provosts, rectors) have to rely on observable proxies, which are related
to the outputs of these activities.
Quality of undergraduate teaching is diﬃcult to measure, since the final out-
come (typically in terms of future wage and/or employment prospect) is often
the joint result of the collective eﬀort of faculty members. In principle one
could exploit variations in the exposure to diﬀerent teachers4. However the
students assessment is often plagued by exogenous source of variations (like
gender, age, ethnicity of both the instructor and the students), and should be
accounted properly. As far as postgraduate teaching, the quality of supervisors
indirectly measured by supervisee, even if again confounding factors should be
appropriately accounted for (in particular considering self-sorting of students
into universities, as well as journal networks).
Quality in research can be measured by diﬀerent indicators: publications, cita-
tions, funding, editorial boards, prizes. All these variables are potentially corre-
lated, and are available at diﬀerent degrees in diﬀerent subjects and countries.
In the sequel we use bibliometric measures5 from the web version of ISI (Kla-
van and Boyak, 2007), since it dispenses of subjective judgments of the scholar,
and it benefits from the property of cardinality (and therefore interpersonally
comparable, at least within the discipline).
We are fully aware of the potential limits of a bibliometric approach (Seglen,
1997). In a sum its main drawbacks consist of:
a) it relies on the existence of large database, which are typically available for
large academic communities, open to international competition;
b) as a consequence, it penalises national academic communities, which often
write in their native languages and are not necessarily open to English writing
and publishing;
4Michela Braga, Marco Paccagnella e Michele Pellizzari. 2011. Evaluating students’ evaluations
of professors. Banca d’Italia Tema di discussione n. 825, ottobre 2011
5Silvia Salini. 2012. An introduction to bibliometrics. mimeo
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c) we are also aware that the diﬀusion of the use of bibliometric indicators
in the process of research assessment induces mainstream compliance in the
research community, in the attempt to publish in the top journals of each field
of research6.
Nevertheless we hold the view that the pros exceed the cons in the present case,
and therefore we proceed with the use of bibliometric analysis, in the Italian
academic communities where we deem it applicable.
Let us start presenting our main output variable, which consists of the number
of ISI-Web of science records associated to each professor (assistant, associate
or full) working in the Italian academia over the sample period (1991-2010)7.
In table 1 we report the number of professors by appointment type and their
presence in the ISI-WOS database, while in table 2 we show the yearly produc-
tivity. This gives us a clear picture that the Italian academy has experienced a
rising trend in productivity recorded in WOS over the last 20 years.
This creates two order of problems in our following analysis:
a) our measure of productivity are clearly trended, and this may not be only
the reflection of Italian professors doing more research, but simply the result of
WOS extending its coverage over scientific journal;
b) some research areas do publish on journals that are not surveyed in ISI-WOS
and for this reason they are excluded by construction;
6Alberto Baccini. 2010, Valutare la ricerca scientifica, il Mulino
7A detailed description of the creation of the dataset is in Chapter. 4, par. 4.4
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Year Assistants Associates Full Prof. Tot. % Assist* % Assoc.* % Full Prof.* % Total*
1991 11750 14042 15642 41434 26.67 30.24 32.39 29.50
1992 11804 16746 14964 43514 28.92 35.71 37.50 33.86
1993 11876 17084 15739 44699 32.22 39.08 41.17 37.22
1994 13288 15915 16694 45897 35.41 41.50 44.48 40.15
1995 14011 16313 18417 48741 38.26 43.58 46.43 42.39
1996 13719 16093 19583 49395 40.80 46.07 49.13 44.83
1997 13399 15675 20105 49179 43.45 48.98 52.01 47.54
1998 13098 18108 18748 49954 44.88 52.43 55.18 50.32
1999 12905 18069 19815 50789 46.63 54.32 57.04 52.01
2000 14411 16615 19200 50226 46.66 55.76 58.59 53.09
2001 16901 17879 20255 55035 47.68 56.46 60.04 54.33
2002 18148 18504 21055 57707 48.78 57.74 60.88 55.46
2003 17997 18115 20577 56689 52.98 59.61 62.37 58.08
2004 18062 18094 21341 57497 53.99 60.89 63.60 59.18
2005 19296 18982 22186 60464 53.74 61.02 64.37 59.42
2006 19843 19084 23355 62282 54.31 62.06 65.55 60.26
2007 19640 18776 23793 62209 57.03 63.52 66.66 62.03
2008 18929 18253 25923 63105 57.80 65.20 68.03 63.01
2009 17980 17630 25911 61521 60.72 67.25 69.52 65.17
2010 15949 16967 25590 58506 62.32 69.01 70.84 66.58
2011 15231 16520 26152 57903 62.03 70.15 71.81 66.92
Tot. 49.02 54.83 58.59 53.68
Table 1 - Professors and ISI web of science publications; * percentage of professors with at least 1 ISI product
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Assistants Associates Full Prof. Total
1991-2 0.437 0.607 0.818 0.606
1992-3 0.498 0.649 0.918 0.667
1993-4 0.530 0.636 0.970 0.694
1994-5 0.604 0.697 1.035 0.759
1995-6 0.674 0.758 1.140 0.831
1996-7 0.705 0.800 1.226 0.877
1997-8 0.737 0.892 1.295 0.939
1998-9 0.782 0.931 1.313 0.970
1999-0 0.778 0.940 1.380 1.004
2000-1 0.855 1.048 1.522 1.23
2001-2 0.823 1.072 1.541 1.129
2002-3 0.896 1.138 1.616 1.200
2003-4 0.941 1.197 1.667 1.250
2004-5 0.952 1.265 1.780 1.315
2005-6 1.028 1.346 1.900 1.403
2006-7 1.125 1.443 2.025 1.505
2007-8 1.1278 1.535 2.089 1.555
2008-9 1.393 1.760 2.380 1.786
2009-10 1.333 1.744 2.377 1.737
2010-11 1.274 1.648 2.228 1.632
Average 0.918 1.115 1.620 1.186
Table 2 - Average yearly productivity by level of appointment - ISI web of science publications
For these reasons, we have decided to set a minimum threshold of significance for
disciplinary areas, and therefore we will consider the measure from ISI WOS as
significant for scientific productivity only when the coverage exceeds a minimum
threshold of 50%. Looking at table 3 we see that only eight research areas satisfy
this requirement, and we will focus mainly on them.
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Scientific area % with 1 ISI record
1. Mathematics (Scienze matematiche ed informatiche) 72,06
2. Physics (Scienze fisiche) 85,51
3. Chemistry (Scienze chimiche) 89,93
4. Earth sciences (Scienze della terra) 67,66
5. Biology (Scienze biologiche) 83,4
6. Medicine (Sceinze mediche) 76,36
7. Agriculture and veterinary science (Scienze agrarie e Veterinarie) 64,01
8. Engineering and Architecture (Ingegnieria civile ed Architettura) 30,59
9. Industrial Engineering (Ingegneria industriale e dell’informazione) 76,05
10. Humanities (Scienze antichità, filologico-letterarie e storico-artistiche) 18,23
11. History, Phylosophy and Psycology (Scienze storiche, filosofiche, pegagogiche, psicologiche) 28,1
12. Law (scienze giuridiche) 12,25
13. Economics and Statistics (Scienze economiche e statistiche) 32,69
14. Sociology and Political Sciences (scienze politiche e sociali) 21,9
Missing** 14,39
Total 37,95
Table 3 - ISI WOS publications by reasearch areas (aree CUN)
3.3 National versus local competitions
In this framework we study the impact of the change in recruiting procedures
occurred in 2000 for selecting (tenured) university professors in the Italian uni-
versity onto the quality of selected professors. We study the quality of the
selections under two alternative systems: national competitions, employed until
the year 2000 (it consisted of two waves for associate professorship concluded
in 1992 and 1998 and one wave for full professorship which ended in 1995 with
some ties), and local competitions, held twice a year and granting three (later
two) qualifications (idoneità) for each competition. This change was required by
the explosion of university applications, combined with the reform of teaching
curricula under the Bologna process. The national competitions were intended
to be held biannually, but the actual occurrence was every 5-6 years.
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In a nutshell the history of recruitment mechanism in Italy could be summarized
as follows. Since 1979, standardized competitions were held to hire assistants,
associate and full professors, and until 1998, almost all academic recruitment
was substantially centralized. Despite the legislative prescription of one ‘con-
corso’ every two years, a three to four years interval occurred. National com-
missions of five members were chosen by lot within a pool of elected professors
(from a pool of 158) belonging to the same discipline. Commissioners declared
which of the candidates had the qualifications to be promoted to associate/full
professorship. Eligibility was given to a number of candidates greater then the
available positions (usually 20% higher) for each discipline. Universities with
opening positions drew by multilateral bargaining between them from the list
of eligible applicants to fulfil their vacancies. Starting with 1999, recruitment
procedures became entirely local, and each university could hold its own se-
lection procedure (both for assistants, associates and full professors). Local
commissions were comprised of five members: one belonging to the institution
itself -the ‘internal commissioner’- and the four others elected by the full set of
Italian professors of that discipline. After 2005, a new reform act9 established
that the commission’s members had to be drawn by lot in a pool of professors
of three times the size of the local commission, elected by popular vote amongst
the discipline’s aﬃliates -of triple in size- elected by the whole set of discipline’s
aﬃliates. The commissions initially declared three qualified candidates for each
‘concorso’, but moved to two between 2007 until 2008, and only one thereafter.
In the following years, universities with open vacancies could hire any candi-
date who had obtained a qualification. Professors hired under the new policy
mechanism were engaged beginning in 2000, two years after the enactment of
Berlinguer’s reform10. Consequently, our empirical analysis marks the begin-
ning of decentralization that year 11. Unfortunately we do not have detailed
information on all competitions, either under the national or the local system.
We just observe changes in the level of appointment, that cannot be but the
result of a public competition, since public universities are prevented from hir-
ing or firing at will12. Nevertheless, the most appropriate definition would be
promotions under a national/local competition systems. The number of such
8d.l n° 31/1979 and dpr n° 382/1980
9“Moratti reform”, dl 230/2005
10dpr n° 390/1998 and dpr n° 117/2000
11this paragraph overlaps with Chapter 4, section 4.2.
12An exception is represented by appointment of professors from foreign universities, which
did not require participation to a national or a local competition
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promotions is reported in table 4. The most sizeable groups are represented by
the transitions from assistant to associate professor and from associate to full
professor, and we will mostly focus on them13
Year Assist to Assoc Out to Assoc. Assoc to Full Assist to Full Out to Full All Transitions
1991 80 46 137 11 21 295
1992 2039 749 51 1 15 2855
1993 237 180 58 3 23 501
1994 84 60 1285 62 77 1568
1995 30 569 175 21 539 1334
1996 35 142 49 6 118 350
1997 53 30 26 16 41 166
1998 2291 489 40 3 30 2853
1999 443 142 228 4 19 836
2000 1578 785 2285 70 429 5147
2001 2610 1288 2069 72 921 6960
2002 1914 803 1457 30 327 4531
2003 384 130 366 3 88 971
2004 686 317 493 6 159 1661
2005 2129 946 1555 26 258 4914
2006 1279 515 1023 10 212 3039
2007 378 227 319 4 143 1071
2008 174 161 154 2 83 574
2009 26 105 27 1 96 255
2010 573 159159 255 3 75 1065
2011 916 244 606 11 195 1972
Total 17939 8087 12658 365 3869 42918
Table 4 - Promotions of Italian professors
Despite being selected under diﬀerent selection procedures, either national or
local, any qualified candidate has to be selected by a local school/department in
order to be hired. As a consequence, our analysis provides information on the
quality of the recruitment in the Italian universities over the last two decades.
13There is an additional reason to leave out of our analysis the transitions from outside to
professorship in an Italian university: since these candidates were previously working in a non
Italian university, we do not match them to any previous publication. In addition, we ignore
the size of the pool of potential applicants. Finally, this channel of recruiting received direct
funding from the Ministry of Education of varying size over the years, following a request of
local university and a check of subsistence of requirement of clara fama.
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A final caveat concerns the number of promotions available. A quick inspection
of table 4 reveals that more openings were available in the second sub-period
(local system) when compared to the first one (national system).
However, what matters for a promotion is the relative odd. In figures 1 and 2
we show the ex-ante probability of being promoted, taking the ratio between
the type of transitions (given in table 4) and the number of potential applicants
(given by the stock of starting number of professors, given in table 1).
!
Figure 1 – Promotions over potential applicants, by type of transitions
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Again by visual inspection, one may ascertain that the odds of being promoted
are comparable across the two subperiods.
!
Figure 2 – Promotions over potential applicants, by research area
Summing up, in the sequel we will analyse the research productivity (as mea-
sured by WOS ISI records) of promoted professors in several research area (area
CUN 1-7 and 9 – using most recent bureaucratic language, one could speak of
“bibliometric areas”), comparing those promoted before and after the year 2000.
This comparison provides an evaluation of the two selection procedure, national
versus local.
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3.4 The average quality of the promoted candidates
We start by providing some descriptive evidences of the distribution of the
available measures of research outputs. By looking at figures 3, 4 and 5, we
observe that researchers promoted to professors are more productive in the
second subperiod, when we consider their number of ISI record14. However
if we take their notoriousness (measured by the number of citations received
by their articles) and/or their impact factor (measured by the average impact
factor of the articles published that year) we do not observe significant changes
over the two periods.
That our data on appearing in WOS are clearly trended is shown in table 5. If
we estimate a linear probability model of the type:
yit = α1 + α2trend+ α3reform+ α4trend ∗ reform+ εit (8)
were when yit = 1 professor i has at least one ISI record, we see that the
number of professors satisfying this condition is increasing (the coeﬃcients of
trend is positive), but at a lower rate (the variable reform contains a step-dummy
assuming a unitary value starting with the year 2000).
Model 1 2 3
Variable Assistants Associates Full Prof.
reform -0.06554 -0.04105 -0.03064
[0.00261]*** [0.00284]*** [0.00314]***
trend 0.02461 0.0284 0.02862
[0.00039]*** [0.00042]*** [0.00048]***
reform*trend -0,00911 -0.01328 -0.01416
[0.00045]*** [0.00049]*** [0.00055]***
Obs. 434.694 363.405 328.155
R-squared 0.37 0.35 0.34
14Since the distribution of our measures of scientific productivity are rightly skewed, we
consider their logs in order to show that they tend to a log-normal distribution. By so doing,
we leave out of the graphs the candidates with zero publication records in WOS. Since we
know that presence in WOS is increasing over the years, figures 3 to 5 provide a lower bound
estimate of the distance between the two distributions.
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Table 5 - Probability of having at least one ISI product, conditional on level of appointment - linear probability
model; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% robust standard errors in brackets - area
and region controls included
We clearly need to identify a reference level, in order to detrend our measures. If
we take the pool of applicants as our benchmark, we can compute the following
measure of the quality of the promotions
qijt =
ypromotedijt
1
n
nj￿
k=1
ynon−promotedkjt
(9)
where qijt is the relative quality of candidate i promoted in research area j at
time t, computed as the ratio of individual publications record over the (equiv-
alent) average record of all researchers in the same research area who are not
promoted in the same year15. Thus all assistant professors represent the counter-
factual for promoted associate professors, and similarly do associate professors
for full ones.
! !
Figure 3 - Scientific productivity of promoted associate professors (3.a) /promoted full professors (3.b)
15By so doing we are implicitly assuming that whenever there is an opening for associate
professorship, all assistant professors are potentially applying to the competition (and simi-
larly with associate professors in case of competitions for full professorships). By anecdotal
evidence, this assumption is realistic in the case of national competitions (when selection took
place in a very irregular timing), while it is an approximation for the second subperiod (when
applicants were entitled to apply to a maximum of five competitions per year. However, since
each competition gave origin to three/two promotions, we think that this approximation may
be acceptable.
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! !
Figure 4 - Citations received by promoted associate professors (4.a) and promoted full professors (4.b)
! !
Figure 5 - Average impact factor of promoted associates (fig 5.a) and promoted full professors (fig 5.b)
If we replicate previous strategy we estimate
qijt = α0+α1trend+α2reform+α3trend∗reform+εijt, j = 1, 2, ..., 7, 9 (10)
Results are reported in table 6 for associate professorships and in table 7 for
full professorship. They indicate that there is some evidence of a decline in
the quality of the selection associated to local competitions: when significant
the intercept and the slope of these regression lines are lower in the second
subperiod (this being more evident in the case of full professorships). A certain
degree of heterogeneity is evident between academic disciplines. An overall -
poorly significant- negative eﬀect of reform (and no eﬀect of the slope) onto
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bibliometric disciplines is associated with both associate and full professorship
promotions. Reform eﬀects are detected in Chemistry, Biology and Industrial
Engineering for full professors selection procedures and in Physics, Chemistry
and Biology for associate ones.
Variables/Area all 1-7+9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9
trend 0.018 0.007 -0.082 0.097 0.09 -0.152 0.101 0.067 -0.081 0.025
[0.049] [0.022] [0.062] [0.041]** [0.031]** [0.198] [0.045]** [0.062] [0.081] [0.046]
reform -0.398 -0.205 -0.289 -0.113 -0.354 -0.052 -0.705 -0.197 -0.127 -0.287
[0.332] [0.114]* [0.337] [0.264] [0.199]* [0.624] [0.290]** [0.425] [0.366] [0.221]
reform*trend -0.059 -0.026 0.063 -0.152 -0.092 0.138 -0.102 -0.096 0.051 -0.044
[0.053] [0.024] [0.067] [0.047]*** [0.035]*** [0.207] [0.048]** [0.066] [0.088] [0.049]
Obs. 17.570 9.298 964 561 948 376 1.268 2.204 1.106 1.871
R-squared 0 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.036 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.03
Table 6 - Quality of the selection of associate professors, by research area – productivity measured by number of
ISI products; *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% robust standard errors in brackets -
region controls included
Variables/Area all 1-7+9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 9
trend 0.039 0.085 0.039 -0.022 0.394 -0.132 0.134 0.083 -0.111 0.178
[0.131] [0.052] [0.131] [0.309] [0.110] [0.295] [0.100] [0.114] [0.081] [0.084]**
reform -0.433 -0.603 -0.433 -0.185 -2.649 0.095 -0.677 -0.48 -0.355 -0.982
[0.767] [0.331]* [0.767] [1.930] [0.673]*** [1.573] [0.613] [0.743] [0.532] [0.471]**
reform*trend -0.005 -0.11 -0.005 0.055 -0.399 0.117 -0.201 -0.106 -0.162 -0.187
[0.133] [0.053] [0.133] [0.310] [0.111]*** [0.305] [0.102]* [0.115] [0.097]* [0.086]**
Obs. 565 6.592 565 416 655 235 905 1884 756 1176
R-squared 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.09 0.06 0.05 0.06
Table 7 - Quality of the selection of full professors, by research area – productivity measured by number of ISI
products*significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% robust standard errors in brackets - region
controls included
Even if the first moment may have not changed, it is possible that the second
(or higher moments) have changed. In figures 6 to 8 we plot the coeﬃcients of
variation computed for promoted professors over the three dimensions of scien-
tific productivity we have available (number of ISI product, citations and impact
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factor). In this case we show that there is evidence of increased variability in the
productivity of promoted associate professors, while the opposite trend reveals
for full professorships.
! !
Figure 6 - Variability in selection of promoted associate professors – ISI product (fig. 6.a) and promoted associate
professors (fig. 6.b)
! !
Figure 7 - Variability in selection of promoted associate professors - citations (fig. 7.a) and promoted full
professors (fig. 7.b)
! !
Figure 8 - Variability in selection of promoted associate professors – impact factor (fig. 8.a) and promoted full
professors (fig 8.b)
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3.5 The selection procedure
We now move deeper in the analysis of the selection process. As starting point,
we proceed to counting the fraction of mis-allocated candidates, i.e. in a com-
petition with k openings, we compute the fraction of non-winner with a rank
(in terms of scientific productivity measure by ISI product) higher than k 16.
This measure is now computed at the level of each 372 research subfield, since
it is at that level that ranking of candidates can be appropriately defined. The
problem comes in with the local competitions, where we do not observe the
participants to each local competition. Thus we have to interpret the reform
as a regime change, where the number of vacancies is the sum of the vacancies
available that year17In the following figures 9 and 10 we show the evolution of
this measure of quality: there is a clear increase in this fraction overall and for
each of the selected bibliometric disciplines, which on average increased over the
whole sample from 45% to 54% for associate professorships and from 46% to
52% for full professorships.
!
Figure 9 - Quality of selection by fraction of wrongly ranked associate professors winners, restricted to the
selected disciplinary areas
16We thank Erich Battistin and Enrico Rettore for suggesting us this strategy
17There is another problem in computing such an index, which are ties. Not breaking
the ties lead to indexes exceeding one, because there are long queues of zero productivity
researchers. For this reason, we have chosen a procedure that arbitrarily break the ties.
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!
Figure 10 - Quality of selection by fraction of wrongly ranked full professors winners, restricted to the selected
disciplinary areas
If we change our unit of analysis by collapsing the data by year and research
subfield, we can compare the means before and after the reform (still using a
subfield fixed eﬀect control). In such a case we observe an increase in the index
(more for associate than for full professors– see table 8). Thus the selection of
professors under the local system seems to rely less on scientific productivity as
measured by the number of ISI records. This is consistent with the increased
variability in the quality of appointed professors, signalled by figures 6 to 8.
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1 2 3 4
Associate Prof. Full Prof. Associates 1-7+9 Area Full 1-7+9 Area
reform 0.078 0.071 0.079 0.032
[0.011]*** [0.014]*** [0.015]*** [0.020]
ties 0.241 0.283 0.169 0.222
[0.012]*** [0.011]*** [0.016]*** [0.020]***
Observations 3.492 2.952 1.829 1.534
R-squared 0.40 0.37 0.32 0.30
Table 8 -Quality of the selection of full professors, by research area - productivity measured by number of ISI
products; *** significant at 1%, std, errors clustered by scientific sector in brackets - constant, year and subfield
fixed eﬀects included
The lower quality of promoted professors and the increased share of “wrongly”
selected point in the direction of a change in the selection criteria, as a reflection
of the change in the selecting committees. In order to investigate such a change,
we estimate linear probability models for being promoted using all information
available on the scientific productivity of the candidates (see table 9). As in
the previous case, we take all the professors who are appointed at the inferior
level as potential competitors for promotions. From this table we observe that
scientific productivity (in terms of both quantity – ISI product – and quality
– impact factor) and notoriousness (being cited) aﬀect the probability of being
promoted, more in the case of competition for associate professorships than in
the case of competitions for full ones. The local competition seems to have
shifted attention of the selecting committees from productivity to visibility.
Then a linear probability model and marginal eﬀects of the probit model are
estimated to study the eﬀect of decentralization on the determinants of the
probability of being selected as associate or full professors, conditional on being
at previous stage (we consider standard career paths such as assistant promoted
into associates and associates promoted to full professors as well as unusual car-
rers such as professors directly recruited into associates without being assistants
before or assistants promoted directly to full professors).
Results (table 9) show evidences of positive eﬀects of quantity and impact mea-
sures and negative eﬀects of notoriousness for locally recruited on the probabil-
ity of being promoted both to associates and to full professors with standard
careers. Unclear results are associated with unusual careers.
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from assistant to associate professors
1 2 3 4
n° of ISI records 0.000314 0.00316
[0.00008]*** [0.00009]***
citations 0.00047 0.0002
[0.00003]*** [0.00002]***
impact factor 0.00362 -0.00084
[0.00017]*** [0.00018]***
reform 0.08354 0.0629 0.067 0.08177
[0.00670]*** [0.00635]*** [0.00637]*** [0.00669]***
trend -0.00472 -0.00268 -0.00269 -0.00491
[0.00024]*** [0.00023]*** [0.00023]*** [0.00025]***
reform*trend -0.00214 -0.00336 -0.00383 -0.00194
[0.00081]*** [0.00074]*** [0.00075]*** [0.00081]**
reform*ISI products -0.00019 -0.0002
[0.00001]*** [0.00001]***
reform*citations 0.00004 0.00001
[0.00001]*** [0.00000]***
reform*impact factor 0.00002 0.00011
[0.00002] [0.00002]***
Observations 253.465 253.465 253.465 253.465
R-squared 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.06
Table 9a - Probability of being selected as associates, conditional on being assistant professors, research areas
1-7+9, * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% robust standard errors in brackets - area
and region controls included
from associate to full professorship
5 6 7 8
n° of ISI records 0.0014 0.0014
[0.00005]*** [0.00005]***
citations 0.00045 0.00018
[0.00003]*** [0.00003]***
impact factor 0.00256 -0.00087
[0.00016]*** [0.00018]***
reform 0.06818 0.06545 0.06791 0.06633
[0.00880]*** [0.00861]*** [0.00862]*** [0.00880]***
trend -0.00329 -0.00199 -0.00195 -0.00338
[0.00025]*** [0.00024]*** [0.00024]*** [0.00025]***
reform*trend -0.00325 -0.00494 -0.00534 -0.00304
[0.00105]*** [0.00099]*** [0.00100]*** [0.00105]**
reform*ISI products -0.00009 -0.00009
[0.00001]*** [0.00001]***
reform*citations 0.00003 0.00002
[0.00000]*** [0.00000]***
reform*impact factor 0.00007 0.
[0.00002]*** [0.00003]
Observations 212.828 212.828 212.828 212.828
R-squared 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05
Table 9a - Probability of being selected as full professor, conditional on being associate, research areas 1-7+9, *
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% robust standard errors in brackets - area and region
controls included
Finally we may ask whether the increased variability in the scientific produc-
tivity of promoted professors may be the results of increased polarisation in the
criteria followed by selecting committees (more correctly: by the departments
who hired these professors). We have proxied this eﬀect by computing the aver-
age indicator by year, university and research subfield (372 “settori scientifico-
disciplinari”) and we have interacted it with the individual measure of scientific
productivity. We have also added a triple interaction with the reform in order
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to see whether something change after the reform. Each indicator of scientific
productivity/visibility/impact is then interacted with the mean of the same in-
dicator at university/research subfield18. These indicators behave in a strange
way. Taken at face value (but notice the very small magnitude of the proba-
bility contribution) a candidate with a higher scientific productivity (number
of Isi products) is less likely to be promoted/hired by a department/university
with a higher (average) productivity (again measured by the number of isi prod-
ucts), but this eﬀect is attenuated after the reform (implying that the reform
favoured polarisation of behaviours). The opposite situation would occur when
considering the other two indicators.
1 2 3 4 5 6
# isi product citations avg impact factor
assist to ass. ass. to full assist to ass. ass. to full assist to ass. ass. to full
output 0.00431 0.00188 0.000116 0.00016 0.00146 0.00078
[0.00011]*** [0.00007]*** [0.00003]*** [0.00003]*** [0.00017]*** [0.00017]***
reform 0.047 0.03815 0.05246 0.05255 0.06076 0.06098
[0.0067]*** [0.00882]*** [0.00657]*** [0.00870]*** [0.00656]*** [0.00871]***
reform*time -0.00632 -0.0056 -0.00728 -0.00751 -0.00807 -0.00813
[0.00077]*** [0.00102]*** [0.00074]*** [0.00099]*** [0.00075]*** [0.00099]***
reform*output -0.00023 -0.00013 0 -0.00001 -0.00018 -0.00019
[0.00001]*** [0.00001]*** [0.00001] [0.00000]** [0.00002]*** [0.00003]***
avg out*indiv out -0.00009 -0.00005 0.00008 0.00002 0.00032 0.00011
[0.00001]*** [0.00000]*** [0.00001]*** [0.00000]*** [0.00003]*** [0.00002]***
reform*avg out*indiv out 0.00008 0.00004 0.00002 0.00003 0.00005 0.00006
[0.00001]*** [0.00000]*** [0.00001]*** [0.00000]* [0.00003] [0.00002]***
Observations 253.465 212.828 253.465 212.828 253.465 212.828
Pseudo R-squared 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.104 0.05 0.04
Table 10 - probability of being selected as associate or full professors, conditional on being at previous stage; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% robust std. err. in brackets - region controls included
18This is just a proxy of the quality of departments, since there may be more than one
department in each university gathering professors of the same research subfield. We consider
these people as members of the same “theoretical” department, since they should have been
at least consulted during the hiring process of new professors.
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Figure 11a - Probability of being promoted from assistante to associate professor (marginal contribution in
probability)
Figure 11b - Probability of being promoted from associate to full professorships (marginal contribution in
probability)
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3.6 Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to measure the decentralizing recruitment reform
impact onto the quality of selected/promoted academic professors in Italy. Using
a standard treatment approach we identify some evidence of a shrinking in the
international research quality of researchers hired with local competitions (that
means after 2000) in bibliometric diciplines only. An overall clear negative
eﬀects of the whole system is not significant.
A large degree of heterogeneity is evident between academic disciplines. In a
nutshell results make evidence of an overall negative eﬀect of reform (but no
eﬀect of slope) onto both associate and full professorship promotions in the
bibliometric research fields. So that reform eﬀects are detected in Chemistry,
Biology and Industrial Engineering for full professors selection procedures and
in Physics, Chemistry and Biology for associate ones. Moreover what is clear is
the increase in the variability of the scientific productivity of locally promoted
professors with respect to national ones.
Then going into details of the selection process we found an increase of the
fraction of mis-allocated candidates (defined as the fraction of non-winners with
higher rank with respect to the relative winners) at the level of each 372 research
subfield in decentralized selection mechanisms (after 2000). This fraction of
mis-allocated on average increased over the whole sample from 45% to 54% for
associate professorships and from 46% to 52% for full professorships.
we explore the issue of the promotions criteria adopted by the selecting commit-
tees under the two regimes (national vs local). We found on one hand a higher
importance of quantity and impact bibliometric measures for local selection
committees (with respect to nationals) and on the other hand less importance
of notoriety after decentralization.
Finally studying if the noticed increase in the variability of scientific productivity
could be considered as the result of an increased polarisation in the criteria
followed by selecting committees we found evidences that candidates with higher
scientific productivity are unusually less likely to be promoted by a department
with a higher productivity. But this particular eﬀect is attenuated after the
reform. So that we can argue that it inderctly implies that the reform has
favoured polarisation of behaviours.
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4 Decentralized academic selection mechanisms:
opportunity or parochialism?
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to test the impact of decentralizing academic
selection mechanisms in Italy on scientists’ research productivity following
a policy reform introduced in 1998. Is decentralization an opportunity to
select higher quality researchers or a way to increase parochialism? We
focus primarily on the diﬀerence between individual research productiv-
ity (especially in terms of impact) before and after the reform, focussing
on individual publication trends and diﬀerences in performance outcomes
six-years after being hired. We collect ISI Web of Knowledge records
with associated bibliometric indicators to obtain comparable international
measures of research performance of the academics involved. We apply
matching techniques (Propensity Score matching and the recently pro-
posed Coarsened Exact Matching) to measure the impact of the policy
change on individual research trends and on average research outcomes
levels (measured six-year after selection) in a "quasi-experimental" re-
search framework. Negative eﬀects on research outcomes and trends of
research impact measures are identified for people selected after decen-
tralization controlling for disciplinary area and geographical eﬀects. For
research quantity indexes, the results show only slope diﬀerences.
JEL Classification: I23 C23 C52 Keywords: quasi-experimental design, policy
evaluation, Coarsened Exact Matching, ISI WoK
4.1 Introduction
Has decentralization had a significant impact on the prevailing level of research
productivity level of newly hired academics in Italy? To what extent does the
mechanism of recruitment provide incentives for researchers to reach better pub-
lication scores after selection? The aim of our study is to determine whether
local recruitment has an impact not only on the research quality of selected
researchers but also on their mid-term research outcomes (examples of previ-
ous studies on research productivity among scientists are Fox, 1983 and Levin
et al. 1991). We focus on the impact of the 1998 decentralization reform of
the Italian university system on research outcomes for candidates publishing
in international journals, bearing in mind that all other aspects of the sys-
tem remained unchanged over the last two decades (salary benefits, university
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funding mechanisms etc. . . ). We investigate this issue using datasets on Italian
academics between 1991 and 2011. Data of ISI-Web of Knowledge (WoK) publi-
cations are collected to obtain standard and comparable bibliometric indicators
of Italian professors’ research activities while administrative records regarding
aﬃliation, academic position and disciplinary area of professors are given by the
National Ministry of Education, University and Research. We adopt a ‘quasi-
experimental’ perspective applied to the Italian university system. Is it true
that local recruiting performs poorly, and that Italian academics hired under
the decentralized system are less productive? Although it is potentially easier to
increase the discretional influence of local professors over the recruitment pro-
cess with decentralization, has this opportunity made it simpler to match better
candidates with local departments or has it merely increased the opportunity to
engage in nepotistic behaviours? From a theoretical point of view, it is possible
that decentralization (or parochialism) of recruitment mechanisms can reduce
the incentives for candidates to produce international research outcomes (con-
ference papers, journal articles etc..) and/or to submit papers to higher-quality
scientific journals (which usually implies longer publication times and lower ac-
ceptance rates). More local management could generate the expectation that
less stringent requirements will be applied. This consideration would be most
crucial for applicants for assistant professorships and for assistant professors
applying for full professorships. Our results document that decentralization,
controlling for academic discipline, has a negative eﬀect on ISI research out-
comes (especially on measures of research impact) in mid-term performances of
hired people.
4.2 The Italian Academic System
The Italian academic system is composed of 89 universities (28 private and 61
public) and 6 higher education institutions. The latter usually dispense only
masters and PhD courses, being more research oriented than most universi-
ties. Three out of the 61 public universities are polytechnics. 11 out of the 28
private institutions are distance-learning universities. The university system is
divided into 372 sectors of discipline (settore scientifico-disciplinare), grouped
into fourteen research areas, as designated by the Italian National University
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Council (CUN)19. Sectors of discipline are categorized for homogeneity within
each research area, and the selection of research candidates is conducted by
recruitment commissions within each academic discipline in both national and
local recruitment systems. Considering academic disciplines as our reference
level of analysis ensures validity in accounting for heterogeneity of recruitment
behaviours between disciplines.
The Italian university system is constrained by national regulations. Each pro-
fessor working at an Italian university is categorized by a level of arrangement
(full professor, associate professor and assistant professor) and by one out of 372
sectors of discipline. Each vacancy is coded in a standardized format, and each
filled position becomes tenured after a review conducted three years after hiring.
Each position is also associated to a school (facoltà) for teaching duties and to
a department for research activity. Salaries in public universities are set by law
and vary only by level of arrangement and seniority. Schools and departments
are prevented from diﬀerentiating wages among professors, linking payment to
research productivity and/or teaching loads. As a consequence, in addition to
celebrity and funds attraction, the strongest incentive to scientific productivity
for individuals working in academia derives from expected promotion (being
hired as assistant professor, being promoted associated or full professor).
Given the public nature of the employment contracts, university professors can
only be hired through public competitions that should grant publicity of the
vacancy, selection of the selecting committee based on objective criteria, trans-
parency of the selection process. This may explain why it is crucial for the
research productivity and quality to study the diﬀerent incentives designed by
diﬀerent selection procedures. Reforms in 1998 changed these procedures with
respect to several dimensions:
1) level of selection (national or local, which mostly aﬀects the number of com-
peting applicants, but also the timing of the selection due to the heavier bu-
reaucratic load associated with a nationwide competition);
2) selection of committees (in accordance to the co-optation attitude of academia,
for most of the period under analysis the committees were elected out of pro-
fessors of the same sector of discipline, with element of randomness introduced
at some stage);
19Mathematics and Computer Sciences, Physics, Chemistry, Natural Sciences, Biology,
Medicine, Agriculture and Veterinary, Civil Engineering and Architecture, Industrial Engi-
neering, Literature, History, Psychology, Law, Economics and Statistics, Social Sciences
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3) number of eligible applicants (each ‘concorso’ declares a number of winners
that are eligible to become professors, this number is usually equal to, but
sometimes greater than, the number of available vacancies).
Since 1979, standardized competitions were held to hire assistants, associate
and full professors, and until 1998, almost all academic recruitment was sub-
stantially centralized. Despite the legislative prescription of one ‘concorso’ every
two years, a three to four years interval occurred. National commissions of five
members were chosen by lot within a pool of elected professors (from a pool of
1520) belonging to the same discipline. Commissioners declared which of the
candidates had the qualifications to be promoted to associate/full professor-
ship. Eligibility was given to a number of candidates greater then the available
positions (usually 20% higher) for each discipline. Universities with opening
positions drew by multilateral bargaining between them from the list of eligible
applicants to fulfil their vacancies (Checchi shows some evidences from a single
national selection procedure for associate professorship, 1999).
Starting in1999, recruitment procedures became entirely local, and each univer-
sity could hold its own selection procedure (both for assistants, associates and
full professors). Local commissions were comprised of five members: one be-
longing to the institution itself -the ‘internal commissioner’- and the four others
elected by the full set of Italian professors of that discipline. After 2005, a new
reform act21 established that the commission’s members had to be drawn by lot
in a pool of professors of three times the size of the local commission, elected
by popular vote amongst the discipline’s aﬃliates -of triple in size- elected by
the whole set of discipline’s aﬃliates. The commissions initially declared three
qualified candidates for each ‘concorso’, but moved to two between 2007 until
2008, and only one thereafter. In the following years, universities with open
vacancies could hire any candidate who had obtained a qualification.
Professors hired under the new policy mechanism were engaged beginning in
2000, two years after the enactment of Berlinguer’s reform22. Consequently, our
empirical analysis marks the beginning of decentralization that year.
20d.l n° 31/1979 and dpr n° 382/1980
21“Moratti reform”, dl 230/2005
22dpr n° 390/1998 and dpr n° 117/2000
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Figure 1: Share of Italian Professors by Academic Position and year
4.3 Theoretical incentives
The decentralization of academic recruitment was an exogenous shock to re-
cruitment rules that potentially impacted the subsequent career of selected pro-
fessors. The majority of other factors that aﬀecting research performance over
this time have remained constant, setting the stage for a natural experiment for
considering the eﬀect of decentralization. Notwithstanding the hiring changes,
university’ funding mechanism remained totally disconnected from managerial
behaviours. No salary incentives (or penalties) were provided to incentivize (or
prevent) virtuous behaviours of the commissioners in selecting high (or low)
quality candidates. Student evaluations of teaching performance for new hired
professors usually had no impact on the professional life of professors (although
including aspects of these evaluations become compulsory after 2000). Due to
strict privacy rules, the results of evaluation exercises were in most of the cases
known only by each professor until recently.
No evaluation mechanisms were established to assess recruitment procedures at
department (or university) level by the central administration. Thus, over the
time period we consider, there was no private cost for opportunistic behaviour
for (part of) the selecting committee, as well as no impact on institutional
funding mechanisms, except for lower scientific reputation.
Decentralizing academic recruitment could have mixed eﬀects. On the one hand,
decentralization could improve productivity and eﬃciency for at least three rea-
sons; first, local recruitment usually induces speedier selection procedures (na-
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tional “concorsi” were held every 4-6 years), second, more certainty of fulfilling
available vacancies when needs arise (both for research and teaching necessities),
and third, decentralization could lead to more competition among universities to
attract candidates. An additional may be better matching between academics
and institutions.
In practice, the multilateral bargaining between winners and hosting universi-
ties could last one or two years under national mechanisms; secondly it means
less compromise with “The Academia” when it is dominated by few national
prevailing “Schools”. The Italian academia is certainly not so unfamiliar with
such corporatism (Durante et al. 2009; Labartino et al. 2011; Allesina, 2011;
Angelucci et al. 2010) and the existence of “schools” that could exert a direct
influence on the selected candidates has to be considered as a possible prob-
lem. Last but not least it could enhance more competition among universities
in attracting better candidates. The better candidate could also be the one that
particularly fits with institutional needs (in terms of research competences and
experiences).
On the other side, decentralized selections enable institution to favour individ-
uals based on familiar, professional or political considerations, independent of
their experience or qualifications. Local processes also may lead to less compe-
tition with respect to national procedures.
In addition, it is important to analyse the extent to which influence of the selec-
tion procedures induces behaviours of the potential candidates. Before reforms,
national concorsi were held less frequently and involved a larger number of in-
terested applicants. This meant more competitors. In most circumstances, a
greater number of competitors encourage more eﬀort on the part of the can-
didates, providing incentives for individuals to maximize their probability of
winning through performance. Furthermore, the number of peers under cen-
tral selections was stable in the Italian context, meaning that opportunities for
advancement could be considered equal over time for each concorso.
Decentralizing academic recruitment meant fewer competitors participate in
concorsi both in the present, and future. Geographical constraints are also
important because, with a local system, there is an incentive to participate in
concorsi that are relatively close to the candidate’s home area, rather than com-
pete in all Italian concorsi for that year. If publishing more papers in impact
journals increases an individual’s probability of being selected (as should theo-
retically be the case), decentralizing academic procedures could provide fewer
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incentives for local candidates. Indeed the individual choice of putting less or
more eﬀort is not mainly driven by the own candidate willingness to exert it but
it could probably be given by the selection year: before and after 2000 is the
threshold. Our research question is twofold; i) has decentralization of selection
mechanisms improved (or worsened) mid-term research outcomes of winners?
and, ii) have local recruitment mechanisms incentivized (or discouraged) indi-
vidual research careers?
4.3.1 A simple theoretical model
The starting teorethical model we consider here originates from Lazear23, on
relative compensation. In a framework where promotion (and associated wage
increase) is attributed to the best performer among two identical workers, and
performance depends on both luck and eﬀort, the worker will supply more eﬀort
the higher is the wage premium and the lower is the variance of the random
component.
Basic version (deterministic)
Le t us define w1 as the wage rate before promotion (i.e. associate professor wage
rate – better thinking of the monetary value of the prestige connected to being
an associate professor) and w2 as the wage rate after promotion (full professor
wage rate – the same model can also be thought with respect to the promotion
of assistants to associate professorships). Then p = mn π (e) ,π
￿ > 0,π￿￿ < 0 is
the probability of obtaining the promotion. It is a positive function of eﬀort e,
and it exhibits decreasing marginal productivity. Then let n be the number of
applicants and m the number of posted vacancies.
c = c (e) , c￿ > 0, c￿￿ > 0 is the monetary-equivalent cost of eﬀort which ex-
hibits increasing marginal cost. The monetary-equivalent cost of eﬀort takes
it’s explicit functional forms as follows c(e) = δe
2
2 and also π(e) = e
α,α > 1.
Each applicant maximises the expected gain from participating to the competi-
tion
Maxep(w2 − w1)− c
The th first order conditions are:
m(w2−w1)
n αe
α−1−δe = 0⇔e = (mn α(w2−w1)δ )
1
2−α = f (m+, n−,α+, δ−, w2 − w1+)
23Chapter 3, Personnel economics, MIT 1995
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The eﬀort (that could represented by a proxy given by the scientific produc-
tivity) is increasing in the size of the premium and in the productivity of the
eﬀort α, while it is decreasing in the cost of eﬀort δ. What is less satisfactory
is the way in which competition is modelled, since an increase in participation
n lower the incentives. Since local competitions are characterised by higher mn ,
the model would predict higher eﬀort as consequence of the reform (contrary to
the empirical evidence).
So far all candidates are ex-ante identical. Without cost we can introduce
agent heterogeneity in the cost function assuming that abler candidate have a
lower cost of eﬀort. Indicating with ai the individual ability endowment, we can
rewrite c(e) = δe
2
2 obtaining e = (ai
m
n
α(w2−w1)
δ )
1
2−α = f (m+, n−,α+, δ−, w2 − w1+, ai+)
Better candidates put more eﬀort and are more likely to obtain promotion.
Basic version (stochastic)
Suppose that individual scientific productivity yi depends on eﬀort and luck (be-
ing accepted by top rank journal partially depends on factors beyond individual
control)
yi = ei + εi, where luck is uniformly distributed over the interval [−b,+b]24.
Competition is governed by the following rule: promotion(s) is(are) allocated
to best performer(s). The simplest case (see Lazear 1995 – see also P.Garibaldi,
Personnel Economics in Imperfect Labour Markets, Oxford University Press
2006, chpt.8) is when there are only two participants (i and j) and one position,
which is allocate to the best performer. In such a case each player maximises:
Maxeipw2+(1−p)w1− δe
2
i
2 ￿ p(w2−w1)− δe
2
i
2 = prob(yi > yj)(w2−w1)− δe
2
i
2 =
prob(ei + εi > ej + εj)(w2 − w1)− δe
2
i
2
Assuming that ε is iid, we can rewrite as follows:
prob(ei + εi > ej + εj) = prob(ei + ei > εj + εj) = F (ei − ej) = (ei−ej)−b2b
Then taking FOC:
dF (ei−ej)
dei
(w2 − w!)− δei = f(ei − ej)(w2 − w1)− δei = 0
By symmetry (equivalent to a Nash equilibrium among two players) ei = ej and
therefore
ei =
f(ei−ej)(w2−w1)
δ =
f(0)(w2−w1)
δ =
(w2−w1)
2δb which means that the eﬀort is
increasing in the prize, decreasing in its cost and in the variance of the random
component.
24This implies that ! .
If we consider now the case where we have n participants and one vacancy, in
order to be promoted a candidate should cearly have the highest performance.
This event has the following probability:
prob(yi > y−i) =
￿n
j=1,j ￿=i prob(yi > yj) =
￿n
j=1,j ￿=i prob(ei − ej > εi − εj) =￿n
j=1,j ￿=i F (ej − ei)
Following the previous strategy as before, the FOC
d[
￿n
j=1,j ￿=i F (ej−ei)]
dei
(w2−w1)−δei = (w2−w1)
￿n
j=1 f(ei−ej)[
￿n
k=1,k ￿=i,k ￿=j F (ei−
ek)]− δei = 0
Using the symmetrical Nash equilibrium assumption
(w2 − w1)
￿n
j=1 f(0)[
￿n
k=1,k ￿=i,k ￿=j F (0)] − δei = (w2 − w1)
￿n
j=1 f(0)[
1
2n−1 ] −
δei = (w2 − w1) n2b [ 12n−1 ]− δei = 0
which yields ei = (w2−w1)2δb
n
2n−1
This expression is nonlinear in the number of participants: an increase in par-
ticipation to the competition for lower number may increase eﬀort, but for large
numbers eﬀort is decreasing.
!
Figure 2 - Eﬀort function representation
If we change the number of vacancies (m vacancies for n applicants) and we
assume that a candidate is promoted as long as her performance exceeds the
performance of at least (n−m) competitors, the model is modified as follows
prob(yi > yj),∨j ￿= i, j = 1, ..., (n−m)⇔
￿n−m
j=1,j ￿=i prob(yi > yj) =
￿n−m
j=1,j ￿=i
ei−ej−b
2b
and following identical steps we end up with
ei =
(w2−w1)
2δb
n−m
2n−m−1
All these models point to the idea that eﬀort is driven by relative probability of
winning.
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Figure 3 - Ex-ante probability of being promoted overall and by scientific disciplines for both associates and full
professors
Thus we have computed the number of winners over the potential applicants
in each year and for each level of competition. All of them are consistent with
the idea that there have been a decline in relative probability, pulling down
scientific productivity (thus the relative worsening would be the results of lower
incentives created by the reduction in the number of qualifications (“idoneità”)
and/or in the budget allocated to new hiring. In addition remember that newly
promoted associate professors ceteris paribus reduce the relative probability of
being appointed full professors.
4.4 Data
Data for this paper were collected from two primary sources: MIUR – Italian
“Ministry of Education, University and Research” - and the “bibliographic” Web
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version of WoK database. We do not use alternative databases from Scopus
and Google Scholar. To quantitatively determine an individual’s production of
international scientific research, we select ISI WoK as our primary information
source.
Web of Knowledge, powered by the Institute for Scientific Information and dis-
tributed by Thomson Reuters, has been the standard in the bibliometric field
for the past 30 years and indexes more than 8.700 journals in the fields of
arts, humanities, sciences and social sciences. Scopus, published by Elsevier
(www.info.scopus.com), indexes a greater number of journals (12.850, including
500 open access journals) within the medicine, technical and social sciences.
Scopus is significantly larger in size and covers more of the international lit-
erature, but it excludes the humanities (Figure 4; Klavan and Boyak, 2007).
Google Scholar stands-today-as the main potential competitor of ISI and Sco-
pus (particularly in light of the fact that it is the only one without commercial
interests), but currently has outstanding information reliability problems.
Using bibliometric databases for evaluation purposes is often debated (Falagas et
al., 2008; Bakkalbasi et al., 2006). Despite significant disagreement concerning
specific research questions, most points of view agree that not all sources are
ideal for all circumstances, and the choice of database to use should take into
account the aims of the research (De Battisti, F., Salini, S., 2011 ).
In this context, our choice in using ISI-Web of Knowledge is due representative-
ness requirements, in addition to our need for high accuracy of information. The
availability of standard metrics information (e.g. Journal Citation Reports) was
also a central consideration. ISI, while maintaining a clear excellent coverage in
science, is less aﬀected by lack of information in the fields of arts and humanities
(AHCI) than Scopus. Scopus otherwise would be preferable as a greater num-
ber of indexed journals and for the best coverage in the social sciences (S/SS)
(Norris, M. and Oppenheim, C., 2007).
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Figure 4: Overlapping and unique coverage of ISI and Scopus databases, 2004 (Klavans e Boyak, 2007)
The literature documents the presence of high correlations between and among
bibliometric measures obtained by Scopus and ISI databases (Archambault et
al., 2009). Thus, despite using a single source, we expected robust results of
our analysis using few bibliometric measure. The main drawback we face still
remains the disciplinary coverage specification of international research data
with respect to the whole research domain.
Researchers of some disciplines such as History and Literature usually publish
on national journals only (usually with articles written in Italian). For these
academics, little bibliometric information is available on ISI, SCO or GS. Dis-
tortion of data due to higher ’ISI exposure’ of some disciplines in comparison to
others can only be managed by disaggregating the analysis by discipline, which
is the approach we employ.
Information regarding academic positions, disciplinary areas, and university af-
filiation are available online from 2000 to 2011. We obtained data on academic
careers before 2000 from Cineca, a MIUR agency which collects administrative
data on personnel as well as on competition for professorship in Italy. These
data have several known problems, often relating to the uniqueness of identifying
codes of individuals, and missing data on academic disciplines over the first five
years (1990-1995). After we corrected for these issues to the best of our ability,
we found a 1.5% degree of imbalance with respect to the last available oﬃcial
statistics published by Miur (reported in table 1). These diﬀerences are likely
are due to a few rare categories of professors, such as newly hired associate and
full professors attracted from abroad, fixed-contract new researchers positions
and so on. However, such a small diﬀerence is unlikely to seriously bias our
results, or be the cause of distortionary eﬀects in our estimation procedures.
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Final database Oﬃcial statistics
%￿
Year Full Prof. Assoc. Assist. Tot. Year Full Prof. Assoc. Assist. Tot.
1991 11750 14042 15642 41434 1991 nd nd nd 45248 0,08%
1992 11804 16746 14964 43514 1992 nd nd nd nd .
1993 11876 17084 15739 44699 1993 nd nd nd 47839 0,06%
1994 13288 15915 16694 45897 1994 12856 15046 20230 47824 0,04%
1995 14011 16313 18417 48741 1995 13204 15465 19891 49098 -0,01%
1996 13719 16093 19583 49395 1996 13720 16231 21038 48560 0,0%
1997 13399 15675 20105 49179 1997 13402 15619 20167 49187 0,0%
1998 13098 18108 18748 49954 1998 13103 18108 18745 49956 -0,2%
1999 12905 18069 19815 50789 1999 12899 17863 19949 50711 1,9%
2000 14411 16615 19200 50226 2000 14676 16973 19542 51191 -1,9%
2001 16901 17879 20255 55035 2001 16418 17572 20011 54001 -2,3%
2002 18148 18504 21055 57707 2002 17571 18100 20714 56385 -2,1%
2003 17997 18115 20577 56689 2003 17388 17783 20371 55542 -2,2%
2004 18062 18094 21341 57497 2004 17469 17633 21149 56251 -0,9%
2005 19296 18982 22186 60464 2005 19147 18849 21904 59900 -0,9%
2006 19843 19084 23355 62282 2006 19676 18966 23099 61741 -0,5%
2007 19640 18776 23793 62209 2007 19623 18739 23560 61922 -0,5%
2008 18929 18253 25923 63105 2008 18932 18261 25569 62762 -1,1%
2009 17980 17630 25911 61521 2009 17878 17567 25434 60879 -2,0%
2010 15949 16967 25590 58506 2010 15834 16745 24784 57363 0,0%
Table 1: Oﬃcial 1998-2010 data reported in 11° rapporto CNVSU (tab 5.8 pp.154)
Individual and research output information refers to the period 1990-2011. Ital-
ian academics’ publication records were downloaded using specific institution
and publication year as key query parameters.
Our work provides evidence of some limitations with regard to ISI web interface,
which makes bibliometric analyses more diﬃcult: first, of all the constraint on
the maximum number of articles (500) that can be downloaded for each query.
In addition “homonymity” issues should be considered in assigning each product
to it’s own author. Furthermore a number of duplicate and incomplete records
are detected and definitively deleted from the dataset.
111
After filtering, our data include around 1.000.000 ISI products over the last 20
years. Duplicates and incomplete records were deleted obtaining a consistent
database of 963.181 scientific publications with at least one Italian author.
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Figure 5: Share of ISI products with at least a 1:1 matching on author’s identifying code by publication year
We then employ a three-step matching procedure to assign the corresponding
author identifying codes to each research product (it might be possible that one
paper is co-authored by two or more diﬀerent individuals belonging to the Italian
academy). In the first step, a combination of the institution code, publication
year, last name and name initial letter as the linking-rule and a 60.5% of the
entire number of ISI records is attributed this way to its own author(s) (exclud-
ing individuals with at least one homonymous author in the current year). The
second step, performed on excluded papers, is running a matching algorithm
based on the previous rule, augmented by control individuals with homony-
mous authors in the current year but not in the same institution. An increase
of 30% over the initial record amount is attributed in this way. The third step
consists of matching the left-overs with last name and name initial letter as new
linking-rule, allowing the procedure to check for records stored under diﬀerent
institutional codes (considering the case of moving researchers between diﬀerent
universities). Overall, 91% of matched records could be considered as a good
result of our procedure. Indeed a 9% percent of ISI products is plausibly stored
in the database reporting an Italian aﬃliation but with an author who is not
included in the oﬃcial faculty list provided by MIUR, which may be plausible
due to post-doctoral students, PhD candidates and individual researchers not
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included in MIUR’s research and teaching faculty list. In addition to this, it is
interesting to note that the ISI matching rate of Italian professors is strongly
increasing in the last twenty years. Starting with a 14% rate of academics with
at least on ISI publication record in 1991 we note an increasing growth rate over
the two decades until the 60% of 2011 (Table 2).
Year
At least 1 ISI paper
Tot.
No Yes
1991 86,03 13,97 100
1992 83,14 16,86 100
1993 80,94 19,06 100
1994 78,87 21,13 100
1995 76,35 23,65 100
1996 74,35 25,65 100
1997 72,51 27,49 100
1998 70,12 29,88 100
1999 68,15 31,85 100
2000 65,71 34,29 100
2001 62,24 37,76 100
2002 59,06 40,94 100
2003 57,19 42,81 100
2004 55,14 44,86 100
2005 52,07 47,93 100
2006 49,12 50,88 100
2007 46,84 53,16 100
2008 44,21 55,79 100
2009 42,32 57,68 100
2010 40,52 59,48 100
2011 38,21 61,75 100
Total 62,05 37,9 100
Table 2 - Percentage of professors with at least one paper on ISI by year
The overall percentage of academics with at least one paper on ISI over the
entire period is higher for full professors with respect both to associate and
assistant professors (50%). This is a measure biased by the lengthier time of
exposure for full professors and associates.
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Academic Position
At least one ISI paper (1991-2011)
No Yes Tot.
Assistant Professor 50,98 49,02 100
Associate Professor 45,17 54,83 100
Full Professor 41,41 58,59 100
Total 46,32 53,68 100
Table 3 - Percentage of professors with at least one paper on ISI by Academic Position
Our data show diﬀerent numbers of individuals over time, the panel for each
academic professor is unbalanced due to varying entry points into the adminis-
trative archives of MIUR. Data vary depending on the year of selection, the year
of the first published international paper, the persistence rate of publication on
ISI of the own discipline. Discontinuities are also possible (and several are iden-
tified in our analysis), due to such considerations as working abroad, or that
the individual enters unusually one year and ceases publishing after that point.
These issues could have significant eﬀects on the distribution of bibliometric in-
dicators over time, and the challenges are more pronounced in some disciplines
than in others. We arbitrarily decide a threshold in order to exclude disciplines
with lower level of individuals with at least one product on ISI. Heterogeneity
within academic research areas is highly eﬀective in ISI studies, and the follow-
ing table (Table 4) give us the idea of which of the standard disciplines overcome
the 50% cut-oﬀ level of individuals with at least one record. We consider in this
study especially the scientific area where this percentage is greater than 50%
with respect to the diﬀerent historical and individual nature of each discipline.
Bibliometric indicators could be theoretically considered for all the scientific ar-
eas but a rate grater than 50% guarantee a degree of reliability in our research
exercise. A high sensitivity level among academic fields and aggregation levels
is common in bibliometric studies.
Thus we reduce the area on less heterogeneous disciplines this way and build
the dataset longitudinally, considering year-of-selection as the (moving) starting
point for all individuals considered.
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Disciplinary Area id
At least 1 ISI paper
Tot.
Yes No
Mathematics and Computer Sciences 1 27,94 72,06 100
Physics 2 14,49 85,51 100
Chemistry 3 10,07 89,93 100
Natural Sciences 4 32,34 67,66 100
Biology 5 16,6 83,4 100
Medicine 6 23,64 76,36 100
Agriculture and Veterinary 7 35,99 64,01 100
Civil Engineering and Architecture 8 69,41 30,59 100
Industrial Engineering 9 23,95 76,05 100
Humanities 10 81,77 18,23 100
History, Phylosophy and Psycology 11 71,9 28,1 100
Law 12 87,75 12,25 100
Economics and Statistics 13 67,31 32,69 100
Sociollogy and Political Sciences 14 78,1 21,9 100
Missing** 85,61 14,39 100
Total 62,05 37,95 100
Table 4 - Percentage of professors with at least one paper on ISI by Academic Discipline; ** Missing values on
disciplinary area refer mainly to ’91-‘95
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Figure 6: percentage of professors with at least one paper on ISI by academic discipline
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4.5 Research Questions and Empirical Strategies
The methodological approach we employ to evaluate the impact of diﬀerent
selection mechanisms caters to the specific research question we ask: “Is there
a causal eﬀect of local (vs national) recruitment programs on the subsequent
(during the course of next six years) research productivity levels of selected
academics?”
We focus on evaluating the eﬀects of a shift to decentralized selection mecha-
nisms in terms of subsequent research productivity six years after average level
of the outcome and its time trend. The treatment status can be considered
as the exposure of an individual to local selections instead of national ones.
The problem is that we can observe almost one of these states for each unit
of interest. Indeed individuals who are exposed to local selection programs are
by definition (due to a specific time constraint: they were selected after 2000)
diﬀerent from those who are exposed to national recruitment programs. These
diﬀerences may invalidate the causal comparison of the impact of decentraliza-
tion on future academics research productivity outcomes.
Recent studies in the econometric literature of program evaluation (Imbens,
Wooldridge, 2008) and methodological research on causal inference (Rosenbaum
and Rubin, 1983) from observational studies (where investigators have no con-
trol over the treatment assignment) suggests the use of propensity scores to
accommodate general heterogeneity between two groups of individuals in esti-
mating the treatment eﬀects and to increase precision of the estimates. The
treated (selected with local programs) and control (selected with national pro-
grams) groups may have significant diﬀerences in their observed covariates (sci-
entific discipline and research productivity outcomes) that could lead to biased
estimates of the selected eﬀect.
The approach is to estimate the individual probability of an academic being
selected in the local program, adjusted for productivity outcome levels in the
selection year. Individual research outcomes are essentially measured on three
dimensions in the data used in this paper: quantity of publications (given by the
cumulative number of papers published in ISI journals), impact of the research
(given by the average impact factor of the journals were they published) and
the network rate (measured by the total number of citations). Similar levels of
estimated probability (measured via propensity scores) signifies similar research
productivity propensity for the individual selected with the local program. We
can then interpret individuals with equal propensity score as being randomly
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assigned to national and local programs, in this way reducing the bias due to
unbalanced covariates levels between treated and controls.
The study has the characteristics of an experimental design, but lacks random-
ization over treated and control unit assignment. Such designs are usually clas-
sified in literature as quasi-experimental. As underlined by D’Agostino (1998),
a question in estimating the propensity score could be: ‘Why are we estimating
the probability that each individual of the considered groups is selected with a
local mechanism (treated) since we already know for certain if it is or not?’.
The answer to this question is that using both nonparametric methods like
coarsened exact matching and parametric techniques, such as propensity score
matching to adjust our estimate (with any of the most common techniques),
we can create a ‘quasi-randomized’ experiment considering balanced groups of
units with respect to their research outcome levels and discipline.
Once estimated, the propensity score at the selection year (that could be con-
sidered the starting point) is used to reduce bias in estimating the eﬀect of
local recruitment programs over individuals’ subsequent research productivity
outcomes through widely accepted methodological approaches: regression ad-
justment (or covariance adjustment), stratification (or sub-classification) and
matching. Stratification and regression adjustment techniques are ways to re-
duce bias in calculating the treatment eﬀect during the estimation procedure
(Myers and Louis, 2010), while the matching strategy is used to adjust bias
prior to estimation (D’Agostino, 1998).
Our analysis also implements a more robust alternative; coarsened exact match-
ing (CEM) technique (computed via an ad hoc SAS macro language) to our
observational study.
Coarsened exact matching is a recent matching method introduced by Iacus,
King and Porro (2009) to improve causal inference controlling for the confound-
ing influence of covariates in observational studies. The time-dependent nature
of our study, and the flexibility of CEM in estimating non-parametrically two
balanced distributions of treated (locally selected professors) and controls (Cen-
trally selected) units, allows us to obtain desired counterfactuals for estimating
the decentralization eﬀect.
Balance between the two selected populations is assured by estimating both
standard univariate descriptive statistics (as well as most of the commonly pre-
sented research papers) and appropriate multidimensional measures of treated
and controls distributions.
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Similarity in the results of diﬀerent methodological approaches confirms the
robustness of the negative causal eﬀects of decentralization in selection mech-
anisms for research impact (both final levels and slopes) and international re-
search production (only slopes).
4.5.1 Bibliometric indicators
Three simple bibliometric measures are introduced in this work. Firstly, as
quantity of published research we calculate the individual cumulative frequency
of ISI items extracted from the database at each year. This measure gives
an idea of the quantity of papers on international journals published by the
considered researcher up to each considered year.
Secondly, we calculate the cumulative average impact factor of each academic
professor at each of the considered years. This measure could be considered as
an individual “expected measure of impact”.
The second measure is open to criticism. On one hand, one could argue that it
is not correct to use journal impact factors to evaluate individual productivity
and, on the other hand, that the impact factor could not be considered as a
proper measure of quality.
Indeed, impact factors are by definition the arithmetic average of citations of
the journal papers in a given period. Referring the average impact factor to
each article means that the underlying distribution of citations is assumed to
be uniform. But this is empirically unproven, and in some respects refuted
by observation. The literature documents that the underlying distribution is
strongly asymmetric to the right; few articles receive many citations, and most
receive few (Seglen, 1997; Adler, 2009).
It is certainly the case however that the impact factor of a journal provides
a priori information about the “expected number of citations” of a published
article. In the absence of acceptable citations indexes, we consider the average
impact factor of the journals were a researcher has published as a measure of
the “expected impact” in terms of citations the researcher will obtain.
Secondly, it is also true that papers published in top journals with high reputa-
tion (high impact factor) have already been peer-reviewed by rigorous referees;
this process should guarantee high quality standards of the published research.
There is thus justification for thinking that a strong correlation exists between
journal impact factors and research quality of its published papers.
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A measure of network extent could be extracted using the total number of cita-
tions. The significance of the network rate measure has to be widely discussed
in the literature because of its strong relationship with time. The greater is
the number of years an article has been published, the higher is the number of
citations due to time exposure on ISI. ISI citations are by definition updated
to download time (April, 2012) and they could not be considered comparable
measures across years. Researchers selected with national recruitment processes
were almost by definition older on ISI in comparison to locally selected individ-
uals. Also controlling citations by the number of years since the first paper
on ISI could be misleading because of heterogeneity in ISI behaviours across
individuals in the same discipline.
4.6 Empirical Results
An analysis of the descriptive statistics for assistant professors at year of selec-
tion (time=-5) evidences the wide diﬀerences of bibliometric indicators within
academic disciplines. “Hard sciences” professors in Physics or Chemical Sci-
ences at time of their selection had an average of 24 ISI papers, with 2.5 average
impact factor, 15 average citations per paper, and more than 400 cumulative
citations. On the other end of the spectrum, Arts and Humanities academics
have on average less than 1 paper on ISI, with 0.33 impact factor, 1.7 average
citations per paper, and 7 cumulative citations in their research careers.
We take log-transformations of research outcomes (impact factor and n° of pa-
pers on ISI) to guarantee the normality of both variables distribution. In order
to maintain the maximum number of observations, we input zero values for all
the individuals with missing values over these variables. The procedure means
that when focusing on impact dimension only, we are considering an individual
with at least one paper on ISI published on a journal without impact-factor
(that is the true reason of its missing on the impact variable). Such a case is
coded in the same way as an individual with no paper at all on ISI (missing
by absence). This could be a source of bias in our estimates, but we argue the
issue is irrelevant for associate and full professors (descriptive below) of hard
sciences, although it could be seriously relevant in analyzing assistant professors
selection procedures (that are excluded from our analysis).
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Id Disciplinary Area Freq. N° ISI papers Impact factor Avg. Cit. Tot. Cit.
1 Mathematics and Comp. Sciences 1282 7,75 1,18 7,07 65,46
2 Physics 1887 24,04 2,62 15,30 402,27
3 Chemistry 1139 24,04 2,99 17,96 500,21
4 Natural Sciences 1644 6,14 1,70 13,75 105,36
5 Biology 1268 16,09 3,43 19,40 344,71
6 Medicine 948 19,47 3,73 14,81 361,47
7 Agriculture and Veterinary 376 6,33 1,38 9,98 90,35
8 Civil Eng. and Archit. 1777 2,21 0,68 4,23 24,64
9 Industrial Engineering 563 10,73 1,43 8,68 107,67
10 Literature 1471 0,70 0,33 1,82 8,89
11 History, Phyl. and Psych. 964 1,49 0,72 3,74 23,24
12 Law 2205 0,43 0,39 1,75 7,41
13 Economics and Statistics 558 1,24 0,66 4,08 14,96
14 Social Sciences 1578 0,62 0,50 1,76 7,79
0 Missing** 279 3,31 0,94 5,50 63,05
Table 5 - Descriptive statistics of bibliometrics indicator by disciplinary area; Associate Professors at year of
selection only
Following Kleinman and Horton (2009) and Hedeker and Gibbons (1997), we
start by fitting the standard regression model for each of the selected research
outcomes (average impact factor, total number of ISI research publications,
average number of citations) in the pool of researchers promoted to associate
professorship since 1991 up to 2011:
ln (yit) = β0+β1timeit+β2treati+β3timeittreati+β4areassdit+β5regionit+εit
(11)
where is the intercept that represents the value of the outcome yi (we use loga-
rithmic transformations of bibliometric indicators to guarantee the normality of
the original variable distributions) at the sixth-year, after the pre-reform group
of associate professors (controls) has been selected. β1 is the linear eﬀect of time
(research outcome time trend) for the pre-reform group. β2 is the condition dif-
ference between pre- and post-reform associate professors groups at the final
year. β3 is the conditional diﬀerence between the two groups, in terms of linear
eﬀect of time. β4 and β5 are academic discipline and region-specific control
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variables. Academic disciplines are restricted to hard sciences only, due to the
cut-oﬀ minimum level of belonging professors with at least one ISI publication.
Parameter
Impact Factor N° ISI Products N° Cit.
Est. Std. Err. Pr>|t| Est. Std. Err. Pr>|t| Est. Std.Err. Pr>|t|
Intercept 0,5549 0,012 <.0001 2,612 0,025 <.0001 2,146 0,021 <.0001
time 0,0037 0,002 0,1246 0,150 0,005 <.0001 -0,003 0,004 0,5395
treat 0,0098 0,009 0,2659 0,383 0,017 <.0001 -0,331 0,015 <.0001
time*treat -0,0058 0,003 0,0466 -0,043 0,006 <.0001 -0,031 0,005 <.0001
R-squared 0,43 0,24 0,18
F-Value 1227,2 <.0001 521,35 <.0001 367,03 <.0001
Obs. 44.349 45.611 44.432
Table 6 - Region and scientific area controls included; log-linear regression model
It would appear that local selection of professors induces better performances in
terms of impact (impact factor) and quantity (n° of ISI records) of their research
outcomes, and worse productivity diﬀerences between two groups in terms of
linear eﬀect of time (impact factor only) with respect to the previous national-
selected candidates. The time trend appears to be significant only in the second
regression model. The average number of citations has a significantly negative
treatment and treatment-time interaction estimates associated to post-reform
academics. These are not surprising results, as older journal articles have on
average a higher number of citations due to longer exposure in comparison to
more recent articles.
We use propensity scores since individuals were not randomly assigned to the
selection mechanism. Our approach is to select two groups of academics, who,
at time of promotion, had balanced observed levels of research outcomes and
disciplines. Balancing both treated and control units guarantees less biased
comparisons between final (sixth-year) levels and growth rates for the selected
outcomes, pre- and post-reform. Propensity score matching is a commonly used
technique among economists in observational studies and we start with applying
it as our basic model.
With propensity score methods, it is important to check for the overlapping of
the propensity score distributions between treated and controls. The univariate
reduction imposed by propensity scores avoids the need to check for multidi-
mensional balancing distribution between treated and controls. As discussed in
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the recent literature (Iacus, 2011), reducing the multivariate distribution into an
univariate probability score could be the source of unexpected problems (as the
diﬀerent dimensional spaces of data and propensity score, or the introduction
of new bias on few covariates while attempting to balance others).
Treated Obs. Mean Std.Dev Min Max
0 5.292 0.6507 0.129 0.0003 0.931
1 12.647 0.7419 0.130 0.0001 0.999
Table 7 - Population propensity scores descriptive statistics
Table 7 reports that mean propensity is larger in the post-reform group in com-
parison to the pre-reform group, meaning that the fitted standard logistic model
is a quite good predictor of the treatment status, and generates an eﬀective esti-
mate of individuals propensity score. However, maximum and minimum values
of the propensity are similar for the two groups. To check for the goodness of
fit for the overlap, we propose (Figure 7) histograms of propensity score distri-
butions for each of the two groups.
!
Figure 7: Propensisty Scores histograms by treatment and control groups
To be sure that there is perfect overlapping of the propensity scores distributions
between the two groups (and that we are not extrapolating outside the range of
data when we adjust the model for propensity), we cut the distribution (both
to the left and to the right) and we exclude all the units with propensity lower
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than 0.42 and higher than 0.94, so that a common support is identified. The
number of individuals considered decreases of about 600 units, and the resulting
sample is composed of 5.071 assistant professors selected before the reform,
in comparison to 12.371 individuals selected after reform, with more balanced
propensity distributions.
Treated Obs. Mean Std.Dev Min Max
0 5.071 0.691 0.051 0.42 0.94
1 12.371 0.717 0.073 0.42 0.94
Table 8 - Common support propensity scores descriptive statistics by treatment group
If we fit treatment eﬀect on the restricted balanced distributions, a slight dif-
ference appears in the estimates of treated academics with respect to controls
(increasing on the impact factor and decreasing on the number of ISI records),
with a still significant evidence of impact factor and n° of ISI papers treat-
ment associations on the interaction with time. Goodness of fit is also slightly
improved.
Parameter
Impact Factor N° ISI Products N° Cit.
Est. Std.Err. Pr>|t| Est. Std.Err. Pr>|t| Est. Std.Err. Pr>|t|
Intercept 0,581 0,012 <.0001 2,791 0,024 <.0001 2,180 0,022 <.0001
time 0,008 0,002 0,0006 0,186 0,005 <.0001 0,007 0,004 0,082
treat -0,001 0,009 0,8971 0,268 0,017 <.0001 -0,343 0,015 <.0001
time*treat -0,007 0,003 0,0099 -0,063 0,005 <.0001 -0,033 0,005 <.0001
R-squared 0,45 0,26 0,19
F-Value 1227,2 <.0001 546,55 <.0001 373,49 <.0001
Obs. 43.313 43.313 42.600
Table 9 - Region and scientific area controls included; common support log-linear regression model
We estimate the treatment eﬀect with three techniques using the propensity
score as a means of reducing diﬀerences due to potentially confounding covari-
ates in the selected individuals.
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4.6.1 Propensity Score Regression Adjustment
In clinical research (where observational studies are widely diﬀused) the regres-
sion adjustment technique is one of the most commonly used methods (Shah et
al., 2005; Weitzen et al., 2005, Stuart et al., 2010).
Table 10 shows the results of fitting this first technique on the restricted distri-
butions, including propensity scores as covariates in a-la Heckman way (1979)
to account for individual heterogeneity. Results underline significant negative
associations between local selection mechanisms (treated) and both impact fac-
tor and number of ISI products at the sixth-year after selection. Region and
scientific discipline are included as geographic and ‘homogeneity’ controls. The
time trend is significant with a positive eﬀect for all the models fitted, and inter-
actions with time are both significant and negative for impact and quantity of
papers. A conditional diﬀerence between the two groups of academics in terms
of linear eﬀect of time at the 10% significance level has a negative association,
considering the impact and ISI quantity measures.
Parameter
Impact Factor N° ISI Products N° Cit.
Est. Std.Err. Pr>|t| Est. Std.Err. Pr>|t| Est. Std.Err. Pr>|t|
Intercept 0,420 0,014 <.0001 1,635 0,025 <.0001 2,234 0,025 <.0001
time 0,008 0,012 0,0003 0,187 0,004 <.0001 0,007 0,004 0,0856
treat -0,054 0,009 <.0001 -0,112 0,016 <.0001 -0,034 0,016 <.0001
time*treat -0,006 0,002 0,0176 -0,058 0,005 <.0001 -0,034 0,005 <.0001
ps 0,275 0,012 <.0001 1,989 0,022 <.0001 -0,091 0,022 <.0001
R-squared 0,45 0,37 0,20
F-Value 1.240 <.0001 900 <.0001 361 <.0001
Obs. 42.483 43.313 42.600
Table 10 - Region and scientific area controls included; common support log-linear regression model
We also fit log-linear regressions by academic discipline, stressing as the main
result the presence of substantial heterogeneity between them, with most of the
hard-sciences reflecting the negative eﬀects with few exceptions.
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Log-Linear Regression model
Area Parameter Impact Factor N° ISI Papers
Variables Est. Pr>|t| Est. Pr>|t|
1
treat -0,0077 0,792 0,0335 0,4131
time*treat -0,0071 0,446 -0,0555 <.0001
2
treat -0,0546 0,112 -0,1882 0,004
time*treat -0,0034 0,743 -0,0743 0,0002
3
treat 0,0641 0,0005 -0,1938 <.0001
time*treat 0,0007 0,9074 -0,0687 <.0001
4
treat -0,1940 <.0001 -0,0584 0,5073
time*treat -0,0260 0,074 -0,0283 0,314
5
treat 0,0212 0,3769 -0,2358 <.0001
time*treat -0,0054 0,4659 -0,0669 <.0001
6
treat -0,2123 <.0001 -0,2988 <.0001
time*treat -0,0188 0,0117 -0,0740 <.0001
7
treat -0,0826 0,0118 -0,0443 0,3984
time*treat -0,0118 0,2574 -0,0313 0,0599
9
treat -0,0180 0,3196 0,0837 0,0181
time*treat 0,0020 0,7235 -0,0465 <.0001
Table 11 - Region control included; common support log-linear regression model, hard sciences only
4.6.2 Quantile treatment regression
An alternative method of estimating treatment eﬀects implements the same
strategy, but stratifies by propensity score quartile. Stratification has only re-
cently been applied in the economics literature (Bitler, Gelbach, and Hoynes,
2002; Abadie, Angrist and Imbens, 2002), although in statistics the approach has
been studied since the early seventies. Following this methodology, propensity
scores are split into diﬀerent strata (usually following distributional quantiles)
and the treatment eﬀect is estimated within each stratum. The general eﬀect
on treated units is then calculated as the weighted mean of the stratum-specific
obtained estimates.
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Quartile Parameter Est. Std.Err. tValue Pr>|t| R-squared Pr>F
1st
Intercept 0,474 0,023 20,02 <.0001
0,41 <.0001
time 0,014 0,004 3,66 0,003
treat -0,008 0,003 -2,11 0,034
time*treat -0,006 0,005 -1,06 0,289
2nd
Intercept 0,548 0,035 15,56 <.0001
0,45 <.0001
time 0,006 0,007 0,88 0,381
treat -0,050 0,024 -2,11 0,034
time*treat -0,003 0,007 -0,41 0,681
3rd
Intercept 0,610 0,019 31,89 <.0001
0,49 <.0001
time 0,003 0,003 0,89 0,374
treat -0,027 0,013 -1,94 0,052
time*treat -0,002 0,005 -0,36 0,721
4th
Intercept 1,566 0,129 12,12 <.0001
0,38 <.0001
time -0,023 0,041 -0,57 0,569
treat -0,0823 0,127 -6,47 <.0001
time*treat 0,022 0,041 0,54 0,590
Tab 12 - Region and scientific area controls included; common support; log-linear model of impact factor
The upper and following tables (12 and 13) stress the extent to which the
treatment eﬀect is significant in all four quartiles with a negative estimate for the
impact model, while only the first quartile reported a negative overall estimate
statistically significant for n° of ISI papers.
Quartile Parameter Est. Std.Err. tValue Pr>|t| R-squared Pr>F
1st
Intercept 2,319 0,042 55,78 <.0001
0,28 <.0001
time 0,226 0,006 34,94 <.0001
treat -0,175 0,031 -5,64 <.0001
time*treat -0,005 0,010 -0,53 0,5946
2nd
Intercept 3,017 0,062 48,30 <.0001
0,22 <.0001
time 0,190 0,012 15,67 <.0001
treat -0,043 0,042 1,01 0,3122
time*treat -0,021 0,014 -1,53 0,1256
3rd
Intercept 3,150 0,036 86,63 <.0001
0,24 <.0001
time 0,120 0,007 17,18 <.0001
treat -0,009 0,026 -0,36 0,7219
time*treat -0,006 0,008 -0,67 0,5017
4th
Intercept 3,680 0,215 17,14 <.0001
0,20 <.0001
time -0,084 0,069 1,21 0,228
treat -0,334 0,212 -1,58 0,114
time*treat 0,014 0,069 -0,21 0,834
Tab 13 - Region and scientific area controls included; common support; log-linear model of number of paper ISI
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The results also show that the time trend is statistically significant with a posi-
tive eﬀect in the first quartile of the impact distribution, while treatment eﬀect
is significant to the overall distribution with negative coeﬃcients that means
lower average values at the sixth-year after selection.
In terms of ISI products the picture changes, a positive time trend with dif-
ferent eﬀects persists along all quartiles, and a negative treatment eﬀect is not
statistically significant except for the first bottom 25% of associate professors.
No slope is significantly diﬀerent between post- and pre-reform researchers. It
appears to be the case that local selection procedures are associated with lower
levels of ISI products rates for the bottom 25% of academics.
It would also seem that local recruitment procedures induce negative incentives
on lower quality researchers’ production and on sixth-year quantity/quality lev-
els of all the academic population. Good and top researchers are invariant in
their incentives in producing a number of high quality papers on international
journals.
Finally, we note that these results could be influenced by the choice of the num-
ber of propensity score strata made we use. This choice usually influences the
bias of the resulting estimates. Generally the eﬀect is twofold, as the width of
the strata produces eﬀects on both variance and bias of the estimates. Wide
strata are associated with lower levels of variance but higher bias, while nar-
row strata produce high variance but lower bias on the estimates. Otherwise,
Cochran’s (1968) empirical results provide evidence of that 90% of the initial
bias is eliminated by quantile stratification.
4.6.3 Propensity Score Matching
We then match between treated and controls units three times according to
the propensity score distance choice: of 0.001, 0.005 and 0.0001. We write an
SAS macro to combine individuals with propensities in a pre-determined inter-
val limit. When one individual is assigned as control of one treated, both are
automatically excluded from the possible-matching individuals by the macro.
This is a selection without replacement technique, based on propensity diﬀer-
ences. The aim is to obtain two subsamples of treated and control units with
the same probability of being treated, according to individual bibliometric levels
and academic discipline at the individual’s career starting point (fixed as the
year of selection for all individuals).
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Three pairs of groups are selected in this manner. Results from the diﬀerent
sensitivity levels are reported in the table 14 to assure that matching invariance
is present in our results, and to indirectly check for estimate robustness. We
know from literature and recent studies that good matching can be highly eﬀec-
tive in removing imbalance in covariates between treatment and control groups,
allowing researchers to reduce the bias due to individual diﬀerences and estimate
unbiased (or less biased) treatment eﬀects over the identified matching units.
Parameter treat
log impact factor log n° ISI products
Matching Matching
0.001 0.005 0.0001 0.001 0.005 0.0001
time 0,0058*** 0,0028** 0,0031** 0,168*** 0,1697*** 0,1585***
[0,0013] [0,0013] [0,0014] [0,0021] [0,002] [0,0023]
treat 0 0,6426*** 0,6791*** 0,7107*** 3,484*** 3,4621*** 3,496***
[0,0746] [0,0758] [0,0821] [0,0461] [0,0461] [0,0522]
treat 1 0,6589*** 0,6928*** 0,7265*** 3,537*** 3,5744*** 3,5716***
[0,0745] [0,0018] [0,0822] [0,0444] [0,044] [0,0505]
time(treat) 0 0,0064*** 0,0090*** 0,0086*** 0,0051 * 0,0056** 0,0061**
[0,0019] [0,0018] [0,0021] [0,0029] [0,0029] [0,0032]
time(treat) 1 . . . . . .
treat a vs. b intercept 0,0163 0,0137 0,0157 0,0529 * 0,1123*** 0,0755**
[0,0167] [0,0158] [0,0184] [0,0316] [0,030] [0,0345]
treat a vs b slope -0,0064*** -0,0090*** -0,0086*** -0,0051* -0,0056** -0,0061**
[0,0019] [0,0018] [0,0021] [0,0029] [0,0029] [0,0032]
Pr > ChiQuadr <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Obs. 27.708 53.361 22.190 29.817 31.403 24.144
Tab 14 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, standard errors in brackets, region and
scientific discipline controls included
Results show a negative and significant eﬀect in treatment slopes both for impact
of research and quantity. An average positive treatment eﬀect is evident for the
quantity of paper published by associate professors at six-year after selection.
Absolute values of treatment and slope estimates do not change, allowing for
more precise levels of matching between treatment and control units. This
means that our matching methods have acceptable performance, with less vari-
ance in the selected units. Figures below (8 and 9) provide evidence of slope
patterns for impact and quantity of research in each of the matching interval.
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!
Figure 8: Growth patterns of Associates research impact at diﬀerent matching thresholds
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!
Figure 9: Growth patterns of Associates research productivity at diﬀerent matching thresholds
4.6.4 Coarsened Exact Matching
The main goal of CEM (Iacus S. et al., 2007 and 2009) is to balance the empiri-
cal distributions between treated and control groups, obtaining exactly balanced
data. Balanced groups avoids having the researcher control for the heterogene-
ity while specifying the model, meaning that simple diﬀerences in means are
good estimates of the causal eﬀect. But usually finding a matching solution in
empirical propensity applications does not guarantee good balance to all the se-
lected covariates. Improving balance on most of them could leave the remainders
imbalanced, often introducing more bias with respect to the initial distribution.
In addition to this, propensity score matching (and Mahalanobis distance meth-
ods) has the drawback of violating the congruence principle, which requires con-
gruencies between data and analysis spaces metrics (the own metric of the two
spaces is diﬀerent). Parametric methods usually force covariates of the origi-
nal data from a multi-dimensional original space in a new space defined by the
propensity itself. Mielke and Berry (2007) show how violating this principle
produces less robust inferences.
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In comparison, coarsened exact matching meets the principle of not reducing
the original data space, operating in the multidimensional variable space itself.
The novelty in CEM in comparison to other matching methods is the approach’s
reverse structure: setting the balance between treated and controls first and then
get the matched units as result (sample size is not a priori known). Common
previous techniques proceed as reverse guaranteeing final matched sample size
ex ante, and usually then reducing imbalances between treated and controls.
The structure of this recent method consists of sets of strata for each variable,
sorting them into groups and then applying exact matching techniques to each
stratum of treated and controls finding pairs of matched units. Strata without at
least one treated and one control units are pruned from the sample. Matching
could be one-to-one, simply randomly selecting the same number of treated
and controls in each stratum. Otherwise, in both cases of no possible matches
and multiple matches of treated and controls between the same strata, CEM
assigns a weight to each unit. The weights are 0 to unmatched, 1 to treated and
the relative weight of the treated and controls of each stratum with respect to
the corresponding weight in the entire population to the matched units. The
remaining diﬀerences in balance (due to the coarsening choice at strata level)
are then spanned by introducing statistical models (weighted regressions, within
strata models. . . ) without serious risks of great model dependence.
The advantage of CEM is that it allows for removing, with a single step pro-
cedure, all covariate imbalances between controls and treated matching units
by coarsened strata. The only possible distributional diﬀerence after CEM is
caused by the a-priori chosen level of coarsening. Indeed, CEM is a data-analyst
dependent procedure that follows the own researcher choices on variables coars-
ening. CEM is hence a useful nonparametric tool in estimating the counterfac-
tual potential outcome of each unit for making causal inference in observational
studies.
Applying CEM to our study means firstly to set variable-by-variable the non-
overlapping intervals to coarsen original data about winners of selection pro-
cedures (before and after the reform) at the year of their selection. This is
to match one-to-one each stratum treated and controls units after removing
all the individuals (treated and controls) owning to zero controls strata. We
write a SAS macro procedure that select only full and associate at the year of
their selection, creating strata for each combination of the coarsened covariates.
Available covariates regarding bibliometric indicators and disciplinary area are
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coarsened according to reasonable assumptions. A 0.3 impact factor intervals, a
one-to-one n° of ISI publications and a 10 pages interval of cumulative number
of pages written by the authors are settled as coarsening rules. Missing data are
treated as ‘missing as zeros’ due to the particular nature of our data. Missing
values of bibliometric indicators (impact factor, n° of paper ISI, citations, sum
of pages etc. . . ) reflect the absence of the author in the data and absence on
ISI is equal to 0 international papers published, with 0 pages written, 0 cita-
tions received and 0 average impact factor. A real drawback of missing replaced
with zeros could be represented by the equal ‘treatment’ of an author with few
ISI publications with zero impact factor and 0 citations and an author without
ISI records. However, having zero ISI publications or few records with no im-
pact factor and no citations at the associate professorship level in our restricted
word (hard sciences only) could be considered, without a significant loss of in-
formation, to be quite the same. So replacing missing values of bibliometric
indicators with zeros seems to be useful to our purposes. The desirable output
of this procedure is a sample of balanced treated and controls. For this case,
we found 3.181 treated professors with one-to-one coarsened exactly matched
controls over 5.292 potentially possible 1:1 couples.
Groups Frequencies Sample Frequencies
Treated total 12.646 3.181
zero controls strata 6.096
Untreated total 5.292 3.181
zero controls strata 1.727
matched units 6.362
Table 15 - Frequencies of Treated and Untreated units by CEM groups
The selected sample population is now composed of comparable sub-groups of
individuals (selected before and after the reform) with similar levels of biblio-
metric indicators (according to the coarsened intervals settled as before) and
operating their research eﬀort in the same disciplinary areas. We estimate the
average reform eﬀect on both the sixth-year research productivity and diﬀerence
in slopes between before and after reform associate professors.
The following table (Tab.16) shows statistics for three of the four selected vari-
ables, impact factor, number of paper ISI and cumulative sum of written pages.
Frequencies and descriptive statistics reported underline the diﬀerences between
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the two sub-populations (most of the diﬀerence is plausibly due to the diﬀerent
time horizon at which the two populations refer to).
treat=0
Variable N Min Mean Max StdDev
Impact factor 5.292 0 1,28 25,285 1,954
N° of paper Isi 5.292 0 5,00 133 10,156
Sum of written pages 5.292 0 35,72 923 67,93
treat=1
Variable N Min Mean Max StdDev
Impact factor 12.647 0 1,65 53,48 2,245
N° of paper Isi 12.647 0 9,55 231 16,334
Sum of written pages 12.647 0 253,1 923 5581
Table 16 - Descriptive statistics by treated and controls
Table 17 provides evidence (univariate absolute diﬀerence in means) of balance
between CEM selected treatment and control groups in the overall sample. Mean
and standard deviations of the two, equal-size, samples of units are relatively
close from one to the next. Before and after reform associate professors have an
average number of 1.2 papers published on ISI journals with an average impact
factor of 0.45 and a n° of pages close to 10.
treat=0
Variable N Min Mean Max StdDev
Impact factor 3.181 0 0,459 10,61 0,998
N° of paper Isi 3.181 0 1,201 41 3,247
Sum of written pages 3.181 0 9,492 249 24,793
treat=1
Variable N Min Mean Max StdDev
Impact factor 3.181 0 0,457 10,55 0,995
N° of paper Isi 3.181 0 1,222 49 3,365
Sum of written pages 3.181 0 9,801 255 27,496
Table 17 - Descriptive statistics of matched units by treated and controls
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By construction, covariate descriptive statistics over the entire sample are almost
equal to descriptive statistics of units in each of the selected disciplinary areas.
However, despite being commonly use in observational studies (especially in
propensity score studies), univariate distributions of means do not guarantee
the absence of bias in estimating the treatment eﬀect. Recent studies (Iacus
et al, 2011) looking at the multidimensional histograms of the two samples (for
treated and controls) introduce methods to check for multivariate balancing of
their empirical distributions. They propose as measure of imbalance the L125
that is the semi-sum of the absolute diﬀerences between relative frequencies of
treated and controls for each identified strata.
L1(f, g) =
1
2
￿
l1...lk￿H(X)
|fl1...lk − gl1..lk | (12)
L1 for the entire population is close to 1 (highly unbalanced distribution of
treated and controls). This means that a substantial number of cells in the mul-
tidimensional matrix have zero controls (or treated). Comparing the L1 of the
matched population with the previous one provides evidence of the unbalanced
reduction due to CEM. L1 is equal to 0.19 after CEM, this means high rate of
balancing between the populations of treated and controls (Table 18).
L1 - matched L1 - population
0.19 0.92
Table 18 - L1 matched and original population multivariate balance measures
We then plot parallel coordinates plot as a visualization method for detecting
patterns of matched and unmatched units in a multivariate setting. Looking at
graphs 10 and 1126 it appears that the full professor matching individuals are
relatively well distributed between the considered dimensions; they belong to
all the academic disciplines, produce a number of papers, with average citations
and impact factor on ISI in the first bottom half of the distribution. On the
25as defined by Iacus et al. (2011) if H(X1) is defined as the set of distinct values generated
by binning on variable X1 then the consequent multidimensional histogram is constructed
from the set of cells generated by the Cartesian product H(X1) × ... × H(Xk). Let f and g
be defined also as the relative empirical frequency distributions for the treated and control
groups then L1(f, g) is defined by the proposed equation. The L1 takes values between 0
and 1: if the treated and controls distributions are completely separated then L1 = 1, if they
perfectly overlap then L1 = 0. In middle cases L1￿(0, 1).
26Thanks to the open source GGobi software
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other side of the story matched assistant professors are distributed as well in
the first bottom half of the distribution between these dimensions.
!
Figure 10: Full Professors parallel coordinates plot across included covariates
!
Figure 11: Associates parallel coordinates plot across included covariates
We then fit the a growth longitudinal model (Hedeker and Gibbons 1997; Over-
all et al. 1999; Howell et al., 2008)) through the individual careers of treated
and controls, that allow us to identify a negative eﬀect of decentralization on
research slopes (impact and quantity) of selected individuals, for both associate
and full professors. Our motivation for using also a growth model (also called
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unbalanced repeated measures model) is firstly because it is specifically designed
for exploring longitudinal structure of the data. Moreover, in commonly speci-
fied generalized linear models, estimations are carried out forcing the pattern of
covariances (or correlations) to be constant across time. This means that we re-
quire that all subjects in each group to change in the same way over time. This
is an unrealistic assumption especially thinking of the heterogeneity of research
patterns across individuals. “The second reason to propose also a growht model
is that it allows for diﬀerent lengths of measurements for diﬀerent subjects. The
model estimates the subject’s trend across time on the basis of whatever data
that subject has, augmented by the time trend that is estimated for the sample”
(Hedecker and Gibbons, 1997). Thus inference is based on all available measures
included in the data. Time can also be continuous, rather than a fixed set of
points and is modeled as random. First, let us consider a model of the changes
in logarithmic transformation of research output yi across time as a function of
treatment group, time and the interaction of treatment and time:
ln (yit) = β0 + β1timeit+ β2treati+ β3timeittreati+ v0i+ v1itimeit+ εit (13)
where ln (yit) is the log-transformation of research output (impact factor, n° of
paper on ISI etc). β0 is the mean of the dependent variable of all the selected
individuals at time zero (sixth year). The term timeit is a time variable with
values from -5 (at time of selection) to 0 (at the sixth year after selection) for
each i-th individual.
So, in terms of its representation, this model could be divided into a within-
subject model:
ln (yit) = b0i + b1itimeit + εit (14)
and the between-subjects model:
b0i = β0 + β2treati + v0i (15)
b1i = β1 + β3treati + v1i (16)
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With this econometric characterization of treatment and time eﬀects, we can
interpret the parameters as follows: β0 is the average of ln (yi) at time 0 (sixth
year after selection) for the untreated group (nationally selected individuals,
where treat=0), β1 is the average trend across time for the untreated group
(treat=0); β2 is the average diﬀerence in ln (yi) at the sixth-year after selection
between centrally and nationally selected professors; β3 represents the average
diﬀerence in trend lines between treated and untreated. Furthermore this re-
gression model allows each individual to deviate from the owning group trend
line in terms of final intercept (v0i) and time-trend across time (v1i).
Then the first step is to estimate the Unconditional Means Model (UMM) and
the Unconditional Growth Model (UGM) to quantify respectively the output
variability between individuals (without taking into account the eﬀect of time)
with the former (UMM) and also within the individuals over time with the latter
(UGM). These simple models allow to establish if a systematic output variation
is present in our data and if it is between and/or within subjects.
The UMM is specified as follows:
ln (yit) = π0i + εit (17)
π0i = γ00 + ξ0i (18)
where εit ∼ N(0,σ2ε) and ξi ∼ N(0,σ20), π0i is the mean output (impact factor in
this case) of subject i (specific mean), γ00 is the mean output of all the subjects
involved, so it is the mean of the individuals’ output means (grand mean). Table
19 shows results for UMM model of Associates Professors. Random eﬀects
estimates of covariance parameters are significantly diﬀerent from zero and the
output mean varies both within and between subjects. The intraclass correlation
coeﬃcient, ρ , give us the individuals variance component.
ρ =
σˆ20
σˆ20 + σˆ
2
￿
=
0.96
0.96 + 0.40
= 0.68 (19)
The 68% of the total output variation is due to diﬀerences between individuals
consequently the 32% is due to the eﬀect of time and individual characteristics.
The intraclass correlation coeﬃcient is also a measure of the residual autocor-
relation of the model, so that in our case the individual average autocorrelation
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of each couple of residuals is 0.68 (really far from the absence of autocorrelation
in OLS).
Covariance Parameters Estimates - UMM
Cov. Parm Subject Estimate Std. Error Z Value Pr. Z
AR(1) - ˆσ20 Id 0.961 0.0014 679.6 <.0001
Residual - σˆ2ε 0.408 0.0133 30.6 <.0001
Fixed Eﬀects Solution
Eﬀect Estimate Std. Error DF t Value Pr > |t|
Intercept - ˆγ00 0.550 0.0151 1621 36.3 <.0001
Table 19 - Uncondidtional Means Model estimates for log of impact factor; selected associates professors
When estimating the UGM model (including time as unique regressor) the
Pseudo − R2 = σ2￿ (UMM)−σ2￿ (UGM)σ2￿ (UGM) , that give us a measure of the variance
proportion explained by the inclusion of the time regressor, is 0.96. It means
that the 96% of the within subject variability is due to the eﬀect of time. Con-
sistent estimates of the UMM and UGM models derive using the other output
measures and for full professors.
Looking now at the results of the completed Growth Model significant negative
eﬀects regarding local selections on both final outcomes level (β2) and slope
diﬀerences (β3) are estimated for impact factor outcomes in both career steps.
Local selection negative eﬀects are statistically significant only for slope diﬀer-
ences with the quantity measure of international research. Associates Professor
estimations of treatment eﬀects are shown in table 20. Robustness checks are
shown for two diﬀerent cases: a “pure incentives” model (Pre ’94 after ’00) where
all the selected individuals were sure of the selection rules (non changes were
predictable during the previous years) and a “restricted” model (restricted to
the five years before and the five years after the reform) were the hypothesis of
more similar quality distributions of treated and controls researchers is largely
acceptable.
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Growth model Pre ’94 After ’00 growth model ’96-’05 Growth model
Parameter treat impact factor n° ISI impact factor n° ISI impact factor n° ISI
Intercept 0,302*** 2,197*** 0,552*** 1,98*** 0,267*** 2,27***
[0,035] [0,066] [0,044] [0,072] [0,046] [0,082]
time -0,026** 0,126*** -0,011 0,21*** -0,011 0,16***
[0,010] [0,020] [0,016] [0,026] [0,012] [0,025]
treat 0 0,077*** -0,051 0,137*** -0,201*** 0,042*** -0,159
[0,017] [0,034] [0,027] [0,043] [0,020] [0,043]
treat 1 . . . . . .
time(treat) 0 0,081** 0,019*** 0,008 0,035 0,046*** 0,115***
[0,011] [0,020] [0,027] [0,043] [0,014] [0,028]
time(treat) 1 . . . . . .
treat a vs b intercept -0,077*** 0,051 -0,137*** 0,201*** -0,042*** 0,159***
[0,017] [0,034] [0,027] [0,043] [0,020] [0,043]
treat a vs b slope -0,081** -0,019*** -0,008 -0,035 -0,046*** -0,115***
[0,011] [0,020] [0,027] [0,043] [0,014] [0,028]
Pr > ChiQuadr <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Obs. 6.362 6.362 5.111 5.111 5.151 5.609
Table 20 - *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, standard errors in brackets, Associate
Professors model with region and scientific discipline controls included
! !
Figure 12: CEM - Associates’ impact and quantity growth lines by treatment and control groups
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Table 21 provides evidence of a treatment eﬀect on the careers of full professors
(sixth year after selection). Both final research impact and impact slopes are
statistically significant and negative.
Growth model
Parameter treat log impact factor log n° ISI products
time 0,014*** 0,159***
[0,044] [0,0066]
treat 0 0,129*** 0,014
[0,0465] [0,087]
treat 1 . .
time(treat) 0 0,014** 0,051***
[0,0063] [0,0094]
time(treat) 1 . .
treat a vs b intercept -0,129*** -0,014
[0,0465] [0,087]
treat a vs b slope -0,014** -0,051***
[0,0063] [0,0094]
Pr > ChiQuadr <.0001 <.0001
Obs. 3.090 2.763
Table 21 - * *significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, standard errors in brackets, Full
Professors model with region and scientific discipline controls included
Newly hired full professors have fewer incentives to produce high quality papers
in the subsequent years. The “number of papers” outcome highlights a negative
diﬀerence in slopes (better for untreated) and no diﬀerence in the final quantity
level.
! !
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Figure 13: CEM - Full Professors’ impact and quantity growth lines by treatment and control groups
Finally, one could also argue that estimating the average eﬀect of decentralized
selection mechanism (our treatment status) over a subset of exactly matched
associate professors (that theoretically is equivalent to restricting to the com-
mon support in propensity score matching) does not consider all the available
information.
Considering the fact that we think that if no matching is available is better
to prune these units instead of artificially include them with one of the pos-
sible statistical tricks. Our objection is the following: extrapolating a model
fitted only on matched units to predict counterfactuals for the unmatched is
still twisting because pruned units are predicted with a model estimated on the
common support only (we could not be sure of betas’ validity above the overall
population). However we show, using a standard extrapolation technique, that
our results are still robust, even allowing for the inclusion of unmatched units.
We extrapolate the model estimated on matched units, and fit these over un-
matched units, obtaining counterfactuals. The average treatment eﬀect is the
weighted average of matched and unmatched estimations.
The model results by each of the selected disciplines shows the negative eﬀects
of local recruitment process over Math and Computer Science, Earth Sciences,
Medicine and Agricultural and Veterinary in terms of final impact factor level
(sixth year after selection) of associate professors. The slope is negative and
significant only in the Match and Computer Science area. Both estimates of
the standard regression model and growth model are basically consistent (Table
22).
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Academic Discipline Regression Model Growth Model
Est. Std.Err. Obs. Est. Std.Err. Obs.
Mathematics and Computer Sciences treat -0,13*** 0,042 537 -0,15*** 0,034 537
time*treat -0,013 0,014 -0,014*** 0,015
Physics treat 0,22 0,133 151 0,31 0,17 151
time*treat -0,057 0,042 -0,036 0,12
Chemistry treat 0,03 0,035 348 0,021 0,049 348
time*treat -0,0039 0,011 -0,024 0,042
Natural Sciences treat -0,22** 0,099 270 -0,17*** 0,11 270
time*treat -0,049 0,035 -0,038 0,09
Biology treat 0,04 0,014 620 0,085 0,071 620
time*treat -0,015 0,061 -0,024 0,068
Medicine treat -0,11*** 0,044 1703 -0,12**** 0,045 1703
time*treat -0,015 0,015 0,025 0,043
Agriculture and Veterinary treat -0,19** 0,013 1371 -0,20** 0,051 1371
time*treat -0,037*** 0,051 0,0143 0,029
Industrial and Information Engineering treat -0,028 0,029 2728 -0,011 0,028 2728
time*treat 0,003 0,011 0,007
Table 22 - * * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, standard errors in brackets, Log of
impact factor Associate Professors model by discipline with region controls included.
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Figure 14: CEM - Research impact growth lines for Associates’ by academic discipline, region controls included
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4.7 Conclusions
Heterogeneity is endemic in the Italian University system and it is not a surprise
to obtain diﬀerent results across academic disciplines; the story is diﬀerent for
each discipline and it is certainly not possible to generalize the results to the
entire Italian Academia. To account for these considerations, as well as data
availability issues for international oriented research outcomes, we focus on the
hard sciences. We find shrinking individual research productivity (both in terms
of slopes and six-year levels) due to local selection mechanisms (with respect
to national ones). Lower incentives for publishing on international top-level
journals are associated with the decentralization reform.
In sum, the main results are the following:
• Propensity score matching regressions provide evidence of negative eﬀects
on slopes only for impact factors while, controlling the balance of local and
nationally selected individuals with the non-parametric coarsened exact
matching technique, the model stresses how both intercept and slopes are
negative and statistically significant for impact of research outcomes on
associate and full professors.
• Quartile propensity score matching models show that, in terms of research
impact, the negative eﬀect is persistent along the impact-distribution of
researchers, while the productivity index (n° of paper on ISI) is significant
only for the bottom of the distribution (first quartile) with associated
negative eﬀects (this means that top researchers were not influenced by
the selection mechanism in their research pipelines);
• For the hard sciences, after-CEM we found negative eﬀects of decentral-
ization on both final outputs levels and slopes for impact factors of both
associates and full professors. The results were statistically significant and
negative only for slopes the N° of paper on ISI (both for associates and
full professors);
• Diﬀerentiating by research areas, the negative incentives of local selections
six years after selection research levels are statistically significant in the:
Math(-), Earth sciences (-), Medicine (-), Veterinary and Agricultural sci-
ences (-); Diﬀerentiating by research areas, the negative incentives of local
selections on slopes are significant only in Math(-) and Agricultural and
Veterinary areas (-);
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• Results on slopes are robust for diﬀerent econometric strategies of balanc-
ing between treated and controls [propensity score matching, coarsened
exact matching] while results on intercepts (final levels) are statistically
significant only with CEM;
• Eﬀects are robust on pre-1994 vs. after-2000 professors (used as controls of
the incentive schema due to the possibility of mixed incentives for people
selected as associates after 1994 but before 2000 with national procedures,
and applying as full professors with the local mechanism).
Otherwise there are several shortcomings that we know aﬀect our estimates:
• Our analysis is focused on the eﬀect of positive/negative incentives of
the recruitment reform in Italy (1998) on research outputs, calculated
using data of publications on international journals only (due to data
availability). Italian language papers and conference proceedings or books
are excluded by the information source;
• No data are available on teaching evaluation of Italian academics, so that
the eﬀort of the applicant on teaching dimension could not be considered
by our models, while this consideration is well-known for its role in aca-
demic recruitment as it is one of the primary departments needs (Noser
et al. 1996).
• Credible results are available for “Hard sciences” only, due to the higher ex-
position of these disciplines onto the international research area (collected
by ISI). Arts and Humanities and Social Sciences could not be tested due
to the inconsistence of available data;
• We have no data on the relative importance of teaching and research as
the two main dimensions of academic recruitment (this is one research
objective we expect to investigate in the future). The eﬀort of candidates
is usually divided on both these activities in the years before each concorso,
and it is likely the case that most universities in the last decade judged
candidates with respect of both their level of research outcomes (quantity
and impact) and teaching.
• The shrinking incentives in the research dimension due to decentralization
are certain, yet we know very little about teaching incentives.
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Trying to summarize few policy indications from our work we argue that key
problems arise from the scarcity of competition between universities in Italy.
An insuﬃcient mobility rate of professors within the country (typical of local
mechanisms), the predominance of institutional needs (both in research and
teaching), and the preeminence of a small number of academic “schools” with
respect to others, all have had a negative impact on research growth paths of
local recruited researchers.
In the Italian hiring system no penalties were associated with collusive behav-
iors, and the lack of competitiveness between institutions is endemic in the Ital-
ian university system. This is probably due to the “false-autonomy” of univer-
sities where salary levels and teaching loads are centrally regulated (by MIUR).
No incentives could be driven by the single universities.
In some countries (UK, USA, Australia et cetera), higher quality professors,
both in terms of research publication records and teaching abilities, are sought
after by universities in a competitive market where salary benefits and teaching
load are key levers in the hands of the institutions. In Italy, there are few incen-
tives that encourage candidates to reach high publishing goals, and decentralized
recruitment mechanisms reduce these incentives further.
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